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ABSTRACT
This thesis consists of three essays on behaviour under risk. First, I inves-
tigate experimentally three related questions: (1) the effects of small-scale
changes in wealth on risk attitudes; (2) whether potential changes in risk
attitudes induced by such wealth increment are affected by (a) by the span
of time this small-scale change in wealth has been anticipated for, and (b)
the form taken by the wealth increment. There are three major results.
One, whether risk attitudes are affected by a srnall-scale change in wealth
depends on the form taken by the wealth increment. Two, that failure in
replicating "house" money effect suggests that people may treat windfall
money differently from earned money. Three, that the attitudes to risk
are stable over the span of time we investigate. Second, I investigate how
cognitive ability relates to consistency of behaviour under risk. Individual
behaviour can be consistent in several forms. I find that individuals with
higher cognitive ability display more consistent behaviour - in terms of
choice and displayed type of risk preferences. Yet, in contrast to some re-
cent studies, I find that individual measures of attitudes toward risk are not
associated with cognitive ability. Third, I investigate the efficacy of a pun-
ii
ishment mechanism in promoting cooperative behaviour in a public goods
game when enforcement of punishment is uncertain. Numerous experimen-
tal studies have found that a sanctioning system can promote cooperative
behaviour. But they rely on perfect enforcement of punishment. I find
that a sanctioning system can no longer promote cooperative behaviour
in a public goods game when punishment enforcement is a low-probability
event.
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Chapter 1
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis consists of three essays presenting results of experiments
studying behaviour under risk. These essays are almost entirely self-contained
and each addresses different issues. Yet, behaviour under risk is a unify-
ing theme of this thesis so that this introduction provides an overview of
the economic literature on this topic. It is by no means exhaustive, but
tries to organise this enormous literature with the aim of pinpointing where
and how each essay contributes to the body of research on decision-making
under risk.
The significance of this topic is hardly disputable. Risk is so prevalent
in a vast number of aspects of economic and social activity that it seems
only natural that a great deal of theoretical and applied work carried out
by economists has been devoted to it. While decision-making under risk
is a research area of interest in its own right, the widespread use of game
theoretic analysis and the search for microfoundations for macroeconornic
models has made models of decision-making under risk a key building block
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of models across several fields of economics.
In the light of the huge literature on the topic and its importance, it
is perhaps surprising that economists are still "hunting" for a good theory
of choice under risk (Starmer, 2000) - a combination, ideally, of predic-
tive power, simplicity and tractability. Such search has been motivated in
large part by results from waves of experimental studies testing the ax-
ioms which the standard analysis of decision behaviour under risk, based
on von Neumann and Morgenstern Expected Utility Theory (EUT), re-
lies on. The assessment of EUT based on the accumulated evidence has
been mixed. \Vhile most of the first wave of experimental studies testing
EUT suggested that people's choices contravene even key axioms of the
theory (for a review, sec Camerer, 1995), tests of other competing thea-
ries have not decisively established their empirical superiority over EUTl.
This seems to account, to some extent, for why EUT still remains a central
framework to much applied theory. Nevertheless, the violations that have
come to light spawned refinements of the standard model and the develop-
ment of alternative theories of decision under risk, such as prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), rank-dependent
utility (Quiggin, 1982; Chew, 1983) and regret theory (Bell, 1982; Loomes
& Sugden, 1982), to name but a few. The bulk of these new theoretical
developments could well be subsumed into categories according to how the
basic elements of a risky choice, its outcomes and associated probabilities,
1For empirical tests and a somewhat mixed assessment of competing decision theories
see for example Harless & Camerer (1994) and Hey & Orme (1994).
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are each dealt with''. There is a large number of functional specifications for
each of these elements and how a rationaf individual combines them prior
to reaching a choice. Some theories may even have a stochastic version, in
which some form of randomness is introduced in the process of choice; the
modelling of the source of randomness itself has given rise to a variety of
models. In fact, Loomes & Sugden (1995) show how a given base model
such as EUT can have very different implications depending on how the
stochastic component is introduced. All these new developments make this
literature vast",
Empirical work of experimental nature on individual choices under risk
is equally vast. This is hardly surprising given, on the one hand, the rich
interplay between theory and data and, on the other hand, an ongoing
interest in unfolding the determinants and correlates of people's attitudes
towards risk. It seems natural, therefore, to divide this empirical literature,
or most of it, into two broad categories: theory testing and fact finding stud-
ies. The first would consist of laboratory and field experiments primarily
aiming to test fundamental assumptions of EUT and alternative theories;
this would include, for instance, tests for transitivity of preferences (e.g.
Loomes et al. , 1991; Birnbaum & Schmidt, 2008), and the independence
axiom (e.g. Starmer & Sugden, 1989b; Loomes, 1991). The second category
would consist of studies seeking to examine how a wide variety of aspects
20ne could also classify these alternative theories according to properties of EUT
they relax.
3The issue of rationality is rather fuzzy in normative and descriptive models. See
Gilboa (2009) for a discussion.
4Camerer (1995) and Starmer (2000) offer surveys.
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affect individuals' risky choices; this would include, for instance, investiga-
tions upon effects of features of a decision setting on risk-taking behaviour
(Goeree et al. , 2003; Chetan et al. , 2007; Bothner & Stuart., 2007) as well
as studies investigating risk-taking involving single and compound gambles
(Benartzi & Thaler, 1999; Klos et al. , 2005).
We are ready to acknowledge that this classification is not problem free.
Because experimental work often features a theoretical framework to make
sense of observed data, this dual distinction could have trouble to provide
an unambiguous classification, having to rely on subjective interpretations
of the work. Yet, we use the term fact finding in a very broad sense; it refers
to empirical work that purely generates data, hut also to empirical work
that is informed by theory but not primarily designed to test fundamental
axioms and general behavioural implications of theories of decision under
risk. Thus the empirical work of Starmer (1999), for example, would be seen
as theory testing, for it investigates particular forms of non-transitivity in
risky choices implied by prospect theory; while the work of Harrison et al.
(2007) would be seen as fact finding, for while it tests an EUT account
of effects of background risk on attitudes towards risk, it is primarily an
investigation of how risk preferences are affected by the nature (monetary
and nonmonetary) of the prizes involved. But whatever terminology one
uses, it is undeniable that the empirical strand of the economic literature
on behaviour under risk has gone beyond theory testing ci la Allais (1953)
or Kahneman & Tversky (1979).
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Indeed, this empirical literature has been exploring various aspects that
influence behaviour under risk. They center, in our view, on three main
genres. First, characteristics of the risk (lottery) such as size and nature
of prizes, knowledge and distribution of probabilities, presence or absence
of losses, and so forth. Experimental investigations on effects of stake size
(e.g. Holt & Laury, 2002), real and hypothetical prizes (Harrison et al.
, 2005a), and studies on ambiguity (e.g., Halevy, 2007) are exarnples of
this. Second, characteristics of the decision setup such as frames of choice
(most on common-consequence effects e.g. Humphrey, 2000), elicitation
methodology (Andersen et al. , 2006b), learning opportunities (Loomes
et al. , 2003) and so OIl. Third, characteristics of the decision-maker;
papers investigating the effects on risk attitudes of gender (e.g., Agnew
et al. , 2008; Borghans et al. , 2009), income (e.g., Gertner, 1993b; Bosch-
Domenech & Silvestre, 2003) and cognitive skills (e.g., Cesarini et al. , 2009)
are examples of this. We then argue that the contributions of each essay
in this thesis fit into these two latter lines of research in the literature.
Chapter 2: On characteristics oj the decision setup and decision-maker
The first essay, presented in the next chapter, is a "hybrid" case for it
examines the role of frames and characteristics of the individuals 011 their
risky choices. This essay has two primary purposes.
First, it attempts to test experimentally the effects of small-scale changes
in wealth on risk attitudes. Assumptions about the effects of changes to
14
wealth on individuals' attitudes to risk plays a key role in empirical and the-
oretical results in a broad range of topics in economics. While it is appealing
to assume that wealthier individuals are willing to take more risks, the em-
pirical evidence as to how changes in wealth affect risk-taking behaviour
is mixed at best", Furthermore, most of this evidence is based on non-
experimental data involving a cross-section of individuals. While econo-
metric techniques could deal with the potential problem of endogeneity
involving observed risky behaviour and wealth levels, these cross-sectional
studies can arguably not provide an accurate account of wealth effects if
preferences are heterogeneous. We design an experiment to examine this
issue using an environment where both risks taken and changes of wealth
are controlled.
Second, it further investigates whether and how potential changes in
risk attitudes induced by a small-scale wealth increment are affected by
the form taken by such increment. We examine two forms or frames that
we term "inside" and "outside". The "inside" framing effect refers to changes
in risk preferences when a small-scale change of wealth is given "inside" a
lottery. That is, a subject's risk preference is elicited through certainty-
equivalent of two lotteries, say Land L'. But L is just a shifted version of
L', whereby a common amount of jj.w is added to its prizes. The "outside"
framing effect, in turn, refers to changes in risk preferences when jj.w is
simply given to the subject outside the lottery. In this case, the "outside
51 will review this evidence more fully in Chapter 2.
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money" framing effect is captured by differences in risk preferences elicited
before and after ~t1J is administered. Several studies investigate the effects
on one's degree of risk aversion when the size of stakes is increased (e.g.
Binswanger, 1980; Holt & Laury, 2002; Harrison et al. , 2005a), but little
has been said about whether and how the form taken by an increase in
the payoff levels affects individuals' degree of risk aversion. Furthermore,
according to rational choice rnodels, these framing effects, whatever they
are, should not be different. But while there is evidence that people's
choices are affected by changes of frame (see, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman,
1986), little has been said about whether the effects of a monetary gain on
attitudes to risk are equivalent across the frames considered here. Part of
the design of our experiment examines these issues.
Chapter 3: On characteristics of the decision-maker
The third chapter examines how cognitive ability is associated with
some aspects of decision-making under risk - it would thus fall into the
part of the literature examining effects of characteristics of the decision-
maker on risky choices.
There is a recent literature on the relationship between cognitive abil-
ity and economic preferences". Most of these studies examine time and
risk preferences through laboratory experiments, comparing observed pref-
erences across groups with different levels of cognitive ability. For the most
part 7, these laboratory experiments use a multiple-price-list method, sirn-
6\Ve review this literature in Chapter 3.
7An exception is Frederick (2005). 'Ve come back to this later.
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ilar to Holt & Laury (2002), to elicit subjects' attitudes towards risk. By
this elicitation method, a subject faces a task consisting of a set of pairwise
choices displayed in a table, with each involving a choice between a lottery
and a risk-free sum of money. Each of such task provides a measure of
risk preferences. In general, existing experimental studies have presented
subjects with few risk-elicitation tasks, collecting only a few decisions from
each subject.
Although this practice is understandable given other features in the
design of these experiments, it may not necessarily reveal an accurate rep-
resentation of individuals' attitudes to risk: responses to a single task with
this format may include a significant "noise" component that one cannot
even out' when there is lack of repetition. Therefore, while the existing
experimental studies suggest that people with higher cognitive ability are
less risk averse relative to those with lower cognitive ability, they tell us
little about whether this association holds when individuals are given some
learning opportunity (by experience) so that their risk preferences become
better reflected in their choice decisions. In Chapter 3, we address this
issue by examining the connections of cognitive ability with risky choice
behaviour in a repeated setting. \Ve take advantage of the repeated nature
of risky choices to, in addition, examine how several forms of consistency
in individual choices relate to cognitive ability.
Chapter 4: On characteristics of the decision setup
Finally, the essay on chapter 4 examines how contribution and punish-
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ment behaviour in a public goods game is affected by the introduction of a
new element of uncertainty into the environment - measurable uncertainty
over punishment enforcement. This places this essay in the part of the
literature examining how characteristics of the decision setup affect risky
choices. This relies on the view that a public good game with punishment
opportunities can have several sources of risk, which is hardly controversial.
Several experiments have brought evidence that the level of contribu-
tions in public good games in one-shot and repeated public good games is
far from theoretical predictions". Yet, it has also been shown that these
contributions display a steady decay pattern when the game is repeatedly
played (Mark Isaac et al. , 1985) 9. Since then nurnerous experirnental stud-
ics have found that a sanctioning system can induce individuals to adopt
and sustain cooperative behaviour'". But the commonly used experimental
design relies on two assumptions: perfect monitoring and perfect enforce-
ment - features that most sanctioning systems outside the laboratory do
not have. This abstracts away from important sources of risk in this de-
cision setting. In chapter 4, we address this issue by relaxing one of this
assumptions: we introduce a sanctioning system that is no longer "perfect"
regarding the enforcement of punishment. By doing so, we introduce an
additional source of risk into the decision setting, with the aim of testing
8For a review of the ''first wave" of such experiments see (Ledyard, 1995).
gOne interpretation is that contributions are partly due to some sort of misunder-
standings that eventually vanishes when the game is repeated (see Andreoni, 1995a),
although more recent evidence suggests that this might be due to "imperfect" condi-
tional cooperation in the sense people do not match others' contributions Fischbacher
& Gachter (2009).
lOWereview this literature in chapter 4.
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whether such imperfect {monetary} sanctioning system can still promote
cooperative behaviour as documented by Yamagushi (1986), Ostrom et al.
{1992} and Fehr & Gachter (2000).
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2, 3 and 4 present
the above mentioned essays. Chapter 5 concludes; in it, we summarise the
the major findings, discuss some limitations and propose further extensions
to our research.
19
Chapter 2
Chapter 2
S~1ALL-SCALE CHANGES IN WEALTH AND
ATTITUDES TOWARD RISK
2.1 Introduction
The primary purpose of this chapter is to describe an experimental
attempt to test the effects of small-scale changes in wealth on risk attitudes.
We also explore how the framing of the wealth change and the span of time
this wealth change has been anticipated for influences attitudes to risk.
Understanding the attitude to risk of economic agents is a goal that
has long been pursued by many economists. Much of the theoretical and
empirical effort to analyze risk-taking behaviour has been influenced by
the Arrow-Pratt measures of risk aversion for von-Neumann-Morgenstern
utility functions. For an expected utility maximizer with a utility func-
tion u(.) defined over wealth w, Arrow and Pratt interpret the functions
RA{W) = -u"(w)/u'(w) and RR(W) = wRA{w) as local measures of ab-
solute and relative risk aversion, respectively. An individual is then char-
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acterised as a decreasing, constant, or increasing absolute (relative) risk
averter depending upon whether R~(w)(R~(w)) is less than, equal to, or
greater than zero. Each possibility describes how changes in wealth affect
one's willingness to take a given risk.
Assumptions made about the sign of such wealth effects on risk aver-
sion underpin empirical and theoretical results in a broad range of topics in
economics. Ogaki & Zhang (2001), for instance, point out how strikingly
different empirical tests of the risk sharing hypothesis involving household
consumption models can be when estimation methods are based on pref-
erences that allow relative risk aversion to vary with the level of wealth.
Models dealing with phenomena as diverse as life-cycle savings (Weil, 1993),
portfolio choice (Hadar & Sea, 1990), and asset pricing (Gallier, 2001),
make predictions that are very sensitive to the way risk attitudes are af-
fected by changes in wealth. How risk aversion varies with wealth has also
implications for Samuelson's fallacy of large numbers (Samuelson, 1967)
and Rabin's calibration theorem (Rabin, 2000), paradoxes that have been
the object of considerable attention". Samuelson's paradox refers to a pat-
tern of choice that rejects positive mean gambles, such as an even chance
to win $200 or lose $100, but accepts one hundred of such gambles in a row.
Samuelson regarded that choice behaviour as inconsistent with Expected
1Regarding Samuelson's paradox: see, on the empirical front, Redelmeier & Tversky
{1992}; Haubrich {199B}; Benartzi & Thaler (1999); Gneezy et al. (2003); Klos et al.
(2005); Chen & Corter (2006); and, 011 the theoretical front, sec Nielsen (1985); Ross
(1999); Pekoz (2002); Hammarlid (2005). Regarding Rabin's theorem, see Rubinstein
(2001); \Vatt (2002); \Vakker (2005); Bombardini & Trebbi (2005); Cox & Sadiraj (2006);
Palacios-Huerta & Serrano (2006).
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Utility Theory (EUT). Assuming that the single bet is unacceptable at all
wealth levels, he proved a theorem stating that the initial rejection should
imply a rejection of any sequence of such bets. But rejection of a gam-
ble at all wealth levels is an assumption that, as showed by Ross (1999),
holds only for a limited class of utility functions, namely, those displaying
constant absolute risk aversion. Such utility functions describe individuals
whose attitudes towards risk are the same across wealth positions. A sim-
ilar claim has been made by Cox & Sadiraj (2006) and Palacios-Huerta &
Serrano (2006) regarding the validity of Rabin's demonstrations that risk
aversion over modest stakes within EUT implies absurd risk aversion over
large stakes gambles, They point out that Rabin's striking results rely
on the assumption that a given risk is consecutively rejected across a wide
range of wealth levels, which in a sense amounts to saying that risk aversion
does not vary with wealth.
Despite the analytical importance of the characterization of absolute
and relative risk aversion, there is mixed empirical evidence as to the ef-
fects of changes in wealth on attitudes toward risk. Ogaki & Zhang (2001),
Guiso et al. (1996) and Rosenzweig & Binswanger (1993), for instance,
find evidence in support of the decreasing relative risk aversion hypothesis,
while Szpiro (1986), using data on insurance, finds empirical support for
constant relative risk aversion. Barsky (1997) and Donkers et al. (2001),
instead, find evidence that risk aversion increases with wealth, while Bin-
swanger (1980) finds that changes in wealth have no significant effect on
23
risk aversion. Even though various methodology-related arguments may be
given to explain that discrepancy, it is debatable whether these economet-
ric studies have fully provided evidence on the way attitudes to risk are
affected by changes in wealth. Most of the existing results are based on
data involving choice behaviour among individuals of different wealth lev-
els2• But inferring how risk aversion varies with wealth from cross-sectional
observations may not be accurate when preferences are heterogeneous.
At first sight, a data set containing measures of risk attitudes at various
wealth positions of an individual (Le. a long panel) could fully overcome
that concern. However, wealth is likely not exogenous to attitudes to risk:
unobservable risk-driven choices can underly the changing of wealth posi-
tions. Thus, econometric estimates would still have to address the problem
of endogeneity that could confound estimation. An alternative approach
would be a laboratory experiment, where wealth can be exogenously manip-
ulated. Though this method cannot produce, under incentivised conditions,
an extensive map of individuals' wealth states onto their risk attitudes, it
can produce evidence that complements econometric studies by providing
careful controls of risks taken and changes of wealth experienced. \Vhile
several experimental investigations (e.g., Harrison, 1986; Holt & Laury,
2002; Bosch-Domenech & Silvestre, 1999; Besch-Domenech & Silvestre,
2003) have brought evidence about attitudes toward scaled-up risks given
2An exception is Eisenhauer (1997), who uses a long sample of aggregate time series
data from the U.S. and finds evidence that absolute risk aversion increases with wealth-
which is in contrast with the above mentioned studies based on cross-sectional analysis.
24
subjects' initial wealth level, contributions that test for effects of changes
in wealth on attitudes toward a given risk are scarce".
This chapter attempts to elicit experimentally the sensitivity of risk at-
titudes to small-scale changes in wealth. We elicit attitudes to risk through
a multiple price list method at two different times, say to and ti. A sub-
group of subjects (treatment group) is awarded money between to and tl•
Another sub-group (control group) is not awarded any money, and their
choices are used to detect changing patterns of risk attitudes elicited at tl
relative to to that cannot be attributed to changes in wealth, induced by
the experimenter.
Payment for their decisions was then made at the end of the experiment;
in cash, according to the random lottery incentive system. This random-
lottery procedure, by which several decision problems are faced but the
subject is paid the outcome of only one of them, has been extensively used.
It allows an incentivised elicitation of individual choices in multiple-task
settings avoiding income effects Lee (2008). The random-lottery system
provides an incentive-compatible elicitation mechanism both under EUT
and PT, in the sense that subjects are incentivized to report genuine valu-
ations to the lotteries they face which reflect their true preference ordering
over the pairwise set of options.
This chapter also studies how effects of small-scale gains on risk atti-
tudes are influenced by how far in advance such gains are anticipated. This
3See Wolf & Pohlman (1983) and Levy (1994).
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issue has practical importance. Consider, for example, the random-lottery
system; this is a procedure by which several decision problems are faced but
the subject is paid the outcome of only one of them. The random-lottery
system provides an incentive-compatible elicitation mechanism both under
Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory, in the sense that subjects
are incentivized to report decisions that reflect their true preference order-
ing over the set of options in each decision problem, This is a a common
practice in experimental investigation of economic behaviour in multiple-
task settings. It aims to address a concern that subjects' behaviour across
rounds may be contaminated by wealth/payoff effects if they are paid for
their decisions in all tasks (see Halt & Laury, 2002; Cubitt et al. , 1998a;
Lee, 2008). The validity of paying for all tasks and, consequently, the moti-
vation of the random-lottery system, relies to some extent on assumptions
about (1) the argument of the utility function (accumulated winnings?)
and (2) the speed with which subjects update such argument in light of
earnings in previous tasks. If, for instance, individual behaviour acts on
preferences represented by a utility function defined on deviations from a
given reference point, and this reference point depends on the individual's
endowments, then paying individuals for decisions in all tasks (assuming
they are payoff-wise similar) would contaminate behaviour with endow-
ment effects. But this would be true only if individuals' reference point
for one task varies according to the payment they receive from other tasks
- an assumption that has not yet been tested and both treatments in our
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experiment shed some light on.
Examining whether and how quickly individuals change their behaviour
as money is earned in the earlier periods of an experiment has also theoret-
ical importance - in particular, for reference-dependent theories. Theories
of reference-dependent preferences, most notably, Prospect Theory (PT),
postulate that individuals evaluate the outcomes of an economic prospect
by contrasting them to a reference-point. While an individual's reference
point has been traditionally interpreted in this literature as corresponding
to her current endowment (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky &
Kahnernan, 1992), applications often adopt the simplified assumption that
such reference point is a zero quantity of such endowment (e.g., Harless &
Camerer, 1994, p.1255; and Andersen et al. , 2006a, p.18). Koszegi & Ra-
bin (2006) challenge these assumptions, building up a reference-dependent
model in which the expectations about outcomes rather than wealth lev-
els are used as a reference-point. They claim that an expectation-based
reference-point helps their model to accommodate a wide variety of ob-
served behaviour that has been found irreconcilable under standard for-
mulations of the major decision theories (EUT and PT). We address some
of those issues by running the above mentioned baseline experiment under
two treatment conditions, which differ in the time elapsed between to and
tl (a few minutes in one treatment and one week in the other). By doing so,
our overall experiment design also allows us to examine (a) the short-term
stability of preferences over lotteries, and (b) the different assumptions as
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to reference-point determination and adjustment.
Finally, our experimental design also allows us to examine the effect of
what is termed here the "inside" and "outside" frames on attitudes to risk.
The "inside" framing effect refers to changes in risk preferences when a
small-scale change of wealth is given "inside" a lottery. That is, a subject '8
risk preference is elicited through certainty-equivalent of two lotteries, say
Land L'. But L is just a shifted version of L
'
, whereby a common amount
of !::"w is added to its prizes. The "outside" framing effect in turn - also
known as "house money effect" - refers to changes in risk preferences when
~w is simply given to the subject".
In this case, the "outside money" framing effect is captured by differ-
ences in risk preferences elicited before and after ~w is administered. An
underlying principle of rational choice models is that different frames of
a given choice problem should not induce an individual to make different
decisions if the variations in frame leave the consequences of the choice
problem unchanged. But while it is no longer novel that people's choices
are affected by some changes of frame (see, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman,
1986), little has been said about whether the effects of a monetary gain on
attitudes to risk are equivalent across such frames. These "Inside-Outside"
money effects, if found, could be of significant relevance for (a) theoretical
modeling (e.g., of risk preferences over different stakes and over different
4There is a subtle distinction here. The "house money effect" (Thaler & Johnson,
1990) is a change of risk preferences in a particular direction that is induced by money
given prior to risky choices; the "outside" money effect does not postulate a particular
direction for how money given given to an individual prior to risky choices would affect
his decisions.
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wealth levels), and (b) practical experimental design questions (e.g., bal-
ance between task incentives and show-up fees). Part of our experiment
addresses this issue.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews
the experimental evidence on risk attitudes. Section 2.3 describes the ex-
perimental design. Section 2.4 derives the predictions of expected utility
for treatment effects on subjects' choices. Section 2.5 presents the results.
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Experimental evidence on attitudes toward
risk
The study of individual decision-making under risk has been the object
of interest of much experimental work (Camerer, 1995; Starmer, 2000).
While much of this work was initially related to an attempt to challenge the
EUT paradigm as a description of how people actually make decisions under
risk, it has been extended over the years to investigate the determinants of
risk behaviour, its measurement and correlates. The resulting experimental
literature is massive and every year general and specialised journals bring
more to this body of work. In spite of the broad range of risk aversion-
related issues investigated by this literature, it could be said that much of
this empirical literature falls into four major categories:
(i) Methods of elicitation of risk aversion
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(ii) Theory-testing using the probability triangle
(iii) Individual correlates of risk-taking behaviour
(iv) Wealth effects on risk aversion
This classification is essentially based on the major purpose underlying
most of the empirical work over the last twenty years on risk preferences.
It provides a fairly comprehensive taxonomy that helps to make some sense
of the nature of the empirical work (mostly experimental) that has been
carried on this topic. In what follows, we briefly review a representative
sample of the branch of the literature in each of those categories.
The first category refers to experimental investigations that look at
whether and how measured individual risk attitudes differ across differ-
ent methodologies of risk elicitation. Using a within-subject design, Isaac
& James (2000), for instance, have found that estimates of risk attitudes
elicited through first-price auction and Becker-DcGroot-Marschak (BD~1)
mechanisms are considerably different. But these results should be inter-
preted with some caution as some potential confounds were not controlled
for5 and there are differences in the way bid data from each elicitation
procedure is collected",
5For instance, order effects: 40 rounds of first-price auction-based elicitation are
always conducted first, and only after that, 4 rounds of a BD~l procedure are conducted.
Also, and perhaps more importantly, a subject's position alternates between procedures,
being framed as a seller in the BD~l and as a buyer in the first auction. Loomes et al.
(2002) provide some evidence that attitude to risk indeed change over a large sequence
of tasks.
6Estimates of risk aversion for bid behaviour in the BD~1 procedure are based on
average-bid only of the last two BD~1 bids (Isaac & James, 2000, p.18l), whereas the
procedure to estimate risk coefficients for bid behaviour in the first-price auction is based
on a transformation of a parameter estimate of a linear Nash equilibrium bid function.
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Another example of how adopted methodological frames can influence
elicited risk attitudes is Harrison et al. (2007). They primarily investigate
whether using non-monetary commodities as lottery prizes instead of mon-
etary rewards affects risk attitudes; a group of subjects is also assigned to
a treatment condition in which the non-monetary outcome (rare coins) has
some background risk. The experiment is run in the field using subjects
[numismatists] who have experience with t.he commodity that replaces the
conventional lottery outcomes. While it departs from the conventional
laboratory experiment regarding the subject pool used, they use a multi-
ple price list design to elicit risk attitudes. This is a common approach
to elicit measurements of risk aversion from choices subjects make when
confronted with a list of paired lottery-choice decisions. They found that
replacing money by a non-monetary outcome does not itself significantly
change elicited measures of risk aversion. Behaviour within their sample
is mostly risk averse, which is in line with other studies that also use this
risk elicitation procedure. Yet they found that subjects, as predicted by
standard EUT, tend to behave in a more risk averse way when the outcome
value involves some uncertainty".
The second category refers to a stream of the literature that has used
the Marshak probability triangle to examine competing theories of choices
under risk. While designed by Marschak (1950) as a geometrical illustration
of rational choice involving risk, it was popularised by Machina (1987) as
7As coins used as outcomes of the lotteries do not have a grade certification and, as
a result, cannot have their retail value easily assessed by collectors.
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a device that can be used to illustrate preferences over a certain family
of lotteries". The Marshak triangle is a unit triangle in which each point
represents a probability distribution P(PI' P2, P3) over a given set Xl, X2, X3 of
outcomes, where Xl > X2 > X3 and Pi is the probability of winning Xi. The
vertices of the triangle represent sure outcomes - degenerate lotteries with
probability mass concentrated on a single outcome - while the points lying
on the triangle edge lines represent binary lotteries - one of the outcomes
has no probability mass.
The Marshack probability triangle has been used to great effect in the
study of choice under risk. Since lotteries and preferences over them have
a diagrammatic representation, the probability triangle framework can be
used to compare individuals's risk aversion characteristics, as well as to
construct tests of alternative theories of choice under risk. In fact, much of
the experimental literature using the probability triangle has been devised
to investigate axioms of the expected utility theory. Several experimental
studies have found evidence of violations of such axioms (for a review, sec
Machina (1987); Starmer (2000); Camerer (1995)). It is an implication
of EUT, for instance, that risk aversion, which is measured by the slope
of the indifference curves, is constant across the triangle. Yet the dia-
grammatic representation in the triangle of individuals' decisions in simple
choice problems systematically departs from such representation. Many of
these violations have been documented in what are termed as common con-
8Those involving a probability distribution over up to three outcomes.
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sequence effects - patterns of choice in pairs of choice problems involving
lotteries that violate the EUT's independence axiom".
In these studies, however, risky choices involve lotteries located on the
corners and edges of the triangle; and there is some evidence that violations
are mitigated when the risky choices involve lotteries that if represented in
the triangle no longer lies on its boundaries. Conlisk (1989) shows, for ex-
ample, that violations as observed in the examples used by Maurice Allais
are less frequent when the choice problem (1) is re-phrased as a three-step
problem, and (2) involves lotteries lying on the interior of the probability
triangle. Discussions and empirical examinations of these effects can be
found in Kahneman & Tversky (1979); Camerer (1995); Wu & Gonzalez
(1998); Starmer (1992); Humphrey (2000) and Starmer & Sugden (1989a);
Carlin (1992); Hey & Orme (1994); Cubitt et al. (1998b), among oth-
ers. In sum, these experimental studies using the triangle have not only
shown under which conditions systematic violations of the independence
axiom arc to be observed, but also that subjects may have variable levels
of risk aversion as the probability of winning the middle prize changes -
phenomena that violates the standard expected utility theory.
The work that falls into the third category we alluded to earlier is
devoted to identifying demographic variables that may importantly inftu-
ence individual attitudes to risk. Several experiments on risk aversion have
9It is worth noting that in most of these studies risk attitudes are captured by
comparison of individuals' choices across different probability distributions over a fixed
set of prizes; in our experiment, however, risk attitudes are captured by the curvature
of an individual's utility function implied by her choices.
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pointed out, for example, that women are more risk averse than men (Eckel
& Wilson, 2004; Eckel & Grossman, 2007), whereas Schubert et al. (1999)
have found that this gender gap in risk propensities no longer exists when
the context of decisions is manipulated, and instead of abstract gambles,
decisions are framed as investment and insurance problems. Risk aver-
sion is also found to be significantly related to age and height {Dohmen
et al. (2005)). While most of this work has been confined to investigate
the effects of demographic variables that are more commonly and easily
observed/measured, experimental findings in Frederick (2005) suggest that
cognitive ability may also playa role in individuals' risk behaviour. This
has been confirmed by Dohmen et al. (2007), who find that subjects who
perform better in a 10 question IQ-type test tend to be less risk averse than
those who perform worse.
Another important theme in experimental studies on risk aversion is
how people's willingness to take risks is affected by changes in wealth.
This may cover both the case where subjects, from a given initial wealth
position, assess lotteries with different magnitudes of payoffs ("inside case"),
and the case where a exogenous variation in wealth is administered and a
given risk is evaluated at each of these wealth positions ("outside case").
The "inside case" refers to assessment of risk-taking behaviour of an indi-
vidual with initial wealth w in two risky scenarios. For instance: in one,
her risky choices involve the lottery L{1/4, 100; 3/4, 50); in the other, her
risky choices involve a lottery L'(1/4, 150; 3/4,100), which is just L with a
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common amount of 50 added to its prizes 100 and 50. The "outside case",
in turn, refers to assessment of risk-taking behaviour of an individual in
two wealth scenarios. In one scenario, an individual with initial wealth
w faces a risky problem involving, say, the lottery L(1/4, 100; 3/4, 50); in
the other, she will face a risky problem involving the same lottery L, but
before doing so, she will be endowed with a certain amount of money, say
50. Depending on problem frarning, these situations should be viewed as
equivalent 10. Whereas in the "inside case" it is as if subjects assess different
positions along the wealth scale, in the "outside case" the risk is given and
subjects are supposed to assess it from two different wealth positions.
But studies in this category have been confined to the "inside" case in
which it is investigated how risk aversion displayed by subjects in real lot-
tery decisions is affected by the size of the payoffs at stake. Kachelmeier
& Shehata (1992), Holt & Laury (2002) and Harrison et al. (2005a), for
example, have found that elicited risk aversion measures increase when the
size of lottery stakes involved in such decision tasks is scaled up, which
is clear evidence of increasing relative risk aversion 11. Indeed, attitudes
to risk do not seem neutral to changes of wealth. Bosch-Domenech & Sil-
vestre (1999) hypothetically endow subjects with several amounts of money.
These amounts range from $3.50 to $103 US dollars. Then they ask sub-
jects whether or not they want to buy fair insurance against losing the sum
lOThis is the case for an expected utility maximiser whose utility is defined on final
wealth.
11In Holt & Laury (2002), this effect is only found with real incentives.
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received, which has probability of 20%. The sum each subject actually
receives at the end is randomly drawn from the list of amounts. Analysing
the hypothetical decisions of subjects, they observe many patterns regard-
ing insurance purchase, but find a significant positive association between
the decision to insure and the size of the endowment. Assuming that in-
surance buying is monotonically related to risk aversion, their results seem
to confirm that risk preferences change according to the size of payoffs at
stake.
While these positive "inside" wealth effects provide some empirical sup-
port for utility functions exhibiting increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA),
they still leave unanswered the question of whether and how behaviour to-
ward a given fixed risk is altered by changes in one's wealth level. Studies
on this are scarce. One of the few attempts to investigate this in the lab
is done by Levy (1994). He uses a portfolio allocation-type of decision
problem repeated over 10 periods, allowing subjects to accumulate their
earnings at each period. He finds evidence that the more ''wealth'' subjects
have, the more they are willing to take risks. Interestingly, he also finds
that the proportion of the subject's ''wealth'' allocated to risky assets does
not decrease, as dictated by IRRA, as wealth becomes larger. It is not
entirely clear how robust these results are; not just because of the contrast
with the preceding findings regarding relative risk aversion (RRA), but also
because the regression analysis was structured in such a way that within-
subject noise is not controlled for. Moreover, and regardless of robustness,
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it is doubtful if subjects integrate money earned throughout an one-hour
task into their conception of wealth. Therefore, the observed results may
not be accounted for by a utility function exhibiting decreasing absolute
risk aversion (DARA), but by a "house money" effect (Thaler & Johnson,
1990). Besides, by allowing subjects to accumulate earnings across trading
periods, his design re-introduces the problem with field data: endogeneity
of risk-taking behaviour. One of the goals of our experiment is thus to fill
this gap, using a design that administers a carefully controlled "exogenous"
small-scale change in wealth.
The analysis carried out and the treatment conditions employed help
to distinguish our experiment from the others, above mentioned, 011 this
issue. Firstly, because we perform a within-subject analysis, we can control
for changes in risk attitudes induced by noisy behaviour rather than by the
stimuli - an aspect not addressed by Levy (1994). Secondly, we pay all
subjects for their decision, thus having a sample in which all subjects were
provide incentives to think carefully about their decisions. In Thaler &
Johnson (1990), for instance, subjects are uncertain about whether even a
single of their choices will be for real: only a few subjects (roughly 5% of
the sample) will be selected to play out one of their gamble decisions+
Furthermore, our design allows us to explore other issues. First, how
the span of time this small-scale change in wealth has been anticipated for
influences attitudes to risk. \Ve do so by contrasting before- and after-
12Subjects are, in this case, still incentivised; but the the large likelihood of having
no decision for real may dilute subjects' incentives.
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increment measures of attitudes to risk of group of subjects who received
the increment news either a few minutes or a week before the second risk-
elicitation stage of the experiment. Second, whether the framing of the
small-scale increment - the above mentioned "inside" and "outside" frames
- can affect sign and magnitude of its effect on subjects' risk attitudes.
Third, and finally, by having the same set of risk tasks being faced on
two different occasions, we can also use a test-retest approach to examine
the short-term stability of risk preferences - an issue of importance to the
reliability of the elicitation method itself.
2.3 Experimental Design
We now turn to a detailed description of our design. Because the elic-
itation of individual's attitudes toward risk is the building block of our
experiment, we shall first present the method used to this end. Then, we
describe the sequence of task stages the experiment consists of, followed
by a description of the treatments. After that, we describe the payment
procedures and the mechanisms used for incentive-compatible elicitation of
responses.
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2.3.1 Risk-elicitation procedure
We propose to elicit risk attitudes employing a variant of the Multiple
Price List (~IPL) procedure used by Holt & Laury (2002)13. The format
of the MPL method devised by Holt-Laury has been widely used in risk-
elicitation laboratory experiments (c.g., Andersen et al. , 2006b; Harrison
et al. , 2007; Offerman & Schotter, 2009) and involves an easily under-
standable task. Measurement of risk aversion is based on ten pairwise
choice problerns presented altogether in a table, one per row. Each prob-
lem is to choose between a lottery A, say a p chance to win Xa and 1- p
to win Ya (where Ya < xa), and a lottery B, say a p chance to win Xb and
1 - P to win Yb (where Yb < Xb), in which p is systematically varied from
1/10 to 1 when proceeding down the table. Then, because the difference
between payoffs for A is much larger than the difference between payoffs
for B (i.e., Xa - Ya > > Xb - Yb), one should cross over to the lottery B at
some point when going down the table.
Here, we depart from Holt-Laury in two respects: first, we use more than
ten pairwise problems; second, the pairwise choice problem at each row is
to choose between a fixed lottery and an amount of money with certainty,
say At, that is systematically varied from row to row by a constant amount,
say 6. For example, consider that the fixed lottery is L, a lottery with p
13Another way of eliciting risk attitudes is by asking subjects' selling and purchase
prices for a lottery through auction procedures (e.g., Harrison, 1986). While this method
yields a point estimate of certainty-equivalents, the way the pricing task is framed can
considerably alter the implied risk attitudes (see Holt & Laury, 2002, p.1644). Auction
mechanisms have also been reported to generate biased elicitation as subjects tend to
overbid to ensure they will be the winner bidder (sce, e.g., Krahncn et al. , 1997).
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chance to win x and 1 - P chance to win y, where x > y. At the first row,
the decision problem an individual faces is to choose between x for sure
and L. At the second row it would be a choice between x - 8 for sure and
L. At the third row it would be a choice between x - 28 for sure and L, and
so on until the sure thing equals y. Note that the sure amount at the last
row is equal to the worst possible payoff yielded by the lottery L. As 8 is
kept fixed, the number of decision rows depend upon the range of prizes of
the lottery option. Our statistical analysis of treatment effects shall control
for that; as we discuss in section 2.5.2., the variation of decision rows is a
change of framing across some risk tasks that, however small, may influence
elicited measures.
In order to clarify the elicitation procedure underlying each risk task,
consider the following example in Figure 2.1 of what a risk-elicitation task
will look like. The task consists of eliciting the cash equivalent of the
lottery L(8.00, 1/5; 4.00, 4/5), where the fractions indicate the probabilities
of winning, and the integer numbers indicate the wlnning!". To this end,
the subject would face the following set of pairwise problems in a table:
Each decision row on the screen constitutes a choice problem, which is to
choose between option A, a sure amount of money, or option B, the lottery.
They are asked to indicate their preferences for each choice problem. As one
proceeds down the table the sure amount of money decreases and becomes
14Probabilities in the lotteries are replaced by numbers. For example: if the lottery
has two prizes, A and R, with probability 0.3 and 0.7, respectively, then A is paid if the
chip drawn is numbered 1 to 30, whereas B is paid if the chip is numbered 31 to 100.
For more details on how lotteries are implemented see section 3.4.
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of a risk elicitation task
Decision
10
11
12
13
If
15
16
17
Risk Task: Choose the option you prefer most for each row
Option A A B Option 8
..... raoo r r """loti..,
,..... £775 r r:
"""LoftaIy
,.... £7.50 r r """lei..,
,...... £725 r:
"""lall..,
........ £700 r r: """loti..,
_£6.75 r- l'I<II'toftaly
,.... £&.50 r r
"""LaII..,
,_t6_25 r r
"""lall8l)l
,_£600 r r
"""lalt..,
,_£5.75 r l'IIiI'tclt8l)l
_£550 r l'IIiI'tall .. r
_£525 r r l'IIiI'lollwJo
,_£5.00 r r: l'IIiI'LotI..,
,...... £475 r r IJIaIoLaIt8I)I
,...... [450 r r """LaIIOI,
,_£425 r- e l'IIiI'leI..,
_£400 r r IJIaIolall..,
Lottery
£4 'j
s 8 if number of ball is 1-20
£: 4 if number of ball is 2)-100
When finished, click
OK to proceed
OK
less and less attractiv when compared to the expected value of the lottery
(in thi cas £4. 0). Note that in this Table, a ri k-neutral individual, for
instance, should tak option A for th first thirte n rows cross ov r to th
risk. option wh n option A offers £5.00. A mildly risk-av r e individual
is expect d to choose option A for the first thirteen rows, switching over
to h lot ry at some row th reaft r. Even an xtreme risk av rt r is
expect d to witch over to the lott ry at some point - at th bottom row,
to b pr ci e since th worst lottery priz is at least as good as th sure
man y at that row.
Note tha , provid d a subject starts by choosing A and switch s once,
tao k r pan can b r duced to a clos d witching interval within whi h
th crain y- quivalent of the lott ry opti n falls into 15. For instanc , if a
for reporting an indiff r 'nee point - in our risk task, all
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subject crosses over to the risky option when the sure option offers £6.00,
choosing the lottery thereafter, then we know that the sum of money that
is regarded as good as the lottery lies between £6.00 and the sum offered in
the next row, which is £5.75. \Ve shall use the switching interval midpoint
as our operational concept of the observed certainty-equivalent 16•
It is relatively common in this type of task to have some subjects switch-
ing back and forth between options as they proceed down the menu of
choices. Our software, though, did not permit a subject to have multi-
ple switch points. \Vhen one chooses option A, say £5.50, over option B,
the lottery, the computer assumes that option A is also preferred over the
lottery whenever it is offering a SlUIl larger than £5.50, filling-in the hut-
tons accordingly. Likewise, when the lottery option is chosen over a given
amount of money, say £4.00 the computer also assumes that the lottery is
preferred to the sure amount when it is less than £4.00. Before proceeding
to a new risk task, subjects could change their choices and adjust their
switching point as many times as they wished.
Some may argue that this device, by forcing a single switch point, is
forcing a monotonicity that subjects's preferences may not have!", But
amount of money which makes the subject indifferent between receiving it with certainty
or playing the lottery option - would turn out being a similar multiple-price list type of
task if the truthfulness of reported indifference point were to be tested under incentivised
conditions.
16This interval is quite narrow (0.25), which makes the midpoint of the switching
interval a more refined estimate of subjects' money-equivalent point of lottery option
sin each risk task. We keep this variation between sure amounts of money from decision
row to decision row constant across all risk tasks.
17There is some evidence, yet, that an enforced single switching point does not yield
significantly different elicited values relative to a multiple-price-list procedure without
such feature (Andersen et al. , 2006b).
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this feature has four potential advantages. First, it may help to alleviate
boredom; subjects who understood it realise that they do not necessarily
need to pick an option at every decision row. Second, it gives complete
flexibility while embodying a feature that those who understand and take
the task seriously would want to obey. Third, it may also simplify the
decision problem, helping subjects to focus attention on the provision of
a switch point that is as accurate as possible. Fourth, and last, it allows
a more refined elicitation of certainty-equivalent from the entire samplelf
by eliminating the appearance of non-useable responses, since they violate
monotonici ty.
As we shall discuss later, task responses straightforwardly yield mea-
sures of risk aversion: once the switch point is elicited, simple indicators
of attitudes to risk can be obtained either by calculating the bounds on
the CRRA coefficient of an individual's utility function implied by the
switch point (Holt & Laury, 2002), by computing risk premia (assuming
the certainty-equivalent is the midpoint of the switching interval), or by
simply comparing that "switch" point to the one predicted under risk neu-
trality. \Vhile these transformations of responses are risk aversion degree-
preserving, the last two approaches have the advantage of yielding indica-
tors of risk aversion that are not conditioned upon particular functional
forms for utility functions or particular models of preferences.
18Provided, of course, a subject's choices do not violate first-order stochastic domi-
nance, which can happen if she prefers a given option over the other in all decision rows
in a given risk task.
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2.3.2 Experiment's task stages
Having given an account of the risk elicitation procedure, we now de-
scribe how the experiment is organised around it. The experiment consists
of three stages: (1) first risk-elicitation stage, (2) cognitive stage, and (3)
second risk-elicitation stage, respectively. In each of these stages subjects
perform the following types of task: risk tasks in the risk-elicitation stages
and a IQ-type of test in the cognitive stage. To avoid confusion, we use "risk
task" to mean a whole table with decision problems of the kind illustrated
in Figure 2.1; and "choice problem" to mean a single decision problem in
each risk task, so defined.
Stage I: Risk tasks
In the first stage, the subjects face 6 risk tasks in a sequence. In each
of them, they are confronted with several pairwise choice problems, each
posed in a given row of a table. They are asked to indicate a preference
for one of the two options in every decision row. To ensure an incentive
compatible elicitation mechanism and avoid income effects, they are told
that one of the rows from each risk task they perform in the experiment
(they are unaware of how many there are) will be randomly selected at the
end of the entire experiment, being informed that only one of the selected
decision rows will be used to determine their earnings (rnore about this in
section 2.4).
As illustrated above, each row in a given risk task is a choice between
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Option A, a sure amount of money, and Option B, a lottery. Table 2.1
below presents the set of lotteries used in each of these risk tasks in the
order they are presented'":
Table 2.1: Lottery option per risk-elicitation task
Lottery Payoff 1 Pr(Payoff 1) Payoff 2 Pr(Payoff 2) EV Rows
Ll
L2
L3
L4
L5
L6
8 0.2 4 0.8 4.8
9 0.2 3 0.8 4.2
6 0.4 3 0.6 4.2
9 0.3 4 0.7 5.5
16 0.2 10 0.8 11.2
6 0.4 3 0.6 4.2
17
25
13
21
25
13
Note that the number of decision rows each risk task contains, which is
listed in the rightmost column in Table 2.1, varies across tasks. This is so
because we keep the variation of sure money offered across decision rows
in the risk tasks constant and the range of prizes vary across tasks20• In
each risk task, the ordered list of certain amounts of money starts at the
highest prize of the lottery option and decreases by £0.25 at each row down
until the Option A offer equals the lowest payoff of the lottery. Hence, the
different number of decision rows stems from the different range of lottery
prizes across risk tasks.
The lotteries we use have four noticeable characteristics. First, they are
all binary lotteries. Second, they only involve strictly positive outcomes.
I91norder to test for order effects, we randomised the (pre-defined) position in which
L2 and L5 would appear in the sequence - either in the second or the fifth risk task.
Thus, to be precise, roughly half of the subjects face the sequence as shown in Table 2,
while the remaining subjects face the same sequence but with L5 and L2 in, respectively,
the second and fifth risk tasks instead.
20'V'econtrol, however, for potential effects of t he number of rows 011 elicited measures
of risk aversion in our analysis.
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Third, two of them are identical- risk tasks L3 and L6. The reason for this
is that by making subjects face the same risk task twice, we can investigate
short-term stability of risk preferences. Fourth, payoffs offered by lotteries
L2 and L5 differ by £7.00 (Le. L5=L2+7), which exactly matches the small
scale change in wealth induced by the experiment under some treatments,
as explained below,
The Cognitive stage
After completing a sequence of six risk tasks, subjects are then asked
to complete a timed cognitive test. They have twelve minutes. They are
told that their answers to these questions have no effect on their earnings
in the experiment.
The cognitive test has three purposes. First, to allow risk attitudes to be
related to cognitive ability (see Chapter 3). Second, to allow the small-scale
wealth increment to be framed as a reward for completing the test. The
idea is then to use this test as an "endogenous" treatment administration
route: depending on the treatment condition the subjects were randomly
assigned t021, they learned that a money reward, for submitting a complete
set of answers to the test, is guaranteed at the end of the experiment. This
way, we want to induce them to think that the reward was "earned" rather
than received as a "gift" from experimenters. Third, to crowd out subjects'
working memory: as the same lotteries will be faced in a later stage task
of the experiment, by going through a cognitive test-type of task, subjects'
21We come hack to this issue in the "Treatment" subsection below.
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working memory is likely to be loaded with new information; this makes less
likely that they will spot the equivalence between first and second round of
risk tasks, which might cause them to guess that the experiment tests for
consistency, and respond accordingly (see Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001).
Stage II: Risk tasks
In this stage subjects are asked to complete the same sequence of six risk
tasks they faced before - though subject are not told this. They are told
that they work just like the risk tasks they completed before: each risk task
consists of a set of choice problems, in each of which they face two options:
Option A, to receive an amount of money, and Option D, to playa lottery.
All they need to do is to indicate the option they prefer most for each
decision problem. \Ve shall refer to this stage as the second-risk-elicitation
stage.
Whether this stage is performed straight after the cognitive stage rather
than at a second session taking place one week later depends upon the time
delay treatment condition the group of subjects is assigned to. This brings
us to the description of the treatment conditions under which risk attitudes
are investigated.
2.3.3 Treatments
The major interest of this experiment is in ascertaining whether a small-
scale change in wealth affects risk attitudes. But two other relevant related
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issues are also investigated as a by-product of our experimental design.
One is whether such wealth effects are affected by, or depend on, how long
the change in wealth has been expected for. The other is what we term
here the equivalence of "inside" and "outside" money. This refers to the
effects on risk preferences of different forms of introducing an increment -
commonly added to the set of prizes of a lottery ("inside"), or simply given
to the subject ("outside").
To this end, we have two treatment conditions:
(i) Increment treatment: here we manipulate the the money reward, say
~w, that subjects are given for completing the Cognitive stage. ~w takes
one of two values: £0 or 7.00, which will be denoted by zero and nonzero
increment conditions. The experimentally induced increment is modest,
but it is larger than the expected value of almost all lotteries used in the
risk tasks.
(ii) Time treatment: here we manipulate the length of the delay, say ~t,
between the cognitive stage and the Stage II (Risk tasks)22. ~t is either
around three minutes or an entire week. Henceforth, they are denoted
by instantaneous and delayed conditions. Note that for subjects assigned
to a nonzero increment condition, we are manipulating for how long the
increment has been anticipated for before subjects face the second stage of
22To be accurate, the delay is between the end of the Cognitive stage and the begin-
ning of Stage II.
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risk tasks23•
A visual illustration of the decision setting in the experiment is given
by the timeline in Figure 2.2.
Now, given the two variables we manipulate, subjects are randomly
assigned to one of the four treatment conditions: 17 (Instantaneous +7),
10 (Instantaneous +0), D7 (Delayed +7), or DO (Delayed +0). Table 2.2
indicates how the experimental manipulation of t ime and wealth increment
varies across the four treatment conditions investigated.
Table 2.2: Treatment Conditions
Independent variables
17
D7
10
DO
~w=7 ~w=O
~t = "Instantaneous"
~t = "Delayed"
Note that subjects assigned to the treatment conditions in which ~w =
0, ID and DO, are used as a control group, as we can use their responses
across stages to control for differences in risk attitudes elicited at Stages I
and II that are genuinely induced by ~1L' = 7 from those differences induced
by inherently irnprecise preferences (Butler & Loomes, 2007), stochastic
choices (Loomes & Sugden, 1995; Loomes, 2005), or even changes in indi-
vidual circumstances'".
Information sets
Subjects in all treatments cannot infer either ~w or ~t from their
23They receive this money, as well as earnings from the risk tasks, at the end of the
experiment only.
24This latter possibility cannot be ruled out for the "Delayed" cases.
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information until the end of the cognitive stage (see Section 2.5. for details).
They also do not know about the existence of a second risk-elicitation stage
until the very start of it - this can be a few minutes or a week after the
end of the cognitive stage.
Inside- Outside money
To understand how the format taken by small-scale changes in wealth
can affect risk attitudes, it will be instructive to examine the measure of
risk aversion generated by choices in risk tasks L2 and L5. Lottery L5 is
an increased version of L2: the prizes of L5 are precisely £7 larger than
the prizes of L5. Contrasting the certainty equivalent of L2 and L5 in the
first stage, before any manipulation of ~w takes place, provides insights
into what we call "inside" money effect on risk attitudes, since when facing
L5 it is as if subjects have been endowed with £7 relative to when they
faced L2. On the other hand, in the second stage when subjects in some
treatments are actually "endowed" with £7, to contrast responses to L2
and L5 before and after the increment allows us to test for the "outside"
money effect; also known as "house money" effect, it refers to individuals'
tendency to he relatively less reluctant to undertake risks after prior gains.
Experimental evidence of "house money" effect has been found in individual
(Thaler & Johnson, 1990) and market settings (Ackert et al. , 2006).
From a EU theoretical standpoint'", however, the "inside" and "outside"
effect should be equivalent; in terms of final consequences, L2 after the
25Specifically, for a EU maximiser who has a utility function defined on wealth or
experimental income.
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increment is not different from L5 before the increment. Thus, comparing
the "inside" to the "outside" effect tests for a different thing: that the
framing of the increment does not affect the individual's choice decisions.
2.3.4 Resolution of risk and payment
Payment is made according to the Random Lottery Incentive System.
Subjects are informed prior to responding to the problems that, once they
they have responded to all choice problems, one of the problems will be
randomly selected and their winnings determined by the option they chose.
This may involve a resolution of risk in the event the option chosen is a
lottery rather than a sure thing.
This random-lottery procedure, by which several decision problems arc
faced but the subject is paid the outcome of only one of them, has been ex-
tensively used. It provides an incentive-compatible elicitation mechanism
both under EUT and PT, in the sense that subjects are incentivised to
attach genuine valuations to the lotteries they face which reflect their true
preference ordering over the set of pairwise-options (Cubitt et al. , 1998a).
Some may have concerns, though, that incentives may be importantly di-
luted when only one decision out of many is actually used to determine pay-
ment. However, several experiments have brought evidence that subjects'
responses in random-lottery experiments are not significantly different from
their responses in single-task experiments (Cubitt et al. , 1998a).
Even though subjects are unaware of the number of risk tasks they will
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perform, we have decided to use a two-stage randomization in order to
maximize engagement in the task: subjects are told that the computer will
pick one decision row from each risk task they perform, with the under-
standing that the computer will use a special randomization device that
makes all decisions rows from the task equally likely to be chosen; so, for
each risk task, a decision row is actually selected. Then, a physical device is
used to determine the risk task, and so the decision row used to determine
their earningsi". In what follows, we describe in more detail how the whole
process is done.
After all tasks are completed, a table with 12 rows is displayed on the
computer screen. Each row represents a risk task, and for each risk task
there is a spin button: by hitting each of them, a decision row is selected
at random from the relevant risk task. The screenshot in Figure 2.3 below
shows the screen after subjects had hit spin for each case. Then to select
one decision row, each subject draws a ball from a bag containing balls
individually numbered from 1 up to the number of risk tasks they perform
(12). Once they select the ball, and so the risk task to be used for real, the
computer screen displays the two options from the relevant row and the
choice the subject has made between them.
If they have chosen Option A, they receive the amount of money it
26We use a physical device (ball-drawing) to give transparency to the second-stage
of the randomization process, as subjects could view computerized randomization as
fixed. Such a suspicion would be unlikely at the first stage as subjects can usually
see that, of the 12 rows chosen, some favour them and others do not. It is favourable
when a relatively low numbered row is selected and unlucky when a high-numbered row
is selected. Hence, Fig. 2.3 below illustrates the normal case where some spins are
favourable and others not so favourable.
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specifies, whereas if they have chosen Option 8, they play the lottery. Risk
is resolved by drawing a chip from a bag containing 10 numbered chips
and receiving the payoff according to what the lottery specifies 27. Note
that subjects who happen to be assigned to one of the nonzero treatment
conditions (17 or D7) know beforehand (by the end of cognitive test) that
£7.00 is already guaranteed. This money, nonetheless, is only to be paid
at the end of the experiment along with earnings from the risk tasks.
2.3.5 Administration
A total of 138 subjects were recruited on a first-come first-served basis
to take part in the experiment, divided in sessions involving 12-16 people
at a timc28• They signed-up for the experiment with the understanding
that the experiment would have two sessions, one-week apart. They were
also told that by signing-up for the first session of the experiment, they
would be automatically signing-up for a second session, to take place one
week later at the same time of the first session they choose to come.
We pre-randomised the combination of delay and increment treatment
conditions to be assigned to each experimental session, so to all subjects
in the session. Subjects in a given session were randomly seated at in-
dividual computer terminals in our laboratory. An individual ID number
was entered for each subject, and this was used to record their decisions
27Probabilities in the lotteries are replaced by numbers. For example: if the lottery
has two prizes, A and B, with probability 0.3 and 0.7, respectively, then A is paid if the
chip drawn is numbered 1 to 3, whereas B is paid if the chip is numbered 4 to 10.
28Participants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
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throughout their experiment. They were told at the beginning of the ses-
sion that although there were many people in the room, their earnings
would not depend on what others did. They were also reminded that all
of them had signed up to a second session which would take place in one
week's time. We told them that in the experiment they would be asked
to complete risk tasks and multiple-choice tasks, without mentioning how
many of them there were. Instructions for each task stage were handed
out one at a time (see Appendix B). Subjects were asked to read them
through with the experimenter, who read them aloud. They experienced a
risk task trial round before the ''real'' ones; the main purpose of this was
to dernonstrate the feature of the software that "enforces" a single switch
point. Throughout the session, there was an experimenter in the room to
answer any questions and to ensure that subjects knew how to run the
computer program used to present the risk tasks and the cognitive test.
While subjects took part in the experiment with the understanding
that it would have two sessions, only subjects in the "Delayed" treatments,
D7 and DO, had actually to return to the second session. 29. For groups
of subjects in the "Instantaneous" treatments, 17 and ID, the experiment
was completed in one single session: they were told at the end of the first
session that the experiment was completed and that there was no need to
turn up for the second session - scheduled for one week later. Reminders
of this were sent a few days later to all of them. Subjects in the "Delayed"
29They did not know this until the end of the first session, so there is no reason to
believe that this could cause a selection bias.
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treatments, in turn, were sent reminder e-mails about the second session
they signed-up for30• In the second session, subjects were told on arrival
that they would be asked to complete risk tasks just like the ones they
completed in the first session. Instructions were handed out and subjects
were asked to read them through with the experimenter, who read them
aloud.
All subjects were paid at the end of the experiment. The average earn-
ings for subjects in the "non-zero" increment conditions (17 and D7) were
£14.61, with payoffs ranging from £10 to £23. Among those in the "zero"
increment conditions (10 and DO) the average earnings were £6.70, with
payoffs ranging frorn £3 to £16.
2.4 Theoretical predictions
This section presents theoretical predictions for the effect of our exper-
imental treatments on subjects' task responses.
Our analysis will focus on predictions for three experimental manipula-
tions. First, that of the money increment between risk-elicitation tasks.
Second, that of the delay between the first and second stages of risk-
elicitation tasks'". Our analysis will also focus on the "inside-outside"
money issue, a "built-in" manipulation of the form taken by the money
30The large majority of subjects in the Delayed Treatments turned up for the second
sessions; and the turn-up rates are relatively similar between the zero and nonzero
increment conditions - 24 and 29 subjects out of 30, respectively.
31For subjects in the increment treatments, 17 and 07, this is also a manipulation of
the delay between the announcement of the guaranteed money increment and its receipt.
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increment.
To define a subject's task response, we must first describe the structure
of their decision problem; despite some generality, it closely resembles the
problem subjects face in our experiment. To begin, let L be a lottery which
has two possible outcomes: x, with probability p, and y, with probability
1 - p. Both outcomes are positive. The decision problem has two stages.
At stage I, the subject gives the certainty-equivalent of lottery L. Then an
exogenous increment of either £0.00 or £7.00 is announced. This increment
is to be received at the end of Stage II. Throughout our analysis we assume
that there is no wealth-relevant news between stages. At stage II, the
subject gives the certainty-equivalent of lottery L. Thus, a subject's task
response at stage i (i E {I, 2}), denoted by T; (L), is the sure amount of
money that, if the task resulted in the receipt of it, would be regarded by
the subject at stage i as exactly as good as the task resulting in play of L.
Hence, by definition, T; (L) is the certainty equivalent of a lottery.
In describing the theoretical framework, we will confine attention to
Expected-utility Theory. While Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) is
one of the major alternative theoretical accounts of choice under risk32, the
features that make CPT more general than EUT and potentially better
able to explain our data have a limited role in our experiment: probability
weighting would not make much difference to our analysis of effects of
the treatments; and because all lotteries are in the domain of gains, loss
32For a theoretical analysis of the relationship between risk aversion and the curvature
of the utility function in CPT see Schmidt & Zank (2008).
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aversion can only playa role if subjects' reference point is located near or
above the high prizes of our lotteries.
2.4.1 Expected Utility Theory
We start by characterizing how risky outcomes are evaluated by a de-
cision maker who obeys EUT. Assume now that she has a utility function
u(.) whose domain is (w,w), a nonempty interval of wealth levels. As-
sume that u(.) is strictly increasing, time-invariant, and twice differentiable.
This implies that u(.) is a continuous function such that lottery L has a
certainty-equivalent. The certainty-equivalent of L, C(L, w), is defined as
the amount of money m such that m "-I L at wealth position ui, where "-I
is a relation of indifference. The amount by which the expected value of
L exceeds its certainty-equivalent, E(L) - C(L, w), will be referred to as
risk premium. The risk premium depends on wand on L, and henceforth
shall be denoted by 1/;(L, w). So, if the lottery L has expected value E(L),
1/;(w, L) is the maximum reduction in E(L) that an individual with wealth
w would accept to make herself indifferent between the lottery L and such
amount with certainty, that is
u[w + E(L) -1/;(w, L)] = u[w + C(L, w)] = pu(w + x) + (1 - p)u(w + y).
By definition, the certainty-equivalent of L, C(L, w), is the subject's
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task response at a given stage i to a risk task featuring L if her wealth is
w. Trivially, then, C(L, w) = 7i(L). Since t/J(w, L) is linearly linked to
C(L, w) - for a given lottery, the higher t/J(w, L), the lower C(L, w) -, by
providing a prediction as to how a change in wealth, say ~w, affects risk
attitudes, as measured by the risk premium, we give a prediction as to how
an increment of ~w will change a subject's task response at stage i, which
we denote by t: (L )33.
2.4.1.1 Wealth effects
Thus, consider that the decision maker attaches the risk premium 'l/J( Wo, L)
to L when her wealth level is Wo. Let us assume for simplicity that even
when her wealth level is Wo but she then finds out that her wealth level is
soon to be WI, she attaches l/J(WI, L) to L as if her wealth level were WI -
which is very much in the spirit of the asset integration axiom of EUT. Let
us also assume that WI = Wo +~W > Wo.
Proposition 1 t/J( WI, L) ~ 1/;(Wo, L) as the decision maker displays in-
creasing, constant, or decreasiuq absolute risk aversion, respeciiueb).
Proof. See Appendix A •
We can conclude from Proposition 1 that, T2(L), a subject's task re-
sponse to a given risk task at stage II after the increment has been admin-
istered, may equal, exceed, or fall short of, T,(L) depending on the form
33Hence, this prediction is only relevant to individuals assigned to nonzero increment
conditions (17 and D7). Section 4.1.2. examines the case of individuals in zero increment
conditions (10 and DO).
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of (absolute) risk aversion embodied in u(.). Unless we arbitrarily impose
a uniform type of risk aversion over the interval [wo, WI], there is, there-
fore, no unique prediction to how task responses will be affected by the
the small-scale change in wealth administered in some treatments of the
experiment.
Prediction 1 (Divergence in before- and after-increment task re-
sponses when ~w = 7): For an expected utility maximizer with an utility
function u(.) defined over wealth, after-increment task response, T2 (L), may
equal, exceed, or fall short oJ, her before-increment task response, T,(L),
depending on the form of absolute risk aversion embodied in 7l(.).
Thus, comparison of task responses (certainty-equivalents) between stages
provides an experimental test of the form of absolute risk aversion for the
scale of change in wealth considered here.
2.4.1.2 Time effects
The effect of our delay treatments can be divided into two distinct
effects: the pure effects of time elapsed between risk elicitation stages, and
the effect of time delay on the wealth effect - that is, the interaction of
money increment treatment with the delay treatment.
With regard to time effects, EUT is mute implicitly assuming time-
stability, that is, that an individual's risk preferences are not perturbed by
a short passage of time. \Ve know, however, that some experimental studies
report that people, when asked to state their preferences over pairwise
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choices on two different occasions, reveal different choices on each of them
(Hey & Orrne, 1994; Camerer, 1989; Loomes, 2005). We shall use the
choices from the control group (zero increment conditions) of our treatment
to provide a further test of the time-stability of subjects' preferences over a
few minutes ("Instantaneous" condition) and a week ("Delayed" condition).
With regard to delay treatment effects, it is easy to check that from
the assumption that u(.) is time-invariant, wealth effects on risk attitudes,
whatever they are, are not influenced by the time dimension involved: for
a given form of absolute risk aversion, the certainty-equivalent (task re-
sponse) attached to a lottery L at two different wealth positions, say U'o
and WI, have a relationship with each other that remains unchanged irre-
spective of the length of time elapsed between the moment at which Wo
and WI are each actually held. Therefore, under EUT a change in task
responses across periods should not be influenced by the time elapsed be-
tween period 2 and period 334• We conclude this subsection by stating the
prediction for the increment/delay treatment interaction.
Prediction 2 (Delay effects on before- and after-increment task re-
sponses): Divergence in before- and after-increment task responses, TI (L)
and T2 (L), respectiuelq, should not be altered by the time elapsed between
such periods.
34Assuming there is no wealth-relevant news between periods.
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2.4.1.3 "Inside-Outside" money effects
We now consider predictions for the effects of the form taken by the
gain of £7.00 on task responses. Loosely put, the "outside" case refers to
the effect of the £7.00 increment on task responses, while the "inside" case
refers to the effect of adding £7.00 to the lottery prizes on task responses.
To make things more concrete, consider the lotteries £2 and £5. L2
gives £9.00 with probability p and £3.00 with probability 1 - p. L5 gives
£16.00 with probability p and £10.00 with probability 1 - p. For this sub-
section, we confine our attention to these two lotteries because their payoff
difference exactly matches the gain of £7.00. The certainty equivalent
of these two lotteries, which will be denoted by C(£2) and C(£5), is the
risk free amount that gives the same expected utility as taking the lottery.
Thus, since u(.) is continuous and the expected value of a given lottery
L(p, x; 1 - p, y) is given by pu(x) + (1 - p)u(y), the certainty-equivalent of
L2 and £5 can be defined as follows:
C(£2) = u-1 (pu(9) + (1 - p)u(3)) (2.1)
C(L5) == u-1 (pU(16) + (1 - p)u(10)) (2.2)
Recall that in our decision setting a risk task is faced on two different
occasions, Stage I and Stage II, and that the outside increment of £7.00
is administered right at the end of Stage I. Each risk task has a lottery
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option, and an individual's task response is the sure amount of money that
the subject regards as exactly as good as playing that lottery - that is, the
certainty-equivalent of the lottery. Let then T; (Lj) be the task response of
an expected utility maximiser for lottery Lj at stage i, where i E {1,2}
and j E {2,5}. Then, it follows trivially that
(2.3)
(2.4)
The set of task response comparisons is illustrated in the table 2.3 below.
Let us first consider the differences in task responses to L5 and L2 within
a given stage. This is illustrated in Figure 2.4, for the case of i - 1.
Lotteries L5 and L2 are evaluated at different points of the wealth/Income
domain, and differences in their certainty equivalents (task responses, by
definition) will depend on the properties of the individual's utility function
u(U') regarding her willingness to take risks as she becomes wealthier.
Proposition 2 Suppose u(.) is concave (convex). Suppose C(L) is the cer-
tainty equivalent of the lottery L(x,p;x', l-p). Let L'(x+k,p;y,x'+k, l-p)
be a lottery constructed from L by increasing each prize of L by the amount
of k > O. Let C(L') denote the certainty equivalent of L', Then C(L') -
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Figure 2.4: Within-stage differences in the certainty-equivalent of L5 and
£2
A == EU(L~) = pu(3)+ (1- p)u(9)
u(x) B == EU(Ls) = pu(10) + (1- p)u(16)
u(x)
----~----------------~----~--------------+x
e(L'l) 9 10 e(Ls)
t t
3 16
C(£) ~ k if, and only if, u(x) exhibits decreasing/constant/increasing ab-
solute risk aversion (increasing/ constant/decreasing risk lovingness).
Proof. See Appendix A •
Proposition 2 states an intuitive result: the difference of an individual's
attitudes toward risk as a sure amount of money is added to all conse-
quences of a given risk depends on properties of the utility function con-
cerning risk-bearing behaviour as she becomes wealthier. The following
prediction follows trivially from Proposition 2.
Prediction 3 (Inside money effect on task responses): Differences
in tasks responses to L5 and L2 in a given stage i, 1i(L5) - 1i(L2) for
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i E {I,2}, may equal, exceed, or fall short of the £7.00 common increase
in prizes of L2 depending on the type of absolute risk aversion/lovingness
exhibited by the utility function.
Hence, there is no unique prediction for differences in task responses
(certainty-equivalents) to L2 and L5 within a given stage. But the sign of
such differences provide an alternative way of inferring properties of risk
preferences as wealth changes.
An equivalent prediction holds for between-stage differences in task re-
sponses to a given lottery Lj (j E {2, 5}). To see why, consider how the
subject responds at the second-stage (after-increment) to, for instance, L2•
The task is to set T2(L2) such that receiving the outside increment of £7.00
and T2(L2) for sure is exactly as good as receiving the outside increment
and playing L2• Thus, T2(L2) solves
u(7 +T2(L2)) = pu(9 + 7) + (1 - p)u(3 + 7). (2.5)
By inverting both sides of (2.5), and using (2.2),(2.4) , it follows that
(2.6)
At stage I, in turn, task response to L2 is the sure task reward that the
subject regards as exactly as good as the task resulting in play of L2•
Trivially, then,
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(2.7)
Note then that by combining (2.6) and (2.7), we can conclude that
T2 (L2) - r.(L2) = [(C (L5) - C (L2)) - 7].
Out the certainty-equivalent difference on right-hand side of this equality
is just a different way of expressing the difference in tasks responses to
L5 and L2 in a given stage i-a result that can exceed, equal, or fall
short of 7 depending on whether risk preferences, as captured by the utility
function u(.), exhibit decreasing/constant/increasing absolute risk aversion
(risk lovingness). Thus, we can make the following
Prediction 4 (Outside money effect on task responses for ~w = 7):
For an expected utility maximizer with a concave (convex) utility function
u(.) defined over wealth, betuieen-staqes (#fJerences in tasks responses to Lj
(j E {2,5}), T2{Lj) - Tt{Lj), may equal, exceed, or fall short ofO depend-
ing on the type (decreasing/constant/increasing) of absolute risk aversion
(lovingness) exhibited by the utility function.
Lastly, let us consider the prediction for a more interesting case: the
across-stage differences, that is, the differences between task response to L5
in the first stage (before increment) and task response to L2 in the second
stage (after increment).
When facing L2 at stage II, the individual view the task as setting T2(L2)
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such that receiving the outside increment of £7.00 and T2(L2) (certainty-
equivalent) for sure is exactly as good as receiving the outside increment
and playing L2• Thus, T2(L2) solves (2.5), where the argument inside the
utility function on the left-hand side of the equality is the certainty equiva-
lent with certainty plus the £7.00 increment, and the argument inside the
utility function on the right-hand side of the equality are the prizes of L2
with the £7.00 increment added. It follows from (2.5), by inversion of both
sides and using {2.2} and (2.4), that
(2.8)
Note that neither (2.3), (2.4), nor (2.8) requires any assumptions about
attitude to risk. Yet, combining all, they are sufficient to yield the following
equality
which, by eliminating Tl (£2) from both sides, can be reduced to the fol-
lowing:
(2.9)
which will be termed here as the inside-outside equivalence condition, whereby
the sure sum which is just as good as getting the increment and playing
L2 should equal the sure sum which is just as good as playing £5 without
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the increment. This is illustrated in Figure 2.5. Note that since 9+ 7 = 16
and 3 + 7 = 10, each figure, while representing the evaluation of different
lotteries, is dealing with the same locus of points in the utility space.
From (2.9), we can now derive the following prediction:
Prediction 5 (Inside-Outside money equivalence condition): For
an expected utility maximizer, differences between task response to L5 in
the first stage (before increment) and task response to L2 in the second
stage (after increment) should be such that the following condition holds:
This prediction states that, within EUT, differences in task responses
induced by an wealth increment of z should not be affected by the framing
used to introduce such wealth increment.
2.5 Results
In this section, we present the results of our experiment, confronting
the predictions for each experimental manipulation with the data. The
repeated nature of our experiment will also allow us to analyse the short-
term stability of risk preferences.
Our data sample set consists of 106 subjects, whom were about evenly
divided among treatment conditions as follows: 26 assigned to 10, 27 as-
signed to 17, 24 to DO, and 29 to D7 35.
35The sample used in our regression analysis, when the model used to estimate risk
behaviour includes controls for treatment conditions and income class, is slightly different
(102 subjects) since we excluded some subjects with missing income data.
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Figure 2.5: Utility space: "Inside-Outside" equivalence condition
u(w) L2 (after Increment)
EU(7 + ~) = pu(3+ 7)+ (1- p)u(9+ 7) = EU(Ls)
3+7 C(~) 9+7
u(w) L5 (before-mcremenr)
EU(Ls) = pu(10)+ (1- p)u(16)
u(x)
16
2.5.1 Elicited risk attitudes
\Ve start by examining the overall distribution of risk attitudes elicited
in the experiment.
A subject's attitude to risk in a given risk task featuring lottery L is
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measured here by the risk premium R(L), which is the difference between
the expected value of the lottery L (E( L)) and the certainty-equivalent
the subject assigns to L (C(£)); i.e., R(£) = E(L) - C(£)36. By taking
into account the expected value of each lottery, this measure is to some ex-
tent "normalised" across lotteries with different stakes, making individual's
elicited risk preferences readily comparable across risk tasks.
Figure 2.6 provides charts with histograms of risk premia (in British
Pounds) in each risk task. Data are pooled across treatments. Each risk
task's histogram is overlaid with a normal density distribution with same
mean and standard deviation of the data. The distribution of risk premia
is clearly skewed to the left in all risk tasks. This indicates that a high
proportion of subjects \vere displaying negative risk premia; hence, some
degree of risk-loving behaviour.
Indeed, the majority of our subjects were systematically not risk averse
throughout the risk tasks. Table 2.4 shows fractions of subjects in each
distributional "class" of risk preference over the entire set of risk tasks. A
subject is placed at class [n, m] if she were risk averse in n risk tasks and risk
neutral/loving in m, where n+m = 12. Very few displayed risk aversion in
more than half of all twelve risk tasks. While the set of histograms ill Figure
2.6 only tentatively suggests that our subject sample is characterised by
some degree of risk-lovingness, Table 2.4 shows, for instance, that 77.36%
36From now on, C(L) is taken to be the midpoint of the switching interval.
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Figure 2.6: Histogram of risk premia, by ri k task in all tratment
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Table 2.4: Distributional classes of risk preferences in all risk tasks
Distributional class Frequency 0/0 Accumulated
of risk preferneces
[0.12] 47 44.34 44.34
[1.11] 14 13.21 57.55
[2.10] 13 12.26 69.81
[3.9] 8 7.55 77.36
[4,8] 11 10.38 87.74
[5.7] 6 5.66 93.40
[6.6] 2 1.89 95.28
[7.5] 1 0.94 96.23
[8.4]
[9.3] 2 1.89 98.11
[10.2] 1 0.94 99.06
[11.1]
[12,0] 1 0.94 100.00
Nore: An individual is placed in class [n, m] if, considering all twelve risk
tasks, she displayed risk aversion in n risk tasks out of twelve; and either
risk neutrality or risk 1ovin gness in m risk tasks.
behaviour in all risk tasks.
It is worth noting that this pattern of risk attitudes is in contrast to
what is observed in most experimental studies that also elicit risk attitudes
using the multiple-price list method and often similarly small stakes37 (e.g.,
Gertner, 1993a; Holt & Laury, 2002; Andersen et al. ,2008, 200Gb; Harrison
et al. , 2007).
It is natural to ask if such distinctly different results are robust and not
driven by (1) framing differences, or (2) by anchoring effects. \Ve try here
to address each of those worries.
There is some evidence to suggest that difference in risk attitudes does
not steIn [roIll differences in the framing of risk tasks we adopted. Our
37An exception is Bombardini & Trebbi (2005). who find evidence of risk neutrality
for small stakes.
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risk tasks are indeed framed in slightly different ways, but they are likely
simpler to understand. While each pairwise choice problem in our risk tasks
involves a choice between a certain amount of money, which decreases as
one moves down the table, and a fixed lottery, in other studies subjects
are presented with a choice between two non-degenerate lotteries. Those
studies closely follow Holt & Laury (2002), where the probabilities of the
lottery prizes is the dimension being modified as one proceeds down the list
of binary choice problems. Nevertheless, subjects in a laboratory elicitation
of risk attitudes, which uses the same procedure used here, also showed a
tendency toward risk-loving behaviour {Andersen et al. , 2006a)38.
But. one could still be concerned that the contrasting results in risk
attitudes were produced by an anchoring effect towards the middle of the
table. Since in most of our risk tasks the switch point for a risk-neutral
individual lies at the bottom half of the table, responses of subjects who
tend to always pick a middle of the table decision row to switch at would
lead us to observe a great deal of risk-lovingness irrespective of her true
risk propensities.
Indeed, if there is a strong bias to the middle row, this would matter
for treatment comparisons because it would prevent any treatment effect.
\Vhile our experiment was not designed to test for bias to the middle, there
is no reason to think that a midpoint bias could generate spurious treatment
38\Vhen it is assumed, however, that cumulative income (earnings in the experiment)
is the argument of the utility function, CRRA estimates are consistent with risk ncu-
trality.
75
effects. If anything, bias towards the middle would make treatment effects
hard to observe.
In sum, we found that the subject sample in our experiment is unusually
risk loving. Since standard recruitment procedures were applied, this can
hardly be attributed to a potential sample bias.
"Ve now proceed to analyse the increment and time treatment manipu-
lations.
2.5.2 Wealth effects
\Ve start by testing whether risk attitudes across stages are affected by
an increment of £7. There is no unique prediction if one looks at each
task separately. Any sign of the wealth effect is consistent with EUT, as
changes in risk attitudes induced by the increment ultimately depend on
the form of absolute risk aversion embodied in the utility function. 39.
We investigate this question using a variety of statistical methods. We
begin by performing unconditional tests on our measure of risk-taking be-
haviour in order to compare the group of subjects assigned to the nonzero
increment condition with the group of subjects assigned to the zero incre-
ment condition.
We test t he hypothesis that changes in risk premia of subjects in uotizero
increment condition subjects are not significantly different from changes in
39It seems to be widely believed, though, that an utility function exhibiting non-
increasing relative risk aversion would better describe observed risky behaviour. CRRA
functions, for instance, are widely used on parametric estimations of risk attitudes (see,
e.g., Harrison et al. , 2005a, 2007; Andersen et al. , 2008)
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risk premia of subjects in a zero increment condition. Table 2.5 reports the
results of Mann- Whitney tests. Tests are performed for each risk task?", as
it is of interest to see whether potential wealth effects on attitudes to risk
are robust to risk tasks involving different lottery prizes and probabilities.
The results do not show any systematic differences between those who knew
£7 was guaranteed at the end of the experiment and those who were not
expecting such extra gain.
Table 2.5: Effects of expected monetary gain on attitudes to risk by delay
condition (within-subjects)
RiskTasks Overall Instantaneous Delayed
L1 Z= 0.5B5 Z= 0.977 Z= 0.OB8
(£8,O.2;£4) p=O.Oo p=0.33 p=0.93
L2 z= 1.542 Z= 0.012 Z= 0.213
(£9,0.2;£3) P = 0.123 p=0.99 p=0.83
L31L6 z=-1.93 Z= -3.020 z= 0.926
(£6,0.4;£3) p=0.23 p=O.OO p=0.30
L4 z= -0.827 z=-1.660 z= 0.323
(£9,0.3;£4) p=0.41 p=0.09 p=0.74
L5 z= 0.045 z= 1.278 z= 0.766
(£160.2'£10) o = 0.96 o = 0.20 P = 0.44
Note: M ann-Whitney two-sam pie test statistic and p-valu e repo rted in each
entry. We test for the hypothesis that changes in attitudes to risk (variation
in risk premia in a given risk task) across stages among treated (i~w=7)
and untreated (Daw=O)subjects are not different. Tests are performed on
aggregated sample and on sub-samples decomposed by delay condition.
Ho: Dariskpremia for subjects in nonzero increment condition = Dariskpremia
of subjects in zero increment condition.
Interestingly, by decomposing the sample by delay condition, we dis-
cover that the increment of £7.00 did have an effect on risky choices for
subjects assigned to the Instantaneous time treatrnent - risk premium de-
40 L3 and L6 are pooled as they are identical.
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creased, on average, after the increment of £7.00; yet, this holds only for
the identical risk tasks L3 and L6. A possible explanation for such dif-
ferences between time treatments might be that the news of the £7.00
induces an immediate change in attitude but this has worn off by the fol-
lowing week. However, we have reasons to think this is not the case, as the
increment effect is only detected in the identical risk tasks; this suggests
that the differences are not capturing the effect of a small-scale change in
wealth but, instead, a reduction in "noise" as result of practice. In sum,
the unconditional analysis performed seem to support the following
Finding 2: Elicited risk attitudes do not seem to be affected by small-scale
changes in wealth (£7).
Are these results robust to some individual controls? In order to ex-
amine that, we regress individuals' risk premia on individual and struc-
tural parameters of the experiment. With the panel data structure of our
dataset, we can now look at the same issue not only exploiting the het-
erogeneity within a given subject's sequence of risk aversion measures, but
also controlling for fundamental characteristics of the experiment and some
observed demographics. To this end, we will implement the following panel
data regression specification:
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(2.10)
where Yit, the risk premium derived from subjects' choices in each risk task,
is the dependent variable; the set of regressors mostly include dummies for
characteristics of the experiment as well as for subject-specific characteris-
tics:
1. I Ne REAt ENT is a dummy variable for whether 't received the
money increment;
2. DELAY is a dummy variable for whether i is assigned to one of the
delayed conditions (DO or D7);
3. EX P ECTV AL is the expected value of the lottery option in the risk
task faced in period t;
4. ROt VS is the number of decision rows in the risk task i faces in
period t;
5. L2L50RDER-i is a dummy for the order in which the risks involving
lotteries L2 and L5 were faccd'":
41 \Ve randomised across subjects the order those two lotteries were faced. \Ve did
this to test for order effects in relation to the L2/L5 comparisons. Note that, while in
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6. LOlV INCOA! E is a dummy equal to one if i said that her aver-
age monthly income is less than £1,000; \Ve use this information to
control for wealth effects due to income differences outside the lab.
7. DV SCORE is the the overall score in the cognitive test;
8. FEA/ALE, and POSTGRAD are two dummies: they are equal to
one if i is female (postgraduate student), respectively.
g. AGE is the i's elf-reported age. Uit is a composite error term including
a random intercept that captures subject-specific effect and a overall
disturbance term assumed to be LLd over i and t.
We use a generalized least square random effects estimator to fit (2.10).
In Table 2.6, we report the estimation results for this specification. The fact
that the coefficient in front of INC REAl ENT is not statistically significant
suggests that risk attitudes, as measured by the lottery risk premium, are
not influenced by the scale of the prior gain received. The estimates also
reveal that the effect of scaling up the stakes of the lottery option in the
risk tasks - reflected in its expected value - is to decrease elicited measure
of risk aversion. \Ve shall later follow up this question when analysing the
"inside/outside" money framing effects.
Estimates showed that an increase in the number of rows in a risk task
tended, on average, to reduce subjects' risk premia. The coefficient in front
a very moderate scale, this randomisation can also be seen as a partial test of order
effects in our sequence of risk-elicitation tasks, as a full test for all possible sequence
with which the tasks could be faced would be cost prohibitive.
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of RO~VS is negative and statistically significant. Recall that risk tasks
with more decisions rows have larger stakes, so the coefficient of the num-
ber of rows variable captures the effect of stake size on risk attitudes. This
is consistent with the sign of the coefficient of the expected value variable,
which also reflects the size of the lottery stakes. The remainder of the
variables, including most demographic controls, are not statistically signif-
icant. In conclusion, our regression analysis confirms the result presented
in Finding 2.
2.5.3 Time effects on choice decisions
We now consider the time treatment effects on the risk attitudes of
subjects who received the increment of £7.00.
Recall that our time treatment conditions involve manipulating the
length of the delay between the news of the reward of the £7.00 increment
and second-stage of risk-elicitation tasks: a short delay of a few minutes
in the "Instantaneous" treatment, and of one week in the "Delayed" treat-
ment. For an expected utility maxi miser with an utility function defined
over wealth, £7.00 today and £7.00 in one week's time are, in lifetime
terms, equlvalent'". Thus, we would expect no effect of delay.
Table 2.7 reports statistics for t-test and non-parametric tests for whether
second-stage responses of subjects in the "Delayed" and "Instantaneous"
conditions are significantly different.
42Ignoring interest that might be earned in one week.
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The hypothesis that there is not significant difference in risk premia
between these treatment conditions cannot be rejected for any of the risk
tasks. This supports the following:
Finding 4: The length of delay between risk-elicitation task stages (one
week) does not seem to induce different task responses.
This finding hardly poses a challenge for a theory that has little to
say about the influence of time delay on choice decisions involving identi-
cal problems. This result can, however, have relevant implications for an
alternative theoretical account of our time treatment effects.
Consider, for instance, Prospect Theory, according to which a risky
prospect is evaluated by contrasting its outcomes to a reference-point. On
the assumption that a decision maker's reference-point is her expectations
about outcomesv', the length of the delay could induce different responses.
One possible reason for that is the time-conditioned process of adjustment
of expectations to new wealth-relevant information: even if the change in
wealth induces an update in the reference-point (equated to her expecta-
tions), this may not take place immediately, and some time will be necessary
to fully observe its effects. In this case, the length of the delay should induce
a change in the coding rule that describes subjects' behaviour. Therefore,
if one week seems a plausible amount of time to unfold the adjustment of
expectations, the comparison of "Instantaneous" and "Delayed" treatments
43This is similar, but not precisely the same assumption advanced by Koszegi &.
Rabin (2006).
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Table 2.7: Time effects on second-stage responses
Time tr eatments Tests Results
Man~ Kolmogorov-
Whitney Smirnov
z= -0.298 0= 0.107
P = 0.76 p=0.99
z= -0.473 0=0.131
p=0.64 p=0.97
z= 0.977 0=0.250
p=0.33 p=0.35
Z= -0.463 0=0.153
p=0.60 p=0.90
z=-1.29 0= 0.177
p=0.20 p=0.80
z=-0.199 0=0.173
p=0.84 P =0.80
Risk tasks Delayed Instantaneous
L1 -0.56 -0.50
(£8,0.3;£4) (0.58) (0.54)
L2 -0.79 -0.48
(£9,0.2;£3) (0.95) (0.65)
L3 -0.23 -0.17
(£6,0.4;£3) (0.32) (0.34)
L4 -0.50 -0.30
(£9,0.3;£4) (0.64) (0.52)
L5 -0.91 -0.73
(£16,0.2;£10) (1.19) (0.98)
L6 -0.22 -0.13
(£6,0.4;£3) (0.34) (0.40)
Note: Risk premia means reported in columns of treatment conditions, with
standard deviatio n reparte din paranth eses. Th e rightmost col umns report
parametric tests for time effects on second-stage respo nses from subjects
assigned to the nonzero increment conditions. The null hypothesis is that
second-sta ge risk me asures of su bjects (risk premi urn) wh 0 were assigne d to the
nonze ro incre ment conditi on are not significa ntly diffe rent betwe en
"Instantaneous" and "Delayed" time treatment conditions. We test this null
hypothesis for each risk task.
should provide a test of the speed of expectations adjustment - conditional,
of course, on expectations being taken as the reference-point. But the above
finding is open to several interpretations. It suggests, for instance, that sub-
jects do not take the expected outcomes, in our case, the wealth increment
announced at the end of stage II, as their reference-point. But it could also
be the case that subjects do take their expectations regarding earnings in
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the experiments as their reference-point; but their expectations are either
slowly (longer than one week) or instantaneously adjusted.
2.5.3.1 Time stability of risky choices
We now turn to look at whether choice decisions arc stable between
risk-elicitation stages, spaced either a few minutes or a week apart. This
will be addressed via the test-retest component of our experiment design, as
each risk task is faced 011 two different occasions by each subject. For this
particular question, we usc raw data: a subject's number of "safe choices",
that is, the number of times the subject chose the sure money option before
she switches from the sure thing to the lottery option.
Although very small, the length of the time interval over which stability
of risk attitude is tested here seems to have relevant counterparts in real-
world economic settings: many decisions involving risk in financial markets,
which normally involve a great deal of risk, are made on a very short
timescale. For example, it is rather common in these markets rapidly switch
from buying to selling a given instrument on a time-interval of minutes.
While virtually every model, for instance, of portfolio allocation pre-
sumes that risk attitudes are stable over short time, experimental evidence
on this question is mixed at best. Using the Ml'L method to elicit risk
attitudes, Harrison et al. (2005b) has found that rnean elicited CRRA co-
efficients differ between two experiments around six months apart, though
differences in the mean coefficients are not statistically significant'". In
44But care must be taken in interpreting these results: differences in conditional
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other laboratory experiments, though, it has been observed that as much
as 25% of subjects reverse their decisions in pairwise choice tasks faced
twice within a single experimental session (see Loomes & Sugden, 1998).
While we observed that there was some discrepancy between individ-
ual's responses to risk tasks at different stages, this turns out not to be
statistically significant. In Table 2.8 we report the percentage of subjects
whose risk attitudes, as measured by the number of safe choices, elicited in
each risk task were equivalent between stages. \Ve see, for instance, that
when there was a short delay between stages ("Instantaneous" treatment),
as much as half of subjects made precisely the same decision in some risk
tasks.
Although the great majority of subjects did not make identical decisions
in each stage a given risk task was faced, the distribution in both treatment
is to some extent very much concentrated about a mean of zero - that is, no
change in decisions across stages. Figure 2.7 shows the set of histograms of
changes in decisions (in terms of number of "safe" decisions) across stages
for each risk task L, (i = {I, ... , 6}); for convenience, the histogram is
overlaid with a normal distribution that has the same mean and standard
deviation as the data.
However suggestive, inference based on simple comparison of raw in-
dividual responses can be misleading with respect to the distribution of
coefficient means, however small, can be misleading as within-subject reversals of risk
attitudes may be difficult to perceive if changes across cross-sections happen to be mean-
preserving.
86
Table 2.8: Stability of risk preferences between stages
Instantaneous +0 Delayed+O
(N=26) (N=24)
Lotteries % %
L1 0.50 0.29
(£8,0.3;£4)
L2 0.11 0.21
(£9,0.2;£3)
L3 0.50 0.29
(£6,0.4;£3)
L4 0.38 0.17
(£9,0.3;£4)
LS 0.23 0.21
(£16,0.2;£10)
L6 0.42 O.SO
(£6,0.4;£3)
Note: Numbers reported in the table are the percentage of
subjects assigne d to zero-increm ent treatm ent co nditions whose
responses (number of safe choices) were equal between stages,
per risk task.
responses at each risk-elicitation stage. In Table 2.9 we present test statis-
tics for the null hypothesis that risk attitudes across stages from subjects
assigned to zero increment conditions are not significantly different. \Ve
report separate results for each delay condition in order to control for
potentially differences in individual characteristics across treatment con-
ditions samples. Two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank and t tests at 5 percent
level suggest that there is no significant difference between the distribu-
tion of elicited risk attitudes: in most of the risk tasks, they were stable
between stages in both delayed and instantaneous treatment conditions ill
which ~w = 0; We can only reject this assumption regarding the risk tasks
involving lottery L3, and interestingly, when the length of delay between
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Figure 2.7: Hi togram of changes in number of safe choic across tages
by risk task by time treatment
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\Ve can thus state the following:
Finding 5: Individual responses to risk elicitation tasks at Stage I do not
differ from responses to the same risk tasks elicited at Stage II irrespective
of the length of delay between them.
2.5.4 "Inside" and "outside" money effects
\Ve now investigate the effect of the form taken by the small-scale change
in wealth all risk attitudes: the "inside" and the "outside" form. In the
"inside" form, a money increment of £7.00 is added to the prizes of a
baseline lottery; in the "outside" form, the money increment is given to
subjects, who are then supposed to assess a fixed lottery from two different
wealth positions - before and after the small-scale wealth increment.
Recall that such effects are examined through within-subject compar-
isons of responses to risk tasks with lotteries L5(0.2, 16; 0.8, 10) and L2(0.2, 9; 0.8, 3)
(see Table 2.3). There are three relevant differences in task responses to
these lotteries:
1. IVithin-stage differences {UInside money effect"}: 1i(L5) -1i(L2) i E
{1,2}
2. Between-stage differences {"Outside money effect''}: T2(Lj )-Tl (Lj) j E
{2.5}
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3. "Inside-Outside" equivalence: T; (L5) - [T2(L2) + 7] = 0 i =I- j
The theoretical predictions regarding the sign and magnitude of the
within- and between-stage differences are that they are all consistent with
EUT: such differences can vary across individuals, with the sign of them de-
pending on properties of the individual's u(.) (i.e., if their utility function
exhibit CARA, DARA, lARA). But theory gives a more precise predic-
tion regarding the relationship between such differences. More specifically,
it predicts an "Inside-Outside" equivalence, by which task response differ-
ences induced by an increment to wealth by !::Jaw should not be affected
by the framing used to introduce such increment. We showed that for
this equivalence condition to hold, the after-increment "corrected" response
to L2 (when taking into account the outside increment) should equal the
before- increment t ask response to L5.
\Ve first examine the within-stage differences. Table 2.10 reports statis-
tics about the distribution of differences in responses, in terms of certainty
equivalent, to L5 and L2 in each stage.
Table 2.10: "Inside" money effects: Within-stage differences in responses
to L5 and L2
Stand ..lul
deviation
Min P25 P50 P15 Ma x
7.43 1.59 3.5 6.75 7.25 8.00 12.50
7.03 1.05 4.25 6.50 7.00 7.50 10.00
Note: Task response IS the medium point of the elicited certainty-equivalent Interval. Statistics of stage Ii
dl1Terences are taking into account only subjects assigned to zero treatment conditions.
The distribution of within-stage differences in task responses is fairly
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symmetrical around the average, which is slightly larger than 7. When we
consider the first-stage, for instance, differences in responses to L5 and L2
were larger than 7 for 78 subjects (74%). These patterns are kept similar
when considering the second-stage differences in responses to L5 and L2•
According to Proposition 2, this result is consistent with a convex utility
function exhibiting increasing absolute risk lovingness.
This result. has key implications for a recent literature over calibration
critique of decision theories (Rabin, 2000; Cox & Sadiraj, 2006; Wakker,
2005; Safra & Segal, 2008). Motivated by the broad use of EUT to explain
departures from risk neutrality when gambles are small, Rabin (2000) has
proved an influential theorem showing that risk aversion over small gambles
implies unrealistic levels of risk aversion over very attractive gambles with
large stakes. This result has been extended to non-expected utility theories
(Cox & Sadiraj, 2006; Safra & Segal, 2008). But it is known, however, that
this calibration critique relies on the empirical assumption that a given
gamble continues to be rejected over a wide range of wealth levels (see,
e.g., Wakker, 2005). This pattern of risk aversion is only consistent with
risk preferences that display constant absolute risk aversion. But our results
suggest that this assumption may not have empirical validity; our subjects'
pattern of risk preferences seem to change over what can be regarded as a
narrow range of wealth levels, displaying, hence, everything but constant
absolute risk aversion.
\Ve now examine the between-stage differences, that is, differences in
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tasks responses before- and after increment to L2 and L5. Table 2.11
reports statistics about the distribution of such differences in the group of
subjects assigned to nonzero increment conditions. We also report a break
down of these statistics by time treatments. For ease of comparison of
increment effects, we also present statistics on differences in responses to
L2 and L5 across stages for subjects in zero increment treatments.
Average figures show that roughly half of the subjects were overall COIl-
sistent with constant risk aversion: between-stage differences in responses
to L5 and L2 were near zero. Yet, when considering average differences
to the lottery with larger prizes, L5, the outside increment seems to have
induced risk aversion. A contrasting result, though, is suggested hy results
to the risk tasks with smaller stakes, L2: among subjects in a non-zero
increment condition (/7, D7), average difference in task responses across
stages is positive, which is consistent with risk lovingness.
Yet, this contrasting pattern of differences in task responses was not
induced by the outside increment. Using subjects assigned to the zero in-
crement conditions as control groups, we test whether difference in task
responses of subjects who received the outside increment (/7, D7) are sig-
nificantly different from difference in task responses of subjects assigned to
zero increment conditions (ID, DO). Table 2.12 reports statistics of Mann-
\Vhitney two-sample tests (two-tailed) for lottery L5 and L2•
We now test whether the "Inside-Outside" equivalence condition holds,
namely, that T2(L2) + 7 = Tt (L5)' This equivalence condition states that,
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Table 2.12: Are between-stage task response differences induced by outside
money? Comparison of between-stage differences in responses to 15 and
12 between nonzero (treatment) and zero (control) treatment conditions
Test statlstic s
Hypotheses Mann-Whitney two-sample
statistic
Instant.meolls neatments
[T:(l5) - T.(U) I 17]v [T:(ls) - T,{ls) I lOJ Z = -0.209p= 0.83
z=-1.096
p= 0.11[T:{L:) - T,~ I 17]v [T:{L:) - T,~ IIOJ
Del~ed treatments
[T:{U) - T ,(l.s) 107] v [T=<U,)- T 1{ls) I DOJ Z= -0.996p= 0.32
Z= -0.991
p=0.32[T:{l.:.) - T.(L:) 107] v [T::(k) - TICk) IDO]
Note: Null hypothesis is that. rr~(L5) - Tl(U)] of subjects assigned to 17(01) is
not significanUy different from [Tl(L5) - Tl(L5)] of subjects assigned to 10(DO).
for an expected utility maximizer with an utility function defined on wealth,
the sure sum which is just as good as getting the increment and playing
L2 at stage II should equal the sure sum which is just as good as playing
L5 before the increment. Figure 2.8 displays the histogram of differences
between task response to 15 at stage I and the outside increment-corrected
task response to 12 at stage II, which, if the equivalence condition holds,
should be zero.
Considering that there is a wide range of values the differences between
Tt (15) and T2(L2) + 7 can take, it is worth noting that subjects for whom
this difference takes the value zero, Le. the equivalence condition holds, are
relatively more frequent (21,43%) than subjects for whom the task response
difference deviates from zero. Yet, we cannot accept the hypothesis that
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the equivalence condition is not violated. A Wilcoxon signed rank test of
the condition, with 56 matched observations, yields z = 2.041, p = 0.04
(two-tailed). \Ve conclude with the following
Finding 6: The "Inside-Outside" equivalence condition does not hold. Dif-
ferences between task response to L5 at stage I (before increment) and
increment-corrected task response to L2 at stage II (after increment) are
not, as predicted, equal to zero.
Why is this equivalence condition violated? It is possible to come up
with different theoretical accounts for that. One could argue, for exam-
ple, that this violation sterns from the presence of a "noise" component in
subjects choices that behaves differently across different ranges of lottery
prizes. But this would require the distribution of noise to be affected by
the expected value of the lottery; otherwise, if noise has a distribution that
holds across risk tasks, noise itself cannot predict a systematic tendency to
violate the equivalence condition in a particular direction.
Alternatively, this violation could also be accounted for by a framing
effect, inconsistent with EUT defined on overall wealth. To see how, let us
start noticing that the "Inside-Outside" equivalence condition holds under
the hypothesis that the decision-maker integrates the increment with the
outcomes of the the lottery L2 (asset integration); it is because of this
hypothesis that task responses to L2 after the increment is supposed to be
framed in a way that makes it equivalent to the task response to L5 before
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the increment, Tt (L5). The violation of the "Inside-Outside" condition can,
then, be just a consequence of a failure of the asset integration hypothesis
in describing how individuals assess a gamble: they simply do not merge
prior gains with the direct consequences of taking the gamble.
2.6 Conclusions
We have investigated experimentally three related issues. First, the ef-
fects of small-scale changes in wealth on risk attitudes. Second, the effects
of time on risk attitudes, which involves a twofold issue: all examination
of different delay times on elicitation of risk attitudes in a repeated set-
ting, and an examination of whether and how potential changes in risk
attitudes induced by the small wealth increment are affected by how long
such increment has been anticipated for - we compare the case in which
the increment has just been earned to when it has been anticipated for a
week. Third, ho,v the frame adopted to introduce a small wealth increment
affects attitudes to a given risk. vVe examine two "frames": the inside "in-
side" frame, when the increment of £7.00 is commonly added to the prizes
of a lottery, and the "outside" frame, when the increment is simply given
to the subject.
Regarding wealth effects, we have observed that risk attitudes do not
seem to be systematically affected by the small-scale change in wealth (£7).
The experimentally induced increment is modest, but it was larger than the
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expected value of almost all lotteries used in our experiment. Theoretically,
and from a EUT standpoint, this result suggests that overall subjects dis-
play risk attitudes consistent with constant absolute risk aversion. This
result is also entirely consistent with a narrow bracketing of problems,
whereby individuals tend to evaluate new gambles they are offered in iso-
lation from other wealth-relevant events. Barberis et al. (2006) show that
this psychological feature can actually help a wide range of decision-making
theories to account for departures from risk neutrality over small gambles.
\Vhile risk aversion is far from widespread in our subject sample, we do find
evidence that subjects' risky decisions ignore the small wealth increment
they were given - and, more generally, their wealth level; instead, they see
to base their decisions only upon the direct outcomes of the risk faced,
therefore, adopting such "narrow bracketing".
Regarding the time treatments, and particularly the purely effect of de-
lay times on elicited risky choices, subjects' decisions have tended to show,
on average, a fair degree of short-term stability. \Ve have had subjects fac-
ing risk tasks on two distinct points of time; some faced them a few minutes
apart, while others faced them one week apart. \Ve have found that risk
task responses elicited at two different occasions do not systematically differ
from each other regardless of the length of delay between them employed in
our experiment. Indeed, as it has been pointed by some (e.g., Hey & Orme,
1994)), some of our subjects indeed do not give precisely the same answer
to a risk task on the second occasion - which would be too "demanding"
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a test of stability. But differences have not been statistically significant
and can be regarded as "noise". Thus, this result has suggested that sub-
jects' risk preferences elicited through the rnultiple-price-list method tend
to exhibit consistency at least over short period of time.
We have also examined the interaction of time and increment treat-
ments. By doing so, we have checked whether how long the increment had
been anticipated for would affect whether and how the increment would
affect risk attitudes. The span of time was either a few minutes or a
week. No effect has been found: comparing risky decisions before- and
after-increment, we have found that there was no statistically significant
difference between delay conditions. This has suggested that, regardless of
how long the increment has been anticipated for, it is still ignored (narrow
bracketing) in subsequent problems, hence, not inducing a different rep-
resentation of the risky problem. Regarding the realm of reference-point
theories (e.g., Prospect Theory), although our design have not provided a
rigorous test of particular assumptions about reference-point determina-
tion, these results can be regarded as instructive; they suggest one of the
following: either (1) that subjects do not take the expected outcomes, in
our case the wealth increment announced before the second round of risk
tasks, as their reference-point; or (2) that they do, but the expectations
are slowly adjusted (a least longer than a week); or (3) that increment is
embedded immediately in reference point.
Regarding the inside/outside money effect, we have found that the same
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amount of money, £7.00, given "inside" the lottery induces more risk loving-
ness, while money given "outside" does not induce changes in risk attitudes.
This results is, in principle, entirely compatible with those from previous
studies reporting prior monetary gains induce people to take more risks
(e.g., Ackert et al. , 2006). Yet what we have found is not a "classic" house
money effect - in fact, we have not replicated it in our experiment - but a
"built-in" house money effect., whereby the "house money" is added to all po-
tential outcomes of the lottery. This is essentially distinct from scaling-up
(multiplicatively) the lottery' outcomes (Holt & Laury, 2002), which even
has been shown to have an opposite effect on risk attitudes (Binswanger,
1980; Holt. & Laury, 2002; Harrison et al. , 2005a).
On the other hand, different ways of framing the increment should not
produce, in theory, different responses. According to standard EUT, for
instance, an "equivalence condition" should hold, namely: the certainty-
equivalent of a lottery L after the £7.00 increment is given should not
differ from the certainty-equivalent of a lottery L', where L' is just a trans-
formed version of L whereby £7.00 is added to lottery L's prizes. But when
confronting this prediction with the data, we have observed that such equiv-
alence condition does not hold with the difference of certainty-equivalents
for L5 and L2 being larger than 7 (loosely put, L5 = L2 + 7).
This result unfolds two distinct theoretical implications. One is that the
effects a wealth increment may have on individuals' risk preferences can be
sensitive to the vehicle used to introduce it - frames matter. Our preferred
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explanation for this "framing" inconsistency is a simple one: when assess-
ing a risk, individuals simply do not merge prior gains with the potential
consequences of taking the risk. This is also consistent with the idea that
decision makers are passive and accept the frames presented to them (Kah-
neman & Tversky, 1979). \Ve readily acknowledge that this is no longer
novel - it is just a violation of the "asset integration" hypothesis demon-
strated in SOUle experiments by (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) that has been
re-labeled as "narrow bracketing". But we have been able to go further on
this "inside-outside" money issue. This brings us to the second theoretical
implication: we have showed that the difference of certainty-equivalents for
L5 and L2 (larger, smaller than, or equal to, 7) reveals information about
properties of one's utility function regarding risk-bearing behaviour when
wealth increases. The results suggest that anything but constant absolute
risk aversion describes out subjects' choices. This may have implications
for the for the practical consequence of the calibration critiques of decision
theories. They are relying on an empirical assumption - rejection of a given
lottery over a wide range of wealth positions - that holds for a class of util-
ity functions that, our experiment suggests, do not capture an increment
to wealth affects individuals' attitudes to a given risk.
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ApPENDICES
2.7 Appendices
2.7.1 Appendix A - Proofs
Proof. of Proposition 1
We provide a demonstration for the case where 1/;(WI, L) > 1/;(Wo, L).
In terms of task response, in this case, it follows trivially that T2(L) ==
C(L, WI) < C(L, lVo) == TI(L). Proofs for the other cases use similar
arguments and are therefore omitted.
\Ve first prove that aR;~w) > 0 => 'ljJ(wJ, L) > 't/J(wo, L).
Assume that an;lw) > 0 for all w E [w, w], where 0 ~ w < w. Assume that
u(.) is monotone and strictly concave over [w, w]. Consider that Uo and UI
are the utility function evaluated at Wo and WI, respectively, where Wo, WI
E [w, w). Since aRa~w) > 0 and WI > Wo, we can infer that the decision
maker is more risk averse at WI than at Wo, that is, -u~/u~ < -u~lu;.
In this case, and at least over a closed ball with center WI and radius
T ~ WI - Wo, we can see UI as a concave transformation of tlo, that is,
UI = cI>(uo) where cl> is a monotone and strictly concave function. Observe
now that
UI(W + E(L) -1/J(w}, L)) = E{UI(W + L)) (by risk premium definition)
104
E(¢(uo(W + L))] < ¢(E(uo(w + L)]) (by Jensen's inequality)
¢(E(uo(w + L)]) = ¢(uo(w + E(L) - 'l/J(wo, L))
¢(Uo (w + E (L) - 1/J(Wo, L)) = U 1 (W + E (L) - 1/J ( WO, L),
This implies, by monotonicity of Ut, that 'l}J( WJ, L) > 'l/J(wo, L). This corn-
pletes the first part of the proof.
\Ve now have to prove that 1/J(WI! L) > 1/J(Wo, L) => aR;Jw) > O. \Ve do so
using a simple argument. Let A be the statement that aR~W) > 0 and B
that 'ljJ(Wb L) > 'ljJ(wo, L). Assume that (I'V A) holds. If that is the case,
then we know that it cannot be true that -u~/u~ < -u1 /u~. From the first
part of the proof, we know then that (I'V A) implies that 1/J(Wt, L) cannot
be greater than 1/J(wo, L). Thus, as u(.) is strictly concave, it must be that
(I'V A) => (I'V B). Hence, B => A. This completes the proof. •
Proof. of Proposition 2
\Ve will prove the 'if" part the proposition (=» for the cases of concave
and convex utility functions. But before we proceed with this part of the
proof, we layout the conditions of the problem for clarity.
Suppose u : X --+ R is a utility function, where X is a convex subset
of a real linear space, L. Suppose that u(.) is continuous, increasing and
twice-differentiable OIl X.
105
Let x and x' be elements of X (x' > x), and let p E [0, 1]. Then suppose
that L(x,p; x', 1 - p) is a baseline lottery that gives x with probability p
and x' with probability 1 - p. Since u(.) is continuous and monotonically
increasing, L has a certainty-equivalent, that is, there exists an element
Cl E X satisfying
u(cd = pu(x) + (1 - p)u(x')
Now, let L'(x + k,pjx' + k, 1 - p) be a lottery constructed from L by
increasing each prize of L by the amount of k, so that L' gives x + k with
probability P and x' + k with probability 1 - p. For simplicity, assume that
x' + k ~ sup X. Again, L' has a certainty-equivalent, that is, there exists
an element C2 E X satisfying
U(C2) = pu(x + k) + (1 - p)u(x' + k)
We now prove the "if-part" of Proposition 2. \Ve start with
Case 1: u(.) is concave. If u(.) is concave then C2 - Cl ~ k if, and only
if, u(.) exhibits decreasing/constant/increasing absolute risk aversion.
Suppose u(.) is concave. By Jensen's inequality, it follows that
U(C2) < u(p(x + k) + (1 - p)(x' + k))
u(cd < u(px + (1 - p)x')
(2.11 )
(2.12)
Since u(.) is an increasing function, u(a) > u(b) => a > b. Therefore, it
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follows from 2.11 and 2.12, respectively, that
C2 < p(x + k) + (1 - p)(x' + k) = E(L') (2.13)
Cl < p.r + (1 - p).r' = E(L) (2.14)
\Ve know then that 3 a, b E lR+ such that C2 +a = E(L') and Cl +b = E(L).
Thus
C2 - Cl = [E(L') - E(L)] + (b - a) = k + (b - a)
Let R(Al) denote the risk premium of a lottery At, defined as EAt - C(A1),
where E(Al) is the expected value and C(Al) is the certainty-equivalent of
11, respectively. Note then that a and b are just the risk premium of L'
and L, respectively. Let them R( L) = band R( L') = a. Thus, C2 - Cl > k
if R(L) > R(L'), that is, if the risk premium of L is larger than the risk
premi urn of L'.
Note, however, that the evaluation of L' and L can be seen as equivalent
to the evaluation of L at two initial levels of wealth, W = 0 and w' = w + k;
and that the difference between the expected value of L and the amount
of money, denoted by c, for which the individual is indifferent between the
lottery L and the certain amount c is decreasing in w.
But it is a well known result that the risk premium of a given lottery
is decreasing in wealth if and only if u(.) exhibits decreasing absolute risk
aversion (DARA). We can therefore state that
C2 - Cl > k if b > a, that is, if u(.) exhibits DAHA.
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Similarly,
C2 - Cl = k if b = a, that is, if u(.) exhibits constant absolute risk
aversion.
C2 - Cl < k if b < a, that is, if u(.) exhibits increasing absolute risk
aversion.
•
Case 2: u(.) is convex. IJu(.) is a convex Junction then C2-CI ~ k if, and
only if, u(.) exhibits incresituj/constant/decreasinq absolute risk lovingness ..
Suppose u(.) is convex. By Jensen's inequality, it follows that
U(C2) > u(p(x + k) + (1 - p)(x' + k))
u(cd > u(px + (1 - p)x')
(2.15)
(2.16)
Since u(.) is an increasing function, it follows from 2.15 and 2.16, respec-
tively, that
C2 > p(x + k) + (1 - p)(x' + k) = E(L') (2.17)
Cl > px + (1 - p)x' = E(L) (2.18)
We know then that 3 a, bE lR+ such that C2 = E(L')+a and Cl = E(L)+b.
Thus
C2 - Cl = (E( L') - E( L)) + (a - b)) = k + (a - b)
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In this case, note that a and b are just the negative symmetric of the risk
premium of L' and L, respectively. Let them -R(L) = band -R(L') = a.
Thus, C2 - Cl > k if -R(L') > -R(L) -+ R(L') < R(L), that is, if the risk
premium of L is larger than the risk premium of L'.
Note, however, that the evaluation of L' and L can be seen as equivalent
to the evaluation of L at two initial levels of wealth, w = 0 and w' = w + k;
and that the difference between the expected value of L and the amount
of money, denoted by c, for which the individual is indifferent between the
lottery L and the certain amount c is decreasing in w.
By the same argument used before, the evaluation of L' and L can be
seen as equivalent to the evaluation of L at two initial levels of wealth,
w = 0 and w' = w + k; and that the difference between the expected value
of L and the amount of money, denoted by c, for which the individual is
indifferent between the lottery L and the certain amount c is increasing in
ut, That is, since the individual is risk-lover, the higher her wealth, the
higher the amount of money in excess of the expected value required, with
certainty, to make her as good as playing L.
By symmetry, the risk premium of a given lottery of a risk-lover is
increasing as the individual become wealthier if and only if u(.) exhibits
increasing absolute risk lovingness (IARL). Therefore, we can state that
C2 - Cl > k if b > a, that is, if u(.) exhibits IARL.
Similarly,
C2 - Cl - k if b - a, hence, if u(.) exhibits constant absolute risk
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lovingness.
C2 - Cl < k if b < a, hence, if u(.) exhibits decreasing absolute risk
lovingness. •
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2.7.2 Appendix B - Instructions
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
PIECE 1: COl'vtMON TO ALL TREATMENT CONDITIONS
Welcome
Thanks for participating. Let me remind you that this experiment has two
sessions. Today's session of this experiment should be complete within an
hour. You signed up to a second session which will take place here in one
week's time. I will say more about it at the end of today's session.
Important Note
Please do not communicate in any way with other participants during
this experiment. Please remember to switch off your mobile. Also, please
do not write on these instructions. If you have a question or problem at
any point in today's session, please raise your hand and I will come to you.
The Exper-iment
This is a study of individual decision-making. Although there are many
people participating in today's session of this experiment, your earnings will
not depend on what others do. The money you receive for participating
will depend partly 011 choices you Blake yourself and partly on chance.
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In this experiment, you will be asked to complete risk tasks and multiple-
choice tasks. 'Ye will give you instructions for the risk tasks now. Please,
take a few minutes to read them through with me.
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RISK TASKS
PIECE 2: COl\1MON TO ALL TREATMENT CONDITIONS
Instructions
You will be required to complete several risk tasks. In each risk task you will
face a set of choice problems, in which you have to choose between option
A, which involves receiving a sure amount of money, or option B, which
involves receiving an amount of money where the amount is determined by
chance.
Please click on the "Demonstration" button on your screen to see
what each risk task will look like. Please follow my directions now. Do not
dick OIl anything until told to do so.
INTERACTIVE DEMONSTRATION
Parts in Italic below were not on subjects' instructions; They
were read out to them during on-screen demonstration
{The table you see on the screen is an illustration of what each risk task
will look like}.
{Observe that this table presents a set of 21 choice problems, each posed
in a given row; each row is a choice between Option A, a sure amount
of money, and Option B, a lottery. You must make a choice between the
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options in every decision row. Observe that Option B, the lottery, is the
same in each row, whereas option A varies, offering progressively smaller
sums as you move down the table:/
[Lei me explain now what a lottery is. As an example, look at two-colour
bar on the right-side of your screen. This is a graphical representation of
the lottery. The lottery has two possible prizes, in this example £ 7 and E 2.
We select the prize by drawing a numbered chip frorn a bag that contains
100 chips consecutively numbered from 1 to 100. E 7 is paid if the chip
drawn is numbered 1 to 35, whereas E 2 is paid if the chip is numbered 36
to 100./
[Let me explain tunu the following interactive [eature.]
fPlease click on the button corresponding to the Option A, offering
E 7. 00 for sure, at the first decision row. This would mean that you prefer
to receive E 7. 00 for sure to playing the lottery.J
[Noui click on the the button corresponding to the Option A, offering
E 5.50 for sure, at the seventh decision row. This would mean that you
prefer to receive £5.50 for sure to playing the lottery. Note that the com-
puter automatically filled-in the buttons corresponding to the Option A up
to E 7. 00. ~Vhy has it done so? ~Vhen you chose option A at a certain
row, the computer will then assume that you prefer option A whenever it is
offering a sum larger than that at the row you clicked first. So, when you
chose to receive .£5.50 for sure to playing the lottery, the computer assumed
that you also prefer E 5.75, E 6.00, and so on, up to E 7.00, to playing the
114
lottery.J
[Click now please on the the button corresponding to the Option B, at
the bottom decision row of the table. This would mean that you prefer
playing the lottery to receiving £2.00 for sure. /
[Noui click on the the button corresponding to the Option B at the de-
cision row 15th. This would mean that you prefer playing the lottery to
receiving £3.50 for sure. Note that the computer automatically filled-in the
buttons corresponding to the Option B down to £2. 00. The logic here is
similar to before. ~Vhen you choose option B at a certain row, the computer
will then assume that you prefer option B whenever the amount of money
offered by Option A is smaller than that at the roui uihere you selected op-
tion B. So, when you chose to play the lottery over receiving E 3.50 for sure,
the computer assumed that you also prefer to play the lottery to receiving
E 3.25, £3.00 for sure, and so on, down to £2.00./
[Note that you must give a choice for every decision row of the table.
As it stands, in our example, if you have exactly followed my instructions,
a choice is still to be made at decision rows 8 to 14. The risk task is not
complete until an option is chosen at every decision row. So, choose any
option you like at decision row number 11. If you chose option A, the
computer will fill-in the option A at all decision rows up, whereas if you
chose option B, the computer will fill-in the option B at all decision rows
down. Choose any option you like for the decision rows at which an option
was not chosen yet. Doing so, you have completed a risk task. I
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{Before confinning your choices, you can, of course, change your mind
and switch the option chosen at any row. The computer will adjust the
choices accordingly.1
{It is important to observe that the computer fills in the button accord-
ing to your choices. You can make any choices you like, subject to the
constraint that you cannot switch between options A and B more than once
in the same risk task. I
Now, I will give you a few minutes to practice yourself. To do so, close
the window by clicking on the "Finish Demonstration" button. Then, click
on the "Practice" button again to see a new instance of this risk task. If
you have a question, please raise your hand and I will C01neto you.
PRACTICE
{Please, click on the "Finish Demonstration" button now and turn to
the instructions now please/
How your earnings are determined
We will determine your earnings at the end of the experiment as follows.
After you have finished all risk tasks in this experiment, the computer will
then randomly pick one decision row on each risk task you performed, The
following figure illustrates ho\v the screen would look like at this point of
the experiment if there had only been two risk tasks.
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Figure 2.9: D termining your earnings: selection of decision row per risk
task
First Risk Task
Row selected You chose
Row selectedr-- You choser-'--
For each risk task you perform in this experiment, there will be a row
like one of those on the figure above. Notice that th re is a spin button for
each task. You will b asked to hit all the spin buttons. As you do this, for
a giv n ta k th comput r will randomly select one of the decision rows
fr m th t task. Th computer will use a special randomization device that
makes all d ci ions rows from th task equally likely to b chos n. So,
note hat for v ry risk task you perform, on d cision row will b s lected;
and 11are equally lik ly.
The set of lect d d cision rows will be displayed on the computer
er n. Th omput r will then retrieve which option you chose at that
row. We then sel ct the option you chose from one of the selected rows.
To do 0, I will a k you to draw a ball from a bag, which contains balls
individually numbered from 1 up to th number of risk tasks you performed.
Th numb r you draw will d termine which risk task and its corresponding
ision row will b us d to d t rmine your earnings. One you
s 1~ct th ball and 0 the risk ta k to be used for real, t he computer screen
will di play he two op ions from the relevant row and the choice you made
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between them. If you chose Option A, you will receive the amount of money
it specifies. If you chose Option B, you will play the lottery by drawing a
chip form the bag and receive the prize accordingly.
Things to remember
(1) Though you make several decisions in this experiment, only one of
them will he used to determine your earnings. (2) You will not know which
decision will determine your earnings from t he risk task until the end of
the experiment. (3) Think carefully about your decisions in each risk task:
every decision row of every risk task could turn out to be the choice that
is for real for you.
Thanks for participating.
Please, click on the "Start" button and enter the password I
am going to tell you now.
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MULTIPLE-CHOICE TASKS
PIECE 3: COMl\10N TO ALL SUB.JtJCTS
Instructions
We now ask you to complete a test consisting of 12 questions. You
will have 1 minute to work OIl each question of this test. There will he a
countdown timer on the top right-side of the screen.
Answers to the questions in this test have no effect on your earnings from
the experiment. Nevertheless, please think carefully about the questions
and answer them as well as you can in the time available.
Important Note: If you finish before time is called please wait for
instructions for the rest of the experiment. Please DO NOT do anything
with your computer until you are specifically instructed to do so.
Please, click on the "Start" button and enter the password I
am going to tell you now.
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MONEY REWARD!
PIECE 4: HANDED OUT 'fO NON-ZERO INCHE~1ENT GROUPS
ONl.Y.
{ --+ INSTANTANEOUS +7
[ --+ DELAYED +7
([
£7.00 is already guaranteed for you!
For completing the cognitive test, you will be given £7.00. This money
will be paid in cash) today at the end of this session [next week at the end
of this experiment's next session.].
{IBe assured that £7.00 is already guaranteed for you. You cannot lose
this money or any part of it, provided you complete the experiment. This
does not affect your earnings from the risk tasks. Therefore, £7.00 will be
added to whatever you earn from the risk tasks.]}
Remaining part of the experiment
[We are now going to give you instructions for the remaining part of
today's session of this experiment.}
[As you have noticed on the invitation to this experiment, it consists of
two sessions: one today and the second one in one week's time.
120
Your earnings for the experiment, including the £7.00 reward, will be
determined and paid at the end of the second session next week. It is,
therefore, crucial that you turn up for the next session. Please, do so as
you will not get paid if you do not turn up next week for completing the
experiment.
Today's session is over.]
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MORE RISK TASKS
PIECE 5.1: HANDED OUT TO INSTANTANEOUS GROUPS ONLY.
{ -+ INSTANTANEOUS +7
( -+ INSTANTANEOUS +0
{(
Instructions
This is the last step of today's session of this experiment. Now, we ask
you to complete some more risk tasks. They work just like the risk tasks
you completed before.
In each risk task you will face a set of choice problems, in which you
have to choose between Option A, to receive an amount of money, and
Option B, to playa lottery. All you need to do is to indicate the option
you prefer most, option A or option B, for each decision problem.
On Your Earnings
After you complete these risk tasks, we will determine your earnings for
all risk tasks you have performed and you will be paid at the end of this
session. Therefore, the money you earn in the risk tasks) as well as the
£7.00 reward for completing the cognitive test (will be paid to you directly
in cash at the end of this session.)}
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{(Please, click on the "Start" button and enter the password I
am going to tell you now. )}
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INSTRUCTIONS
PIECE SET 5.2: HANDED OUT TO DELAYED GROUPS ONLY
__.. DELAYED +7
« __..DELAYED +0
1«
Welcome
You are in the second session of an experimental study of individual decision-
making. You have already attended the first session one week ago. The
entire session today should be complete within 30 minutes.
Today's Session
In today's session, you will be asked to complete some more risk tasks.
They work just like the risk tasks you have completed during the first
session. I will now remind you how that was.
Please click on the "Demonstration" button on your screen to sec
what each risk task will look like. Please follow my directions now. Do not
click on anything until told to do so.»)
INTERACTIVE DEMONSTRATION (Same parts in italic on
Piece 2)
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[« We will det rmine your earnings at the nd of the experiment as
follow. After you have fini hed today's risk task, the computer will th n
randomly pick one decision row on ach risk task you performed in this
xp rim nt. Th following figure illustrat s how the screen would look lik
a thi poin of th experiment if th re had only been two risk tasks.
Figur 2.10: Determining your earnings: selection of decision row per risk
task
First Risk Task
Row selected You chose
Row selected You chose
For each risk ta k you perform in this experiment, ther will be a row
lik on of hose on th figure above. Notice that ther is a spin button for
a h ta k. You will b a ked to hit all th spin buttons. A you do this, for
a giv n ta k the comput r will randomly select one of th de ision rows
from tha t k. Th computer will use a special randomization device that
m kes all decisions rows from the task equally likely to be chosen. So,
note that for ev ry risk task you p rform, one decision row will b sel ct d;
and all are qually likely.
11 of 1 et d deci ion rows will be display d on the computer
er n. Th comput r will then r tri v whi h option you chose at that
row. vV th n 1 et th option you chos from on of th
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To do so, I will ask you to draw a ball from a bag, which contains balls
individually numbered from 1 up to the number of risk tasks you performed.
The number you draw will determine which risk task and its corresponding
selected decision row will be used to determine your earnings. Once you
select the ball, and so the risk task to be used for real, the computer screen
will display the two options from the relevant row and the choice you made
between them. If you chose Option A, you will receive the amount of money
it specifies. If you chose Option B, you will play the lottery by drawing a
chip form the bag and receive the prize accordingly.»]
[«
Things to remember
(1) Though you make several decisions in this experiment, only one of
them will be used to determine your earnings. (2) You will know which
decision will determine your earnings from the risk task at the end of today's
session. (3) Think carefully about your decisions in each risk task: every
decision row of every risk task could turn out to be the choice that is for
real for you. (4»> You have already earned £7.00 for completing the test.
Thus, I will add £7.00 to the money you earn in the risk tasks.«You will
be paid in cash at the end of this session.»]
[«
Thanks for participating.
Please, click on the "Start" button and enter the password I
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am going to tell you now. »]
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2.7.3 Appendix C - Demographic questionnaire
\Ve now ask you to complete a questionnaire consisting of 12 questions
about yourself. Be assured that your responses are completely confidential.
If you do not wish to answer a question in this questionnaire, you are free
to omit it.
DIRECTIONS:
Please fill the ID Number box below. As for the questions, tick the box in
the questions below whose option best describes you. ID NUi\IBER (one
digit per cell)
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QUESTIONS
1.What is you r sex?o Female DMaie
2.What is your age?
[ I years
3.What is your area of study?
Social sciences
Humanities
Health-related sciences
Natural sciences
Other
4.What is the highest level of education you have completed?§SecondaryUndergraduatePostgraduate: Mphil/MSc
S.Which of the following ethnic groups is appropriate to indicate your cultural background?
White
Mixed
Asian or Asian British
Black or Black British
Chinese
Other ethnic group
S. Which of these categories best describes the average MONTHLY amount of money you have
received for JUST YOURSELF over the last 12 months? This can include educational grant,
educatinal loan, payments from a family member, income from part-time jobs, state benefits, etc. I'd
like to remind you that anything you tell us is completely confidential.
Less than £500
£500 through £799
£800 through £999
£1,000 through £1,499
£1,500 through £1,999
£2,000 through £2,999
£3,000 and greater
Don't know
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7. How well would you say you yourself are managing financially these days? Would you say you are
(choose the option best describe you):
Living comfortably
Doing alright
Just about getting by
Finding it quite difficult
Finding it very difficult
Don't know
8.What is the highest level of education attained by the head of your family?
Primary
Secondary
Undergraduate
Postgraduate: Mphil/MSc
Postgraduate: PhD
9. How much money would you ask for solving logical puzzles during 1 HOUR?
Q_£ __,I Pounds
10. Different things can be important when deciding what type of occupation you want to follow.
Please look at this table below and choose by clicking how important each of the following aspects
are for you. How important is:
Very Important Not Important Not at all Don't
Important important know
Futurejob security () () () () ()
f-H!9._hincome () () () () ()
Findingan occupation which is well () () ( ) () ()
. respected
Findingan occupation that leaves you () () ( ) () ()
f-with a lot of time for leisure
A high degree of interaction with () () () () ()
E._eople
Findingan occupation which () () () () ()
makesa contribution to society
Findingan occupation in which you () () () () ()
_canhelp others
11.On a scale from 0 to 10, what is your willingness to take risks, in general, where 0 indicates
"unwilling to take risks" and 10 indicates "very willing to take risks".
C1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
12. How much money would you ask for filling in forms during 1 HOUR?
~ I Pounds
--------'
***
Thank you for completing this questionnaire.
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Chapter 3
Chapter 3
COGNITIVE ABILITY AND CONSISTENCYOF
BEHAVIOUR UNDER RISK
3.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates experimentally whether violations from prin-
ciples underlying standard models of rational choice (e.g. EUT) are at-
tenuated as the cognitive ability of the subjects increases. To do this, it
combines data on risk choices from the experiment presented in Chapter 2
with data from the cognitive test.
Individuals differ from one another in many aspects: gender, school-
ing, intelligence, cultural background, to name but a few. It is hardly
controversial that differences in individual characteristics can be of sub-
stantial importance to understanding some phenomena. Sunden & Surette
(1998), for instance, shows the importance of gender and marital status in
understanding financial wealth accumulation for retirement. But in model-
ing economic behaviour, the diversity of individual characteristics has had
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a mixed role. A hallmark of twentieth century orthodox economics, for
example, was to take preferences as a primitive, i.e. unexplained, even
though preference differences were recognised as possible and, indeed, es-
sential to motivate many of the main concerns of economic theory, e.g.
general equilibrium theory, labor-leisure allocation, etc. Sometimes the
issue of individual differences is just overlooked - like, for example, in rep-
resentative agent models and many classes of game-theoretic models. The
underlying principle in these cases is that people deploy similar toolboxes
for making economic decisions and, regardless of personal attributes (e.g.,
age, intelligence, or gender), will respond to economic problems in similar
ways. It seems a reasonable simplifying assumption especially when there
is limited understanding of which individual characteristics are significant
for economic behaviour at the macro level. But some models have tackled
the question, introducing some form of heterogeneity (e.g. expectation for-
mation, beliefs); and the introduction of heterogeneity has provided many
insights. Grandmont (1992), for example, shows that an increasing degree
of heterogeneity can have a regularising effects on aggregate demand. Yet
individual characteristics have a neglected role as these models use a "black-
box" approach to heterogeneity, whereby the source of it (Age? Cognitive
skills?) is usually unspecified.(see, e.g., Morris, 1996; Xiong & Yan, 2006)
In applied work though, the possibility of differences in economic be-
haviour being linked to differences in individual characteristics has been
examined more directly. It is natural in much of the current econometric
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practice, for instance, to control for observable individual characteristics.
Failure to do so would produce biases in the estimated model if such char-
acteristics influence the dependent variable. In a less instrumental per-
spective, demographics have also emerged as primary objects of interest
in experimental economics. A number of studies have explored the links
between certain individual characteristics and individual decision-making.
Eckel & GrOSSIuan (1998) and Bolton & Katok (1995), for instance, in-
vestigate differences in pro-social behaviour between men and women in a
dictator game; Andreoni & Vesterlund (2001) examine gender differences in
altruistic behaviour. Harbaugh et al. (2001), in turn, investigate the role
of age in choice rationality as measured by tests of transitivity. Cachter
et al. (2009a) examine the incidence of framing effects between groups with
different levels of seniority within the economics profession. Other studies
have looked at the influence of individual ethnicity and cultural background
on behaviour in ultimatum bargaining games (Roth et al. , 1991; Henrich,
2000; Henrich et al. ,2004) and public goods games (Cachtcr & Herrmann,
2009). Irrespective of the approach, these studies provide a general sense of
relevance of some demographics to understand how people respond when
faced with similar economic circumstances.
In this vein, economists have recently begun to look at cognitive ability.
Since individuals engage in some form of reasoning when facing decision
problems, it is only natural to inquire about how differences in cognitive
ability are related to differences in choices in some economic domains. Fred-
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erick (2005), for instance, proposes a cognitive reflection test (CRT) - a
three-item test to measure the disposition to resist reporting the response
that first comes to mind. He finds that those who scored higher in the
CRT are generally more patient and less risk-averse in the domain of gains.
Despite using hypothetical choices to elicit time and risk preferences, Fred-
erick's results have been confirmed in properly incentivized designs. Ben-
jamin et al. (2006) and Sunde et al. (2009) find that individuals with
higher intelligence test scores tend to be closer to risk neutrality and less
impatient. Brafias-Garza et al. (2008), though, find no statistically signif-
icant difference in risk preferences between groups of subject with different
levels of mathematical skills. Despite the contributions of these studies to
our understanding of how differences in levels of intelligence affect human
decision making, the literature on this issue is still relatively scarce and
mainly focused on risk and time preferences.' This paper aims to con-
tribute to this emerging literature by further examining whether and how
cognitive ability relates to aspects of individual decision-making.
Using the experiment of the previous chapter, in which subjects make
risky choices when facing a series of tasks, we are particularly interested in
three aspects of such decision-making.
First, short-term choice consistency. \Ve will use choice consistency
to refer to a subject's choice switches in identical risk tasks. In our ex-
1Exceptions are Burks et al. (2009), who also investigate how cognitive ability relates
to social awareness in Prisoner's Dilemma game and job attachment, and Charness &
Levin (2005) study the link between bayesian updating skills and bids in a "winner's
curse" experiment.
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periment, subjects face a sequence of twelve risk tasks: four of them are
identical and the other eight consist of four tasks, each played twice. An
underlying principle in models of rational choice is that individuals should
make the same choice when facing same circumstances. This has great
normative appeal, but there is some evidence documenting a tendency to
violate this principle'': these studies show that people tend to make dif-
ferent decisions when facing the same problem in different. occasions (for
a survey, see Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001). Based on subjects' choice
switches in these identical tasks, we introduce a simple index of individual
consistency that captures dynamic aspects of their choice decisions. We
shall thus extend the literature on this issue by examining whether choice
consistency is influenced by cognitive ability.
Second, type consistency. \Ve will use this term to refer to a subject's
switches in her type (risk-averse, risk-lover). \Vhile models of stochastic
choice often allow switches of type, standard theory restricts pattern of
risk preferences across different tasks. As attitudes towards risk are cap-
tured by the curvature of the utility function, a risk-averse individual, for
example, cannot be risk-loving over the same wealth/income range. Our
experiment provides a rich decision environment to test for this principle
as subjects proceed through sequence of several risk tasks. Using responses
to this sequence of risk tasks, we introduce a simple index to characterise
2There are many competing explanations for that: an intrinsic stochastic component
in people's decisions (Loomes, 2005), different time preferences, etc. It is beyond the
scope of this chapter, though, to discuss the reasons behind time instability of prefer-
ences.
136
a subject's type inconsistency over all risk elicitation-tasks. We examine
how it relates to individual's cognitive ability.
Third, framing consistency. This refers to the different frames adopted
to introduce a small-scale change of wealth: either given "inside" the lot-
tery, adding a common amount, say m, to all lottery outcomes, or given
"outside" the lottery, by simply giving m to the subject. Several studies in-
vestigate the effects on one's degree of risk aversion when the size of stakes
is increased (e.g. Holt & Laury, 2002; Harrison et al. , 2005a), but little has
been said about whether and how the form taken by an increase in the pay-
off levels affects individuals' degree of risk aversion. We showed (Chapter
2) that within EUT and under the hypothesis of asset inieqratioti, the form
taken by a monetary gain of m should not influence its effects, if any, on
an individual's risk attitudes. This means that variations of risk attitudes
should be consistent between the "inside" and "outside" frame. However,
we have leaned in the previous chapter that whether the gain is "inside" or
"outside" affects subjects' choices. \Ve then examine here how this framing
inconsistency relates to differences in cognitive ability as measured by our
test.
We also examine how cognitive ability relates to attitudes towards risk.
Obviously, this is not a new issue - several other studies have examined the
influence of cognitive skills on risk preferences. Yet, as risk is elicited in
a repeated setting and our measure of cognitive ability captures different
forms of intelligence, this can be seen as robustness test of the general
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finding, namely, that those with higher cognitive ability are relatively less
risk-averse (e.g. Burks et al. , 2009). Furthermore, the fact that we have
unusually risk-loving subjects provides a chance to shed some light on a
question that previous studies do not distinguish: will those with high
cognitive ability be the most risk-loving or the closest to risk neutrality?
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2
presents the experimental design. Section 3.3 presents the indicators that
seek to quantify attitudes to risk and of consistency of behaviour in our
experiment and presents the results. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Experiment Design
To study how cognitive ability affects attitudes towards risk and choice
consistency, we designed a set of risk-elicitation tasks and a brief cognitive
test. In what follows, we describe each component of the experiment. Since
the risk-tasks and subject sample are the same used in the experiment
described in Chapter 2, the following draws heavily from the experimental
design section from the previous chapter (The reader is referred to that
chapter for further details.).
3.2.1 Risk tasks
The question of how to elicit people's attitudes to risk is addressed via
a Multiple Price List (~IPL) procedure. We implemented a sequence of
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risk-elicitation tasks in each of which a subject faces a number of pairwise
choice problems. Each problem is to choose between a given lottery L (a
p chance to win x and 1- p to win y, where x > y > 0) and an amount of
money with certainty; the certain money option is systematically decreased
from x to y by a constant amount, say a, when proceeding down the table.
So, in the first row, the decision problem an individual faces is to choose
between x for sure and L. In the second row it would be a choice between
x - 8 for sure and L, and so on until the sure thing equals y, the lower
possible payoff yielded by the lottery L. Because the difference between the
sure sum and the expected value of the risky option decreases and turns
negative from some point on, even a very risk-averse individual is expected
to switch over to the lottery at some row when going down the table.
Figure 3.1 below presents a screenshot of the set of pairwise problems
presented to subjects in a given risk task. In this example, the task consists
of eliciting the cash equivalent of the lottery L(8.00, 1/5; 4.00, 4/5), where
the fractions indicate the probabilities of winning, and the integer numbers
indicate the winnings:
Each decision rowan the screen constitutes a choice problem, which is to
choose between option A, a sure sum, or option B, the lottery. Subjects are
asked to indicate their preference for each choice problem. Under EUT, an
individual will choose A in decision 1 and B in decision 17, switching from A
to B at some point in between. Thus, provided a subject starts by choosing
A and switches once, task responses can be reduced to a single number:
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o
the decision row number at which the subject switched from option A to
option B 3,
In our experiment, a subject faces a sequence of six risk tasks on two
different occasions. They are not told though that the sequence of six risk
tasks they face in those occasions are identical. For convenience, Table 3.1
below presents the set of lotteries used in each of these risk tasks in the
order they are presented":
Table 3.1: Lottery option per risk-elicitation task
Lottery Payoff 1 Pr(Payoff 1) Payoff 2 Pr{Payoff 2) EV Rows
L1 8 0.2 4 0.8 4.8 17
L2 9 0.2 3 0.8 4.2 25
L3 6 0.4 3 0.6 4.2 13
L4 9 0.3 4 0.7 5.5 21
L5 16 0.2 10 0.8 11.2 25
L6 6 0.4 3 0.6 4.2 13
The lotteries we use have four notable characteristics. First, they are
all binary lotteries. Second, they only involve strictly positive outcomes,
Third, two of them are identical - risk tasks L3 and L6. The reason for this
is that by making subjects face the same risk task twice, we can use a test-
retest approach to investigate short-term stability of risk preferences. Sec-
and, payoffs offered by lotteries L2 and L5 differ by £7.00 (i.e. L5=L2+ 7),
which exactly matches the small scale change in wealth induced by the
3As explained in Chapter 2, the software allowed the subjects to economise on
"clicking effort", and in doing so guaranteed a maximum of one switch. \Ve view this
feature as an advantageous one, as it prevents boredom and guarantees usable data
while still leaving plenty of scope for cognitive ability to affect behaviour.
4For roughly half of the subjects. For the other half the order of L2 ad L5 was
reversed. The purpose is to perform a small-scale test of order effects. We do not reject
the hypothesis that there is no order effect on elicited risk attitudes (see Chapter 2).
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experiment under some treatments, as described in Chapter 2. This ma-
nipulation will allow us to investigate the effects of the form taken by an
increment on risk attitudes (here, the increment is either given "inside" or
"outside" the lottery).
After completing the first sequence of six risk tasks and before facing
the second one, subjects are asked to take a timed cognitive test - for
completing it. SOUlesubjects get a small-scale wealth increment. In what
follows, we describe the components of the cognitive test.
3.2.2 Cognitive test
There has been a prominent effort to develop psychometric tests to
measure individual reasoning abilities. While there is no clear conceptu-
alization of intelligence (Sternberg & Detterman, 1986), several tests have
been devised - if not to measure intelligence itself, to measure some closely
related construct like scholastic aptitude, school achievement, etc (Neisser,
1996).
Like other psychometric tests, our cognitive test is a set of questions
that seek to assess a range of reasoning skills. The test contains twelve
questions divided into four sections: one on each of mathematical, ver-
bal and sequential reasoning; plus the cognitive reflection test proposed
by Frederick (2005) (see Appendix to this chapter for the complete test).
Subjects are given one minute to complete each question included in the
test as they are presented on the computer screen. In our investigation, we
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measure cognitive ability with scores obtained in this test. An individual's
cognitive score is simply the total number of correct answers.
Besides allowing us to do an exploratory analysis of variation of choice
behaviour in our risk tasks across groups with different levels of cognitive
ability, the cognitive test has two additional purposes as explained in Chap-
ter 2. First, to allow the small-scale wealth increment to be framed as a
"earned" reward for completing the test and not as a "gift" from experi-
menters. Second, to load subject's working memory with new information
and make less likely that they will spot the equivalence between first and
second round of risk tasks. This might have caused them to guess that
the experiment tests for consistency, and respond accordingly - not be-
cause their preferences are truly consistent but rather because they want
to appear to be consistent (see Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001).
Like many other tests, our test measures relatively abstract reasoning
skills. The mathematical and verbal sections are very much like the GRE
Quantitative and Verbal sections, requiring understanding of elementary
mathematical concepts and working knowledge of vocabulary and gram-
mar. The GRE is a test widely used by universities for admission and
financial-aid in master's and doctoral programmes. A great deal of re-
search has been done to investigate the reasoning abilities measured by the
GRE, their predictive validity, and its correlation with scores in other tests
of intelligence (see \Villiams, 1996, p.511-16). The mathematical section
picks up problem solving skills involving basic understanding of arithmetic
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and algebra. The verbal section tries to measure ability to analyse parts of
sentences, and recognise the relationship between words and literary con-
cepts. The sequential reasoning section of our test, in turn, covers analysis
of patterns and deductive reasoning in arithmetic and geometric context.
The cognitive reflection test (Frederick, 2005) tries to measure one's ability
to resist reporting intuitive answers that first spring to mind. Table 3.2
shows descriptive statistics for the cognitive test and its components,
Since it is apparent that one's performance in this test involves a com-
mand of skills developed over many years of education, performance in
cognitive test is likely to be shaped by individual's successful school learn-
ing. While this depends on many personal characteristics other than in-
telligence, school performance is shown to be correlated with scores on
psychometric tests to measure cognitive skills (Mayes et al. , 2009). Thus,
our test, like other measures of scholastic achievement, is likely to be pick-
ing up individual's general cognitive ability as well. Furthermore, relative
to the general population, our subjects are likely to be less heterogeneous in
their schooling success; so differences in cognitive ability within our sample
may be more influenced by "raw ability" than they would be in the general
population.
On incentivisation of cognitive test
Performance in our cognitive tests has no effect whatsoever on sub-
jects' earnings - a feature that this part of our experiment shares with
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other studies using psychometric tests. Let us, however, address here a po-
tential criticism of this practice, namely, that the lack of financial incentive
affects the validity of test score data - since, payoff-wise, test performance
does not matter. The belief is that without financial incentives, variation
in test performance, if any, would reflect individual intrinsic motivation
differentials and not cognitive abilities.
This potential problem, however, is unlikely to be alleviated by mone-
tarily rewarding subjects for correct answers; in fact, incentives could make
things worse and arguably affect accuracy of test scores: by paying for cor-
rect answers, individual test performance differentials could then reflect an
unknown [nix of individual differentials in money-driven efforts exerted by
subjects and cognitive abilities required to solve the questions. Further-
more, there is some evidence (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000) that subjects,
when regarding incentives as small, can perform in some tasks worse than
subjects who were driven solely by their intrinsic motivation. Thus, it
seems plausible that, even when not incentivised, test score variation to
some extent reflects cognitive ability differentials.
3.2.3 Subject pool, parameters, and procedures
This experiment has a subject pool of 106 participants recruited from
a database of volunteers/' Most are undergraduate students from different
disciplines with a median age of 20 years and age range from 18 to 25 years.
5Participants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
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Slightly more than half of the subjects are women (52.83%).
The experiment was conducted in a computerized laboratory in sev-
eral sessions. In each session, following their arrival, each subject received
instructions explaining the risk tasks", The instructions were read aloud
while the students read them silently. Before the beginning of the actual
experiment, subjects had the opportunity to face a risk-elicitation task for
practice, knowing that it would not affect their earnings. The set of lot-
teries used in each risk-elicitation task and its parameters are presented
above in Table 3.1. There were no time constraints to complete the risk
tasks. But only when all participants finished making their choices, the set
of instructions for the next part of the experirnent was handed out.
After completing the first risk-elicitation stage, subjects were given in-
structions for the cognitive test (framed as questionnaire designed to assess
their ability to perform certain type of reasonings 7• They had twelve min-
utes to complete the test. The cognitive test phase was followed by the
second risk-elicitation stage". After this stage was completed, subjects
were asked to complete a short questionnaire with survey questions and fill
out a form with information for the administration of payments.
Payment for their decisions was then made at the end of the experiment,
in cash, according to the random lottery incentive system, This random-
6Instructions for the cognitive test and second risk-elicitation stage were handed out
one at a time when all subjects completed the first risk-elicitation stage.
7Scc Instructions - Appendix B of Chapter 2
8Which was immediately after the cognitive test for subjects in time treatments 10
and 17; but a week later for those in DOand D7. \Ve pool observations across treatments
as time treatments had no effect on subjects' attitudes to risk.
147
lottery procedure, by which several decision problems are faced but the
subject is paid the outcome of only one of them, has been extensively used.
It allows an incentivised elicitation of individual choices in multiple-task
settings avoiding income effects Lee (2008). The random-lottery system
provides an incentive-compatible elicitation mechanism both under EUT
and PT, in the sense that subjects are incentivized to report genuine valu-
ations to the lotteries they face which reflect their true preference ordering
over the pairwise set of options.
Thus, subjects were informed prior to responding to the elicitation tasks
that, when they had completed all risk tasks, one would be randomly se-
lected; one decision in the chosen task would be randomly selected. Their
winnings is determined by the option they chose, after the resolution of the
risk in the event that option was the lottery. As explained before, £7.00
was awarded for roughly half of the subjects for completing the cognitive
test". This was added at the end to their earnings in the risk tasks. On
average, experimental sessions lasted around one hour and average earnings
were £6.70.
3.3 Data Analysis
\Ve use data from the two sequences of risk-elicitation tasks all subjects
faced. Recall that subjects proceed through a sequence of six risk tasks
9This reward was announced only after the test was completed. Subjects assigned to
the treatment 17 received it at the end of the session. Subjects assigned to DOreceived
it at the end of the second session one week later.
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on two different occasions. There is an experimental manipulation of the
time elapsed between those occasions that, in principle, could "contami-
nate" responses in the second sequence of risk-elicitation tasks, affecting
any inference based on aggregation of the data between the two occasions.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the equality of distributions reported in the
previous chapter showed us that the time manipulation of our experiment
did not have an effect, so that one cannot reject that distribution of risk
attitudes in each risk task is statistically equivalent between groups as-
signed to different time treatments ("Delayed" and "Instantaneous"). There
are differences, however, in the way choices from risk-elicitation stages are
used to evaluate subjects' choice and type consistency. We will explain this
in detail in Section 3.3.2. In what follows, we describe the data provided
by the risk tasks and the procedures used to compute measures of risk
aversion.
3.3.1 Measurement of risk aversion
There are different ways in which subjects' choices in each risk task can
be used to identify individual estimates of risk aversion.
In a given risk-elicitation task, a subject faces a set of discrete binary
choices. In each choice problem, a subject chooses between a sure amount
of money and a given fixed lottery. These choices yield a switching point
for each elicitation task, which is the number of times the subject prefers
the sure thing before switching over to the lottery. In the case of a risk-
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elicitation task with, say, n decision rows, this indicator varies from 0,
indicating that the subject prefers the lottery over all amounts given with
certainty, to n, indicating that the subject prefers the sure thing over the
lottery in all decision rows.
While there are several ways in which one can use subject's risky choices
to infer a measure of her risk attitudes 10, we summarise the risk aversion of a
subject by computing her risk premium for the lottery in each risk task. The
risk premium for a lottery L is the certain amount of money an individual
would forego in order to avoid the risk inherent in L. This is a simple
and non-parametric method based on the subject's discrete choices. Recall
that a subject's switching point in a given risk task provides a relatively
narrow interval within each the amount of money that for her is as good
as taking the gamble must fall into - that is, her certainty-equivalent of
the lottery. For simplicity, assume that that such certainty equivalent is
just the midpoint of such monetary interval. Now, the risk premium is
calculated by subtracting the certainty equivalent from the expected value
of the lottery. It can take a negative, positive or zero value depending on
one's risk preferences.
We shall refer to a subject's risk-score as the average risk premium of
the lottery options in the risk tasks faced by each subject!'. The risk score
10For a discussion, see Chapter 2.
11'Ve acknowledge that using a measure of central tendency to summarise subjects'
risk attitudes has the drawback of throwing information away. But note that we average
risk premia over the same set for all subjects, and use this measure to compare groups
assigned to different treatment conditions - hence whatever problem this measure has,
it is a "fixed effect" across the sample. When necessary, our analysis control for lottery
characteristics (e.g. prize sizes, number of decision rows, etc).
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can range from a positive number, indicating a degree of risk lovingness,
to a negative number, indicating a degree of risk aversion. The risk score
takes value zero in case of a consistently risk neutral individual. It can also
take value 0 for someone who is risk-loving on some tasks and risk-averse
on others. This brings us to the issue of consistency of risk preferences.
3.3.2 Measurement of inconsistency of risk preferences
A second important issue that this experiment allows us to address is
the consistency of subjects' decisions. In our experiment, we consider two
forms of consistency, which we term choice and type consistency.
The first one, choice consistency, relates to the (short-term) stability
of subjects choice decisions in repeated risk tasks, an aspect addressed via
the test-retest component of our experiment design. Recall that a subject
faces the same set of six risk tasks on two different occasions, which are
referred as first and second stages. But among this set of six risk tasks, two
of them are equivalent- that is, within each stage, one of the risk-elicitation
tasks, the third one, is faced twice. \Ve shall combine subjects' decisions on
those two occasions to create a measure of short-term consistency of their
choices.
The second one, type consistency, relates to the variability of a subject's
risk preferences over the course of the risk tasks. Since this involves sub-
jects' decisions in all risk tasks, we will propose a measure that captures
two aspects of such preference variability: first, the type consistency, that
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is, the frequency of each "type" of risk attitude over the set of risk tasks.
For example, risk preferences of an individual who is risk-averse half of the
time and risk-loving the other half should be deemed, ceteris paribus, as
more inconsistent than an individual who displays risk-averse behaviour in
2/3 of the tasks and risk-loving in 1/3 of the them. The second dimension
to be captured is the degree of preference change. For example, an indi-
vidual who switches frorn extreme risk-lovingness to extrerne risk-aversion
should be considered, ceteris paribus, more inconsistent than an individual
who switches from extreme risk-lovingness to moderate risk-aversion.
We propose an individual index for each form of consistency (type- and
choice-consistency), later analysing the relationship of each one with cog-
nitive ability. \Ve start with the numerical characterisation of our indicator
of risky choice consistency.
3.3.2.1 An index of choice consistency
Our choice consistency measure involves subjects' choice decisions in the
risk-task L3. This task is faced four times, including the two times where it
is faced as L6. The fact that they are all identical arises the question: which
of these should be used as a reference to judge the consistency of a subject's
choice decisions the other three times the risk task is faced? There arc two
problems with arbitrarily picking one of these tasks. First, that it is unclear
which one captures the subject's "true" underlying preferences. Second, and
more important, that using a task as a fixed "reference" for choice in this
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task overlooks the dynamic aspect of subject's decisions, that is, how a
subject's choices may evolve over the set of identical tasks. We propose
to quantify this type of inconsistency in our experiment with an index
that captures this dynamic aspect. But because the overall consistency
of all choices is taken into account, choice similarity and consistency are
not necessarily the same; an individual who makes identical choices in £3
within each stage is not always more consistent that an individual who
made different choices.
Denoting s, as the number of "safe choices" made the t-th time (t =
1, ... ,4) the risk task was faced, the following set S describes all the six
relevant pairwise comparisons: S = {(St, St + 1); t = 1,2, 3}. A subject's
choice consistency index, C, will then be denoted by
3 4
C= L LIsp-Ski
p=l k=p+l
(3.1)
where the differences (in absolute value) in the inner summation term are
the inter-tasks variations in choice behaviour over the identical tasks -
that is, the difference between the number of safe choices made in each
possible pairwise comparison of the identical risk task. Let us now give
SOIIle examples,
Suppose two subjects, say A and B, who makes the following number
of "safe" choices in the set of identical tasks, respectively: {6, 6, 9, 9} and
{4, 4, 9, 9}. The risky choice consistency index of A is 12, while B's index is
20 - A's risky choices are more consistent than B's. Suppose, instead, that
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A has made identical choices, say {9, 9, 9, 9}, and B's choices were all but
one identical, say {5, 5, 5, 6}. In such case, as one expects, A has a more
consistent risky choice behaviour than B, as A's index is 0 while B's index
of choice consistency is 3.
It is worth mentioning some properties of this index. First, that an
individual's index of choice consistency depends on her decisions in each
replica of the risk task L3; it depends neither on any other parameters,
such as her coefficient of risk aversion, nor on any other risk task. Second,
that the index is not more sensitive to upward shifts in choices than to
downward shifts. Third, that the index is invariant to the order in which a
given series of choices in the identical task are made. Fourth, that the index
is not monotonic in the frequency of pairwise perfectly identical decisions.
This property means that an individual who makes identical choices in
three out of the four identical risk tasks need not be more consistent than
an individual who made no identical choices in any pair of the risk task
repeats. For example, let Si = {1, 1, 1, 5} and Sj = {1, 2, 3, 4} be the
sequence of "safe" choices of two individuals in each of the four occasions
they face the risk task L3. The respective indices of risky choice consistency
of i and j are C, = 12 an Cj = 10; hence, j is more consistent than i, though
i has made identical choices in all but one time risk task L3 was faced.
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3.3.2.2 An index of type consistency
We now introduce a measure of a subject's type consistency over the
course of the risk tasks. In a given risk task, a subject i is said to be a risk-
averse type if her risk premium in that task is larger than zero. Likewise,
i is said to be a non-risk-averse type if her risk premium in that task is
smaller than, or equal to, zero. Obviously, this latter type encompasses
risk-neutrality and risk-lovingness. The reason is simple; for one subject
to be precisely risk neutral is a very strong requirement: in a risk task,
there are several choice decisions that make one a risk-averse/risk-loving,
but there is only one choice that makes her risk-neutral'P. vVe believe that
this strength makes the "merging" acceptable.
We purport to construct an index that captures two dimensions of con-
sistency in one's risk type. First, the degree of uniformity in type throughout
the set of risk tasks. Second, the degree of variation between types. To this
end, consider first the number of times an individual displays risk aversion
and non-risk aversion, RA and RA respectively. Considering all risk tasks
one faces in our experiment, we know that the type profile of an individual
can be described by an element of P = {(RA, RA)IRA + RA = 12}, which
is a set of ordered pairs representing an individual's distribution of types
over her entire set of risky decisions. Then, for an individual with a type
profile (RA, RA)' let Iu be a measure of her type uniformity, where
12In fact, there is not really any choice that strictly implies risk neutrality, since we
never really know where in the switching interval the subjects' true indifference lies.
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This measure takes value of zero, for example, for an individual who, type-
wise, is perfectly uniform throughout all risk tasks. Yet this measure is not
sensitive, as it stands, to the degree of variation between type switches. To
see that, consider two individuals who are both risk-averse in half of the risk
tasks - hence, non-risk-averse in half of the risk tasks. One of them, though,
switches from extreme risk-lovingness to extreme risk-aversion, while the
other switches from moderate risk-aversion to moderate risk-lovingness.
While they would both have the same Ju, it is hardly disputable that such
patterns of risk preferences should not. yield equivalent indices of type COIl-
sistency. This brings us to the second dimension of our indicator of type
consistency - variability of choices when switching between types. We pro-
pose to formalise this dimension with a simple and widely used measure of
variability: the variance-to-mean ratio. So let
be a measure of an individual's (between-type) variability, where the nu-
merator is the variance of risk-premia variation between choices associated
to one type and the other; and the denominator is the absolute value of
mean risk-premia variation between choices associated to one type and the
other. This measure of variability is increasing on the dispersion of risk
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premia between risk tasks of one type relative to the other one.
We now combine these two measures, Iu and L, to construct a simple
index of type consistency. Let such index be denoted by T, such that
(3.2)
This index is monotonically increasing in both measures of uniformity
and dispersion of type in one's choices over the set of risk tasks. The virtue
of combining L; and L, into a simple index is that this composite measure
allows us a more refined ordering of individuals. For a pair of subjects
who, for example, match each other in terms of uniformity of types over
the risk tasks, the dispersion component of it. will work as a "tie-breaker".
For example: an individual who is extremely risk-averse half of the choices
and extremely risk-loving the other half will be deemed as more type in-
consistent than an individual who is moderately risk-averse half of the time
and rnoderately risk-loving the other half. Note, thought, that because we
intend to capture two dimensions, the ordering of individuals according to
their type consistency does not necessarily preserve the ordering produced
by each element T is composed of individually considered. That amounts
to say that an individual who does not display much uniformity in the dis-
tribution of types over her choices is not necessarily more type inconsistent
than all other individuals who were more uniform than her; final ordering
depends on both uniformity and dispersion of choices made under each
type.
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3.3.3 Results
3.3.3.1 Cognitive ability and risk attitudes
This section begins by asking how individuals' measures of risk aversion
are related to their performance in the cognitive test.
Figure 3.2 presents box plots with key distributional features of risk
scores per cognitive score group - subjects are divided into two cognitive
groups according to their score in the test: "High" score group, which
includes subjects who scored above the median score, and "Low" score
group, which includes those who scored below (or equal to) the median
score. In each box, a line is drawn across the box at the median risk score
value. The first and the third quartiles of the distribution of scores in each
group are represented by, respectively, lower and upper "whiskers" in the
plot lines used to outline the box.
By comparing the line drawn across the box at the median , one can
see that subjects with higher level of cognitive ability do not have different
attitudes towards risk relative to subjects in the low cognitive score group.
Both cognitive groups have a similar pattern of distribution of risk scores,
with the majority of subjects in both groups displaying a. moderate degree
of risk lovingness. Yet, low cognitive ability subjects arc, on average, closer
to risk neutrality than high cognitive ability subjects.
These differences are not statistically significant though. The result
suggested by visual inspection of Figure (3.2) is indeed confirmed by a
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (D = 0.105, p = 0.93). T st r ults show that w
cannot r ject th hypothesis that the risk scores of low and high cognitive
score groups are the arne. One might wonder though if this result would
hold in a less aggregated analysis. To check this, we test for differences in
distribution of risk scores at a risk task 1 vel. Table 3.3 reports the averag
risk score per risk task in each cognitiv group in both eli itation stag s;
th r sult of Mann- Whitn y t sts sugg t that diff rences in risk score
betw n cognitive group ar not statistically ignificant v n at a risk task
I vel. Henc cognitiv ability, as we measur it is in ed n a so iat
with risk a titud s in our xp rim nt.
Surprisingly, these results hold true ven wh n cognitive ability is m a-
ur d by ubj et's perforrnanc in the ognitive R, fl ction T st (CRT).
Fr derick (2005) shows that scores in this test correlate positively and sig-
nifi antly wi h or s in other ests of cognitiv ability, laiming that th
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Table 3.3: Average risk score per risk task, by cognitive group
At'erag' RiskscOTS ~a~OQ1~ij1canc,
Firsts/agel "Low SCOTS)) "High SCONl)) A-lJJltn-WIlitn,J' Tssfl
L1 -0.569 -0.462 Z = -0.670
(£8,0.2;£4) (0.6.54) (0 ..501) (P = 0..503)
L2 -0.863 -0.642 Z - -0.531
(£9,0.2;£3) (1.141) (0.696) (P = 0.595)
L3 -0.129 -'0.210 Z = 0.853
(£6,0.4~£3) (0.532) (0.391) (P = 0.393)
L4 -0.391 -0.457 Z = 0.822
(£9,O.3~£4) (0.917) (0.630) (P = 0.411)
L5 .1.277 -1.107 Z - -0.652
(£16,0 .2~£10) (1.395) (1.075) (P a 0.514)
L6 -0.143 -0.240 Z = 1.000
(£6,0.4;£~ ~.515~ ~.400~ (P = 0.317~
Second stage'Z
L1 -0.710 -0.372 Z = -0.610
(£8,0.2;£4) (0.656) (0.391) (P = 0.542)
L2 -0.804 -0.487 Z = -0.360
(£9,0.2;£3) (1.010) (0.575) (P = 0.719)
L3
-0.198 -0.204 Z - 0.693
(£6,0.4;£3) (0.323) (0.344) (P - 0.488)
L4
-0.434 -0.365 Z = 0.314
(£9,0.3;£4) (0.697) (0.467) (P = 0.753)
L5 -0.844 -0.795 Z = 0.088
(£16,0.2;£ 10) (1.149) (1.029) (P =- 0.929)
L6 -0.181 -0.163 Z = 1.388
(£6,0.4;£3) (0.402) (0.339) (P = 0.165)
Notes: "Low score" C'High score") are those subjects whose cognitive test sore is below
(above) the median score. Standard deviations reported in parenthesis. P-values are two-
tailed .... p<0.10, ......p<0.05, .........p<O.Ol.' HO: distribution of risk scores does not differ
between the "high" and "low' score groups. 1 Based on observations from all SUbjects. 2
Based on observations from subjects in zero-increment treatments (10 and DO) only.
CRT is a good predictor of time and risk preferences. vVe test the robust-
ness of these results to an incentivised risk-elicitation procedure - a feature
absent in Frederick's design. We do so by re-dividing the subject sample
according to their score in Frederick's three-item Cognitive Reflection Test;
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this is one of the sub-sections of the cognitive test subjects completed.
Following Frederick's analysis, we compare risk measures of two "ex-
treme" groups: those who scored 0 out of 3 ("low" group) and those who
scored 3 out of 3 ("high" group). No significant differences between these
groups are found though 13. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for risk scores in
the low versus the high CRT score group yields D = 0.433, p = 0.11.
Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that those who scored higher
on the CRT were not more or less risk-averse than those with the lowest
scores.l!
To examine the relationship between risk preferences and cognitive abil-
ity more rigorously, we conduct a regression analysis of the following basic
econometric specific ation,
(3.3)
where R; denotes subject i's risk score, and SCORE denotes the i's measure
of cognitive ability. The vector Xi includes a set of dummy variables iden-
tifying subject i's parental education, income levels, gender and age. This
will allow us to control for the role of some observable socio-demographic
aspects in determining risk attitudes, providing a check of the robustness
of the non-parametric test results.
13This result holds even when we enlarge the sample and redefine the "low group" as
those who scored either 0 or lout of 3, and the "high group" as those who scored 2 or
3 out of 3. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test yields D = 0.1133, p = 0.95.
14Parametric tests (unreported) show that this result holds when we compare risk
scores of subjects divided according to their performance on other components of our
test - the quantitative, verbal and sequential, reasoning sections.
161
We estimate four econometric models. Model I is the baseline one,
where the risk score, as measured, is used as dependent variable and the
performance in the cognitive test (not including the CRT score) is used as a
measure of cognitive ability. The other three models check whether the the
baseline results are robust to using either different measures of cognitive
ability or different measures of risk aversion as dependent variables. Model
II uses the CRT score as the measure of cognitive ability. Models III and
IV use a self-reported measure of willingness to take risks15 (WTR) as
dependent variable, while using either the cognitive test score or the CRT
score as the measure of cognitive ability. This is to check whether the
results of the baseline model are robust to using a sirnple survey question
to measure subjects' willingness to take risks. Estimates of all models are
based on standard linear regression.
Table 3.4 reports OL8 estimates of the four model specifications. The
second and third columns present the coefficient estimates of models I and
II, respectively. The two remaining columns present the estimates of speci-
fication III and IV of the baseline model. The point estimate on the SCORE
variable suggests that a better performance in the cognitive tests does not
lead to a statistically significant change in attitudes towards risk. In mod-
els I-IV, the parameter estimates of the effect of cognitive ability on risk
attitudes are slightly different from zero; in fact, the hypothesis that they
15\Vhere 0 indicates "unwilling to take risks" and 10 indicates "very willing to take
risk". This information was collected through a short socio-domographic questionnaire
that subject were asked to answer at the end of the experiment.
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are basically zero cannot be rejected. Similarly, in models II and IV in
which cognitive ability is measured by the CRT, the estimated coefficients
describing the effect of cognitive ability on risk scores are very similar to
those found in the other models and equally not significantly different from
zero. Thus, results based on \VTR corroborate those based on risk score.
Estimates across all four specifications confirm the non-parametric results
shown before.
In summary, we find no relation between CRT scores and risk aversion.
This is consistent with a recent study by Brafias-Garza et al. (2008),
who find that individual computational capabilities are unrelated to risk
attitudes. In general, demographic variable have little explanatory power.
An exception is models III and IV where gender is significant. Based on
those models, females are more risk averse than men.
One may wonder why these results differ from those found in (Frederick,
2005; Benjamin et al. , 2006; Sunde et al. , 2009), who report that risk
aversion over small gambles is less common among individuals with higher
scores in cognitive tests. It is not clear though where such differences are
primarily stemming from. Our experiment differs from these in several
aspects. The risk-elicitation procedure employed here, for instance, differs
from Frederick (2005) in using an incentive-compatible mechanism to elicit
risk attitudes, but uses the same measure of cognitive ability - along with
others. Sunde et al. (2009) use the same multiple-price list method used
here to elicit risk attitudes, but we use a different test to measure cognitive
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ability. This suggests that the relationship between cognitive ability and
risk attitudes, and possibly other types of economic preferences, might be
sensitive to intelligence and preference measurement methods used.
We summarize the results regarding the relationship between cognitive
ability and risk preferences in
Result 1. There is no difference in risk attitudes between "high" and "low"
score groups. Risk aversion is not related to cognitive ability - even when
we use Frederick (2005) 's cognitive reflection test to measure individuals'
cognitive skills.
3.3.3.2 Cognitive ability and choice consistency
We now ask whether individuals with higher levels of cognitive ability
have greater choice consistency. Before proceeding to a parametric anal-
ysis of the data, we want to check the distribution of the index of choice
consistency in each cognitive group.
The box-plot in Figure 3.3 shows an economical display of the distri-
but ion of the index of choice consistency in each cognitive group. The
horizontal line in each box plot is the median value - 8 in the "low" cog-
nitive group and 5 in the "high" one. The first and third quartile range
defines the upper and lower boundaries of the box. The whiskers represent
the range of more extreme values!". It is apparent that choice consistency
16By "extreme" we mean values lying on the interval between the upper quartile
(inferior limit) and 1.5 times the interquartile range (superior limit).
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ha diff r nt patt rns of distribution b tween cognitive groups.
Figure 3.3: Choic Consist ncy Index, by cognitive core
Less
consistency
T
Index
l
Ind d h ic on ist ncy in the t of id ntical ri k task i n t th
am aero gnitiv groups. Non-parametric te ts how hat w can rej et
th null hypothesis that both distributions of choice consistency arc statis-
ti ally quival nt!". A Mann-Whitn y t t yields z = 2. 04, P = 0.0050,
and a Koimogor v-Smirnov tes yi Id D = 0.3157, P = 0.006. We sum-
mariz thi finding in t he following
suIt 2. When a given risk ta k wa faced on different occasions, indi-
vidual with higher cognitive ability displayed a more con i tent patt rn of
choice than individual with lower cognitive ability.
Why do ho with b tt r ognitiv skills display mor eh ic consis-
t ncy? uppo e a tochastic sp cification of choi e is allow d, a ubje t'
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choice in a given task would be thought as a random variable equal to her
true preference plus noise. Through this framework, Result 2 is to be in-
terpreted as simply showing that individuals with higher cognitive ability
make fewer mistakes in translating their preferences into choices - i.e. less
noise. This is the account advanced by Burks et al. (2009) for a similar
result 18. While this is arguably a natural way to account for differences in
choice precision in a stochastic frarnework, this account does not explain
why choice decisions of individuals with lower cognitive ability are nois-
ier than choice of individuals with higher cognitive ability. We offer two
possible accounts for that.
One is psychology-based and takes into account the repetitive structure
of this component of the experiment intending to test for consistency. If one
thinks of "working memory" - the very short time over which we keep some-
thing in mind before dismissing it - as the cognitive device that enables
subjects to retrieve information as they proceed through the experiment,
it is natural to think that stronger memories will be associated to more
consistent choices. Alexander & Smales (1997) and Engle et al. (1999)
show some evidence that working memory capacity is positively correlated
with cognitive skills. Individuals with better working memory would then
demonstrate more accuracy in retrieving representations of recent events.
Thus, in those risk tasks which are faced several times, individuals with
18They also find that individuals with higher cognitive ability make more consistent
choke. But the type of consistency they examine, multiple switching in risk-elicitation
task, is different from ours.
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higher cognitive ability could more easily retrieve their previous choices
and, therefore, demonstrate more consistency in their risky choices relative
to individual with lower cognitive ability. Note that this does not neces-
sarily rely on subjects spotting the similarity of these risk tasks; in fact,
this argument is even consistent with a possible scenario in which all sub-
jects spotted the similarity, since it still holds that some will retrieve their
previous choices in similar scenarios more easily and precisely than others.
Another possible account is that those with lower cognitive ability
choose without serious deliberation. Obviously, the effect of lack of en-
gagement with risk tasks also extends to all parts of the experiment, in
particular, the cognitive test. Psychometric tests, like the cognitive test
used here, are designed in a way that there is a necessity of sustained
cognitive effort in order to perform well; indeed, test-takers need to know
certain logical rules; more importantly, to perform well they need to en-
gage in a deliberate, slower, serial and effortful reasoning process rather
than answer based on a plausible judgment that comes quickly to mind -
that is, they need to use their "System 1 (reasoning) as opposed to their
"System 2" (intuition) (Kahneman, 2003). This is cognitively costly and
some subjects decided not to think that hard. Likewise, choice decisions in
risk tasks did not involve much deliberation. Thus, the argument goes, the
individuals who get lower scores in the cognitive test also display "noisier"
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behaviour in the risk tasks'",
3.3.3.3 Cognitive ability and type consistency
We now focus our attention on the effect of cognitive ability on the
consistency of subjects' type over the course of the risk tasks.
For each risk task, we classify a given subject into two types: risk-
averse, if her risk premium for the lottery in that risk task is non-negative,
or risk-loving, if her risk premium is negative. From a theoretical point of
view (based on standard theory), displays of both types by a subject would
be inconsistent, as there cannot be a unique utility representation of such
preferences. Our index tries to measure the degree in which an individual
violates this principle. Some could argue though that, if a stochastic spec-
ification of individuals' choice process is allowed, some choice pattern that
yields a mixed sequence of risk preferences in terms of type may be com-
patible with type consistency; and depending on how the structure of such
stochastic term is modelled, consistent but "noisy" choices may produce
type reversals and some relatively extreme variations across the spectrum
of type classes. But even in this stochastic specification, our index of type
consistency capture both aspects'".
So is there a difference in type consistency between high and low cogni-
19This account invites a discussion of why some subjects engage in more serious
deliberation than others. There are many competing explanations (e.g. different under-
standing across cognitive levels), but it is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine
them.
20ln which case the type consistency index, so long there is some type mixing, would
just be a more comprehensive measure of choice consistency in our experiment, since
involving all risk tasks.
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tive groups? Figure 3.4, plotting features of the index of typ consist ncy's
distribution, sheds light on this issue.
Figure 3.4: Ind x of typ consistency by cognitive group
co
Less consistent
1 o
~101'(" consistent
Low Cognitive Gl'OU})
In each box, the red line drawn across each cognitive group box rep-
res nt the median index value for that group. There are clear differ ne s
betwe n cognitive groups. Not only the median index of type consistency is
larger among subjects with relatively low scores, but also the interquartile
range. Th se differences are statistically significant: a Mann-Whitney two-
sample test yields Z = 2.581, P = 0.0098. W test wheth r thes r sults
are driven by th effect of differences in dispersion of choic s, a m asured
by L; We do so by xamining whether differences betw en cognitive groups
in t rms of type uniformity, as measured by Iu, ar statistically significant.
Th yare: a Mann- Whitn y test yields Z = 2.43 , P = 0.0146.
esult 3. Individuals with higher cognitive ability displayed a more con-
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sistent pattern of risk attitude type than individuals with lower cognitive
ability.
A first hypothesis to explain this result would not differ much from the
explanation for differences in choice consistency in identical risk tasks. We
have seen in the previous section that higher cognitive ability is associated
with more consistent choices. It was advanced that this could possibly
be related to the somewhat indirect effects of cognitive ability in reducing
noise in subjects' choice decisions - either because of the way differences
in cognitive ability affect ''working memory", hence choice precision, or
because of differences in deliberation when responding cognitive test and
risk tasks alike.
But since our measurement of type consistency employs choices involv-
ing different lotteries, one could think that the above is not the most plau-
sible theoretical interpretation for these results. It could be the case that
the observed type reversals are actually capturing different curvature zones
of individuals' utility function. Note, however, that all lotteries used have a
narrow range of prizes, with almost all lotteries'" featuring prizes between
3 and 9 British pounds; often, type reversals involve lotteries with similar
range of prizes. For this reason, even if the utility function representing
each subject's preferences has different concavity as we move along the
wealth line, the index of type consistency is capturing risk preferences that
cannot be simultaneously consistent. There is little reason, however, to
21Exception is L5 that gives a prize of either 10 or 16 British pounds.
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think that such differences would be affected by reasoning skills.
3.3.3.4 Cognitive ability and framing consistency
Are individuals with higher cognitive ability less or more susceptible
to framing effects than those with lower cognitive ability? According to
rational choice models, they should not be. It is not that such a prediction
can be derived from these models; they simply do not take into account
the potential effect that demographic differences might have on what is
regarded as rational decision-making. At least normatively, rational choice
in these models mean choice that satisfy a certain set of principles.
One underlying principle of such models is that different frames of a
giving choice problem should not induce an individual to different deci-
sions if the variations in frame leave the consequences of choice problem
unchanged - their decisions should be consistent across frames. Obviously,
individuals' choice decisions should satisfy this principle regardless of levels
of cognitive ability. But while there is plenty of evidence that, in a variety
of problems, people's choices are affected by changes of frame (e.g. Druck-
man, 2001; Tversky & Kahnernan, 1981), little has been said about whether
individuals with different levels of cognitive skills are equally prone to such
framing effects.
To examine this question, we make use of two risk tasks: L2 and L5. L5
is just the lottery constructed from L2 by increasing each prize of L2 by the
amount of 7. By thinking of these lottery prizes as small-scale changes in
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wealth, as we increase the prizes in 15, we increase the individual's wealth
level - but we do so through money given "inside" the lottery. So we denote
risk premia differences between L5 and 12 in the first risk-elicitation stage,
before the £7.00 increment is given, as the "inside money" framing effect.
In turn, we denote risk premia differences between L2 across stages, before
and after the £7.00 increment is given, as the "outside money" framing
effect. For an expected utility maximiser whose utility is defined on final
wealth, these framing effects should be equivalent as the consequences are
wealth-wise identical between these frames. The only difference between
them is that the small-scale wealth increment in one frame is given "inside"
the lottery and in the ot.her frame is given "outside" the lottery. Hence
the variation in risk attitudes that may be induced by a small-scale change
in wealth of, say, D.w, should be unaffected by the form the increment is
framed; that is, individual choices should be consistent across frames.
In Table 3.5, we examine framing consistency for subjects in the high
cognitive group versus subjects in the low one. Specifically, we report the
means and standard deviation of risk premia variations between frames
- a measure of framing inconsistency. Statistic tests and p-values from
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of equality of distributions are reported in the
third column. This test includes only individuals in the treatment condi-
tions who were assigned to a non-zero increment condition (/7 and W7).
We do observe framing effects: 72% of subjects in the high cognitive
group and 84% in the low cognitive group show some degree of inconsistency
173
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between the framings used to introduce a small-scale change of wealth.
Yet differences of framing consistency between cognitive groups are not
statistically significant.
The framing inconsistency of most subjects' choices tells us that they
tend to evaluate the risk tasks in terms of a minimal account, which would
include only the sums that could be won in each risk task and exclude
rnoney won before. Tversky & Kahnernan (1981) propose that this "nar-
row" framing makes the decision-making easier by simplifying the problem
evaluation and reducing cognitive strain. We find that this mode of framing
is adopted by individuals with different levels of cognitive ability. There
can be at least two interpretations of this result. One, that this mode of
framing reflects what seems to be a "natural" and intuitive way of assessing
a choice problem i.e., choosing according to your preferences over the direct
consequences. Another, that overriding the "narrow" focus underlying this
framing inconsistency is too "complex" - depending on how "broad" it is
assumed to be, it requires merging outcomes from other domains with the
consequence of the current choice problem and calculating the joint distri-
bution of them. Hence the deliberate deployment of cognitive operations
that this requires is, in principle, only accessible to individuals with very
high levels of cognitive ability. While subjects who were perfectly consis-
tent between the "inside" and "outside" frames were in the high cognitive
group, our sample size is too small to allow more definitive inference.
vVe summarize the results regarding the relationship between cognitive
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ability and risk preferences in
Result 4. The way a small-scale wealth increment is framed -either given
u: 0,]" 0 0 k U t id "Ot . f1'. t biects' 0 k I 0 iltnsuie a quiet) ItS or ou ,8Z e u. - aJJee .';su rjects ris y e iou:e regan ess
of their levels of cognitive ability. Thus, framing inconsistency is robust
across cognitive score groups.
3.4 Conclusions
We present a set of experimental results which, built on design pre-
sented in Chapter 2, explore the relationship between cognitive ability and
consistency of behaviour under risk. An irnportant innovation over previ-
ous work on this topic is that several dimensions of behavioural consistency
are investigated.
First, we used a test-retest approach, where a given risk task is faced on
different occasions, to examine choice consistency. We introduced an index
that reflects the degree of choice variation over the repeated risk tasks; it
also captures "dynamic" aspects of an individual's choice decisions in this
set of tasks. 'Ye find that individuals with higher cognitive ability display
greater consistency in their choice behaviour. Our preferred interpretation
for this result is simply that higher cognitive ability help individuals to
state their preferences with more precision, reducing noise in their observed
choices.
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Second, we examine the association of cognitive ability with what we
termed type consistency. In order to do so, we introduce an index that
intends to quantify this form of behavioral consistency based on type clas-
sification of subjects' choices in all risk tasks of the experiment. We think
of type consistency as a type of bi-dimensional feature of the way risk pref-
erences evolve in a repeated elicitation setting, reflecting uniformity but
also variability of risk attitudes. Because both dirnensions are somewhat
related to how "noisy" is the process whereby individuals translate their
preferences into choices, we expect individuals with higher cognitive ability
to display relatively more type consistency. Cognitive ability through its
effects on memory, deliberation, etc would reduce the propensity to error.
It is not startling then that we find that individuals with higher cognitive
ability also display more type consistency.
Third, we used different forms to represent a small-scale change in
wealth to investigate framing consistency. This increment would take place
under two frames: an "inside" and an "outside" frame. In the "inside", the
small increment is incorporated into the outcomes of a risk task; in the
"outside", it would be given to the subject. While there is no theoretical
constraint to the sign of the effect of such increment on risk attitudes, theo-
ries of rational choice predict that such effect should be consistent between
frames. \Vhile subjects in our experiment violated that principle, we do
not find that differences in the patterns of violation are related to differ-
ences in cognitive ability. Under some hypotheses regarding the argument
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of the utility function, framing consistency in our context would require
overriding a "narrow framing" approach, whereby lottery outcomes are not
mentally merged with the wealth increment. We then conjectured that
only individuals of a certain top percentile of the distribution of cognitive
ability could, in principle, experience some success in mentally accessing
the distribution of outcomes that a "broad framing" requires.
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of our set of results is the failure to
replicate Frederick (2005)'s results regarding risk behaviour. The cognitive
reflection test (CRT) proposed by Frederick is part of our cognitive test; and
an important difference over his work is the incentivised elicitation of risk
attitudes. Under incentivised conditions, we do not observe that individuals
with higher cognitive ability are less risk-averse. In principle, this would
cast doubts either on either the validity of the CRT in measuring cognitive
ability or validity of elicitation of risk attitudes under non-incentivised
conditions. But it is worth noting that we used a more comprehensive
psychometric test and provided inccntiviscd conditions to risk elicitation;
yet we do not find any statistically significant association between risk
attitudes and cognitive ability. While this seems to be in stark contrast to
other recent studies (Burks et al. , 2009; Sunde et al. , 2009), this particular
result should not be particularly startling. After all, individuals with higher
cognitive ability benefit from a more efficient reasoning system; and there is
nothing particularly complex in tasks used in laboratory-based elicitation of
risk preferences that allow cognitive ability to arise as a source of differences
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in risk preferences. This is consistent with (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002;
Stanovich & West, 2008)'s two-system based framework, according to which
some experimental tasks will give cues to some subjects that a heuristically
primed response needs to be overridden and an analytically derived choice
substituted. Thus, the variability in the association of cognitive ability and
performance in heuristic and biases tasks documented by Stanovich & West
(2008) would derive from the failure of lower cognitive ability individuals
in performing such overriding-". It is arguably the case that in expressing
their risk preferences, individuals do not perceive that as a heuristically
based answer that needs to be overridden by a analytic reasoning process.
Therefore, cognitive capacity would have little bearing on the expression of
preferences underlying a subject's display of risk aversion or risk lovingness
in the type of task used in experimental investigations.
22Either because "mindware" is not available or, even when necessity for override is
detected and mindware is available, the individual cannot carry out what they term
sustained cognitive decoupling (Stanovich & 'Vest, 2008, p.687).
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ApPENDIX
3.5 Appendix: Cognitive Test
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GENERAL COGNITIVE ABILITY ASSESSMENT*
Part I: Frederick's Cognitive Reflection test (JEP 2006) (3 questions)
Ability to spot erroneous features of intuitive answers that spring to mind when facing certain
. problems.
Part II: Quantitative Reasoning (3 questions)
Ability to use algebraic, arithmetical and geometrical methods to solve problems in a
qUantitative setting.
Part III: Sequential reasoning (3 questions)
Ability to use deductive and logical reasoning in a arithmetic and geometric context.
e Part IV: Verbal Reasoning (3 questions)
:Ability to analyze relationships between words and concepts and to interpret written
Information.
Total number of questions: 12
Time given: 12 minutes
* This page was not shown to subects. The test section heading on the next pages also were not
Shows to subjects. .
182
Part I: Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, JEP 2006)
Solve each of the following problems and then write your answer.
1. A bat and a ball cost £1.10 In total. The bat costs £1.00 more than the ball. How much does
the ball cost?
_5_pences.
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to
make 100 widgets?
_5 _minutes.
, 3. In a lake, there Is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If It takes 48 days
for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would It take for the patch to cover half of the
lake?
_47 days.
[ Part II: Quantitative Reasoning I
Section A: Problem solving
Solve each of the following problems and then choose the correct answer. Use the paper provided for any
rough work.
4. A fish tank Is half full of water. When 10 gallons are added, the tank is 6/8 full. What Is the
capacity of the tank In gallons?
(A) 30 gallons
(B) 40 gallons (X)
(C) 50 gallons
(0) 60 gallons
(E) 80 gallons
5. If a dealer had sold a stereo for £600, he would have made a 200/0 profit. Instead, the dealer
sold it for a 400/0 loss. At what price was the stereo sold?
(A) £300 (X)
(6) £315
(C) £372
(0) £400
(E) £440
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6. x and yare integers such that x + y < 11, and x > 6. What is the smallest possible value of x
-V?
(A) 1
(8) 2
(C) -2
(D) 4 (X)
(E) -4
[ Part III: Sequential Reasoning I
7. Determine the number that should come next in the following series:
3 8 14 21 29 38 ?
(A) 46
(8) 42
(C) 51
(D) 54
(E) 48 (X)
8. Determine the missing square:
184
B c D
x
9. Determine the missing square:
D
1 5
[ Part IV: Verbal Reasoning I
. Section A: Analogies
Choose the answer key which contains a pair of words with a relationship most similar to the relationship
between the pair of words in capital letters.
10. ARCHIVE: RECORDS
(A) arsenal : arms (X)
(B) locker : uniform
(C) box : shoes
(D) pantry: bread
(E) arsenide : death
Section B: Antonyms
Choose the answer key corresponding to the word with a meaning most nearly opposite to the meaning of
the word in capital letters.
11. CENSURE
(A) proceed
(B) freedom
(C) praise (X)
(D) enclosure
(E) interest
Section C: Sentence completion
Choose the answer choice that contians the words that best complete the sentence.
12. To reach Simonville, the traveller needs to drive with extreme caution along the __
curves of the mountain road that climbs to the summit.
(A) jagged - steadily
(B) serpentine - steeply (X)
(C) gentle - precipitously
(D) shady - steadily
(E) hair-raising - languidly
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Chapter 4
Chapter 4
COOPERATION AND PUNISHMENT UNDER
UNCERTAIN ENFORCEMENT
4.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates experimentally the efficacy of a punishment
mechanism in promoting cooperative behaviour when punishment enforce-
ment is uncertain.
There has been a long-standing interest across many disciplines - situ-
ations where self-interested behaviour is at odds with collective interest! in
behaviour in social dilemma situations. We commonly find ourselves fac-
ing such dilemmas. For instance, should we vote in a national election? It
hardly seems individually rational to do so: it is costly and almost certainly
has negligible impact on the final outcome. Yet, democratic political sys-
terns would breakdown if everyone refrained from voting. Quite often social
lSee for example, in economics, Hardin (1968); Axelrod (1984); in psychology Dawes
(1980); Messick & Brewer (1983); in biology Trivers (1971); Boyd & Lorberbaum (1987);
in sociology Kollock (1998); Glance & Huberman (1993).
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dilemmas appear in the use of public resources - water, forests, and health
systems, to name a few - when self-interest of users conflicts with collective
interests and the very sustainable use of such resources. A crucial ques-
tion to social scientists and biologists alike is then how can self-interested
individuals be induced to cooperate in social dilemmas?
Attempts to answer this question have led to a number of experimental
studies on how to increase cooperation in social dilemmas, Many mecha-
nisms have been investigated. Isaac & Walker (1988); Cinyabuguma et al.
(2005); Guth et al. (2007) and Masclet et al. (2003), have showed that
preplay communication, threat of expulsion, or even symbolic disapproval
can all boost cooperative behaviour. Alternative mechanisms such as giving
subjects an opportunity to penalise others financially can also effectively
increase and maintain high levels of cooperation in repeated public goods
game (Fehr & Gachter, 2000). This monetary sanction system has been re-
ceiving increasing attention (see e.g. Anderson & Putterman, 2006; Sefton
et al. , 2007; Casari et al. , 2007; Ertan et al. , 2009).
Subsequent studies have confirmed that subjects are willing to pay from
their own earnings to punish defectors (e.g., Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Masc1et
et al. , 2003; Noussair & Tucker, 2005; Bochet et al. , 2006; Sefton et al. ,
2007; Gachter et al. , 2008); by doing so, they help to maintain contribu-
tions to the public good at high levels. Overall, they support the view that,
at least under some circumstances, the existence of a sanctioning system
189
can foster behaviour deemed as socially acceptable'',
The laboratory setting used in these studies abstracts from many things.
Take the uncertainty about the link between behaviour in the social dilemma
and punishment. In principle, there could be uncertainty about, at least,
three things: first, others' willingness to punish; second, whether our ac-
tions are being watched by others; third, whether willingness to punish can
be translated into actual punishment decisions, There is no doubt that the
first type of uncertainty is naturally present in the standard design: indi-
viduals face some uncertainty about whether others are willing to punish
them, especially when it is costly to do so.
But the last two types of uncertainty have been largely neglected, as
the commonly used experimental design relics on two assumptions: per-
feet monitoring and perfect enforcement. To see how this is the case, note
first that in the standard public good design contributions are disclosed
in every period, after which punishment opportunities are given. Hence,
there is certainty of being monitored all the time throughout the game
(perfect monitoring). Yet in many real world settings behaviour deemed
as socially inappropriate escapes punishment simply because it is not ob-
served. Note, also, that in these experiments there is no uncertainty about
whether subject's demand for punishment will be satisfied: punishment
decisions are always carried out (perfect enforcement). Most sanctioning
2There is some evidence that what is "socially acceptable" varies across societies,
with high contributors in some cases getting more punished than low contributors; see
Herrmann et al. (2008).
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systems in modern societies, however, do not have this feature. Often,
there are hindrances to punishment enforcement. For instance, individuals
tasked with enforcing punishments can be corruptible, and anti-social be-
haviour, even if detected, could still not result in any penalty at all. Even
when sanctions are decentralised and informal, individuals may have the
willingness but not the ability to punish someone simply because an oppor-
tunity to do so will not arise. In either case, punishment is rarely perceived
as certain. An experimental setting assuming perfect monitoring or perfect
enforcement does not take into account those uncertainties, which could
lead to a misleading assessment of the efficacy of punishment mechanisms
in disciplining non-cooperators.
The aim of this study is then to relax one of those assumptions, iso-
lating its effect on the deterrence force of punishment opportunities. We
investigate, in particular, if a punishment mechanism can succeed in pro-
moting cooperative behaviour in a public goods game when there is uncer-
tain enforcement. While there exists a subjective clement in individuals'
perception of this uncertainty, assigning a probability distribution to en-
forcement of punishment could make the perceived uncertainty surrounding
this event measurable (risk), controllable and, at least objectively, uniform
across individuals.
Thus, to investigate the impact of uncertain enforcement on the com-
mon boosting effect of a punishment mechanism on cooperation, we de-
signed an experiment that introduces measurable uncertainty into whether
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others' decision to punish a given player is actually carried out. To our
knowledge only one previous study, by Walker & Halloran (2004), has in-
vestigated this. The authors compare cooperation in a one-shot two-stage
punishment game (Fehr & Gachter, 2000) in which imposition of sanctions
is certain to a two-stage game in which imposition is uncertain. They find
that uncertainty does not change the level of cooperation or the willingness
to punish in a significant way. We took a second look at this issue by exam-
ining it in a repeated setting and including different levels of uncertainty.
Specifically, the experiment sought to investigate how "high" and "low" en-
forcement probabilities affect cooperation in a repeated-play public goods
game, comparing behaviour in such uncertain environments to behaviour
in an environment in which punishment enforcement is certain.
While we are primarily interested in the effects of uncertain enforcement
on cooperation", such uncertainty may also affect individuals' willingness
to punish free-riders. Its effects on punishment decisions are far from obvi-
ous. The reason is that backward- and forward-looking motives arc likely
to be driving punishment decisions. Experimental evidence suggests, for
instance, that punishment is motivated by negative emotions triggered by
past free-riding behaviour (Fehr & Cachter, 2002, p.139). There is also
evidence that punishment tends to decrease over time (Nikiforakis, 2008,
p.102), which suggests that the future matters: individuals presumably
reason that the effectiveness of their punishment in enforcing cooperation
3Because we want to isolate the effect of uncertainty over enforcement, costs of
punishment are not incurred unless it is enforced. We come to this point later.
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is weakened as the game proceeds towards the end.
One can conjecture that uncertainty about punishment enforcement af-
fect both backward- and forward-looking motives. Backward-looking mo-
tives because, as punishment may not be carried out, there may be many
past episodes of free-riding behaviour that went unpunished; not because
of unwillingness to punish, but because "luck" got free-riders "off the hook".
Hence, through its effect. on backward-looking motives, enforcement uncer-
tainty could cause an increase in punishment - reflecting a delayed outlet
of accumulated negative emotions caused by past free-riding behaviour.
Uncertainty could also affect forward-looking motives because the antic-
ipation that punislunent may not be enforced could weaken its strategic
usc. Hence, through its effect on forward-looking motives, enforcement un-
certainty could cause a decrease in punishment. Given these countervailing
forces, it is not clear why punishment should be less effective. So whether
and how uncertainty affects individuals' willingness to punish free-riding
behaviour is also an empirical question that remains open to investigation,
providing additional motivation for this study.
Further, this study can be seen as extending the current body of re-
search on the "robustness" of the punishment mechanism used by Fehr &
Gachter (2000, 2002). Recent papers have provided evidence that punish-
ment may not help to maintain cooperation. Even when there is certainty
over enforcement, the effectiveness of punishment in promoting cooperation
is sensitive to (i) its price (Andersen et al. , 2006c), (ii) its payoff impact per
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unit of punishment (Egas & Riedl, 2008), (iii) whether individuals are given
counter-punishment opportunities (Nikiforakis, 2008) and, to (iv) cultural
differences regarding the strength of norms of civic cooperation (Herrmann
et al. , 2008). The findings reported here add to this literature, furthering
our understanding of under which circumstances a punishment mechanism
can induce cooperation in social dilemmas.
The experiment has two major results. First, that the threat of pun-
ishment cannot raise and sustain high levels of contributions when pun-
ishment enforcement is perceived by the individuals as a low-probability
event. The experimental results show that a relatively low probability of
non-enforcement does not impair punishment to serve as an effective de-
terrent device, whereas a high probability of non-enforcement docs. This
indicates that there is more at work in sustaining cooperation than the
simple existence of a sanction system. Second, that low contributors are
more intensely punished when enforcement of punishment decisions is a
low-probability event. Also, and curiously enough, punishment of free-
riders and low contributors is generally more intense at the beginning and
the end of the game. Thus, in contrast to Walker & Halloran (2004), we
find that the existence of uncertainty over the imposition of sanctions has
consistent implications on subjects' decision rules.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 de-
scribes the experiment design. Section 4.3 presents the hypotheses to be
tested. Section 4.4 reports the results. Section 4.5 concludes. An Appendix
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with the set of instructions is at the end of the paper.
4.2 Experimental Design
The design consists of a public good experiment with punishment with
three treatment conditions. In one treatment (PlOD) there is certain en-
forcement. This corresponds to the standard case in the literature, in which
punishment decisions are always enforced. The remaining two treatments
differ according to the probability of enforcement of punishment decisions:
one treatment with "high" probability of enforcement (P80), in which pun-
ishment decisions are carried out with probability 0.8; and the other with
"low" probability of enforcement (P20), in which punishment decisions are
carried out with probability 0.2. Thus, there is a chance in these two latter
treatments that punishment decisions will not be actually carried out".
In each session, sixteen subjects arc randomly partitioned into groups
of four people. Composition of groups remains unchanged throughout the
game - the so-called partner matching protocol. They playa public good
game for ten periods. We use a between-subject design, so that in a session
subjects are only exposed to one of the following three treatment conditions.
4We chose these probability values because we want to examine decisions in two
enforcement settings that were rather contrasting; but not so much that the probabilities
of enforcement were close to the endpoints of the unit interval.
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4.2.1 Certain Enforcement Treatment (PlOD)
This treatment builds on the standard design for the public goods game
with punishment, with three differences. First, while Fehr & Gachter (2000)
frame contribution decisions as an investment into a group project, we
frame them as investment into a Public Account. Second, they usc a con-
vex punishment cost function while we adopt a linear one. Third, in the
current experiment, group members' contributions are identified by an ID
number when disclosed on the computer screen; contribution are always
listed in the same ID column position'', rather than randomly reassigned
every period. Of these, we believe this last feature is potentially a major
distinction from the standard design; it allows participants to create a link
between the actions of other group members across periods. There are
two reasons for that. First, that by allowing individualization, we reduce
the possibility for indiscriminate punishment and make interpretation of
data more transparent. Second, that by allowing subjects to track group
member's contributions, we can investigate the extent to which punishment
decisions are influenced by contributions in previous rounds. This is partie-
ularly important when, as in the treatments P80 and P20 described below,
the opportunity to punish is intermittent, but we allow it in PlOD too, to
avoid confounding possible effects of probability of punishment enforcement
with information differences.
5Although players could track a particular co-player's contribution record, they have
no way of identifying that person. This matters (a) for ethical treatment of subjects and
(b) for elimination of confounds if, for example, subjects might respond to information
contained in the name (e.g gender, nationality, etc).
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At the beginning of each of the ten periods, each subject is endowed
with a fixed amount of 20 Rubis (the experimental currency used). Each
period unfolds in two stages. In the first stage, subjects are required to
simultaneously decide how much of their endowment to invest in a Public
Account, say Ci, and, consequently, how much of it to invest in a Private
Account, 20 - Ci. Each Rubi a player allocates to the Private Account has
a return of 1 for that player. A Rubi allocated to the Public Account yields
a return of 0.4 for every player in the group. At the end of the first-stage,
each subject is informed of the group's total investment, her income from
the Public Account and her first-stage earnings (7f), which is given by:
4
nf = 20 - c, + 0.4L:Ci
i=l
(4.1)
Note that the total return of investment in the Public Account depends on
the total investment made by the entire group. While each Rubi allocated
to the Public Account yields a marginal private return of less than 1, by
investing in the Public Account players in a group may obtain earnings that
exceed those associated with full investment in the Private Account. Invest-
ments in the Public Account, given its non-rivalness and non-excludability,
can be seen as contributions to a public good.
In the second stage, participants are informed of the investment de-
cis ions of their group members and given the opportunity to punish each
group member by assigning "deduction" points. Each deduction point costs
the punisher one Rubi and reduces the punished players' first-stage income
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by 3 Rubis. Each subject can assign up to 10 "deduction points" to each
other group member.
Additionally, it is imposed that a subject cannot have her first-stage
income, 1rl, reduced below zero as a result of the punishment given her by
others. Nevertheless, as she always carries the cost of punishment she does,
her period income may end up negative depending on the total number of
"deduction" points received and assigned". Subject i's end-or-period payoff
is given by:
(4.2)
where P-i,i stands for the number of deduction points imposed on subject i
by other group members, and Pt,-i stands for the total number of punishing
points assigned by subject i to other group members.
4.2.2 Uncertain Enforcement Treatments (PSO and P20)
The other two treatment conditions involve a similar game to the one
played in the above treatment condition. The difference now is that one
stage is added after the second stage, which \ve refer here to as the "en-
forcement" stage. Recall that in the second stage, subjects are informed
of the contribution decision of each other group member and are given
the opportunity to punish them. In the "uncertain enforcement" treatment
6As in Fehr & Gachter (2000), Nikiforakis (2008) and others, each subjects is given
a one-time lump-sum payment of 25 Rubis at the beginning of the experiment to pay
for negative payoffs they might incurr during the experiment.
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conditions (termed P80 and P20), they do so with the understanding that
their "punishment?" decisions may not be carried out. They will be so with
a probability p. They are told that this probability is the same for all 10
periods of the experiment. Note that it is as if their punishment decisions
were delegated to a central authority that, depending on the state of the
nature, may fail to implement their decisions. Thus, there were two states
of the nature, say S E {Sb S2}, and punislunent decisions are enforced only
when S = Sb where P(S = SI) = p. To investigate the effect of uncertain
enforcement of punishment on cooperative (or punishing) behaviour, we
ran "high probability" (P80) and "low probability" (P20) sessions, in which
p is 0.8 and 0.2, respectively. The PlOD treatment can be viewed as the
particular case in which p = 1.
In each period, whether or not punishment decisions are enforced is
decided at a group level as follows: for each group, a ball is drawn from a
bingo cage with replacement. The bingo cage has balls numbered from 1 to
10. If the ball for a given group is numbered 9 or 10 in the P80 condition, or
3 to 10 in the P20 condition, then punishment decisions are not carried outs.
In these cases, a subject's end-of-period earnings are equal to her earnings
in the first stage. Otherwise, punishment decisions are implemented and
the final earnings in the period are given by the equation in (4.2).
To avoid there being any communication of disapproval when punish-
7We did not use this terminology ("punishment") in the experiment.
8Doing these realisations separately for each group reduced the danger that PIOOand
P80 would actually be the same or that P20 would actually have no enforced punishment.
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ment is not enforced (i.e., nonmonetary forms of punishment, see Masclet
et al. (2003)), punishment assigned to each individual in a given group is
not disclosed unless it is enforced. So only when punishment decisions are
actually implemented are subjects informed of the total punishment points
they received from the group. In a similar fashion, assigning punishment
points will not have any cost to subjects if punishment is not to be en-
forced. This could correspond to a case where opportunity to punish, as
opposed to willingness to, may simply not arise. More importantly, this
feature of our design avoids that one's profile of punishment decisions be
"contaminated" by her unwillingness to pay for something that may not
happen.
Thus, the information disclosed at the end of each period depends on the
enforcement state: in case punishment is not enforced, subjects are shown
their final earnings, which in this case is equal to their earnings from the
first stage. in case punishment is enforced, they are shown (a) the total
cost of the punishment points they assigned, (b) the punishment points
they received in total from the group, and (c) the associated reduction in
their earnings along with their final earnings in the period. All subjects
are also informed of their own accumulated earnings, which is equal to the
sum of earnings over all previous periods.
In all three treatments conditions, the parameters of the experiment
(endowment, the return rate from the Public and Private Accounts, group
size, payoff functions, number of rounds) are publicly announced to the
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participants.
4.2.3 Administration
There are ninety six subjects in this experiment. None of them had
previously participated in a public good experiment at the University of
Nottingham". The subjects signed up for one of six sessions. At that point,
they only knew that the experiment would take up to DO minutes. Treat-
ment conditions were randomly allocated to sessions, with two sessions per
treatment condition.
Sixteen subjects took part in each session. Following their arrival, each
subject received instructions explaining the experiment!". The instructions
were read aloud while the students read them silently. To ensure subjects'
understanding of the game's structure and payoff determination, each of
them was asked to complete a control questionnaire. The experiment only
proceeded when all subjects had answered it correctly. The experiment
was conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Sessions took around
fifty minutes to be completed. At the end of the experiment, subjects
were asked to complete a short questionnaire about themselves. Their
earnings were converted into Sterling Pounds and they were then paid in
cash. The exchange rate was 1 Rubi = 2.5 pence. Participants earned 011
9Participants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004), a subject-recruitment
software that allows us to exclude those in the subject database that have been recorded
as participat.ing in previous public good experiments. For elimination of confounds, we
did not want subjects, in particular those assigned to P80 and P20 treatments, who
have had previous experience of PlOD.
10 Instructions are included as an Appendix.
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average £8.51, which included a show-up fee of £2 and a one-time lump-sum
payment of 25 Rubis.
4.3 Theory: Effects of uncertain enforcement
on cooperation and punishment
We now present predictions for cooperative and punishment behaviour.
\Ve start considering a standard game-theoretic ease in which players are
of the same type: they are all strictly concerned with their material payoff.
Then, we consider a mixed case in which some of the players have fairness
concerns.
4.3.1 Cooperation: Homogeneous players
Assuming that individuals are monetary payoff .maximizers and that
this is common knowledge among them, they should contribute nothing to
the Public Account. In the presence of punishment opportunities this still
holds true. The threat of punishment is non-credible as this is a payoff-
reducing action. Therefore, subgame perfection dictates that individuals
would always be better off by not punishing at all. It is straightforward to
see that the equilibrium outcome regarding punishment does not change
when punishment enforcement is risky. In this ease, the actual infliction of
punishment is conditioned on a probability distribution over a set of states
of nature. Even so, costly punishment would not be a credible action by
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self-interested payoff maximizers regardless of the status of enforcement.
Since individuals do not punish, one should contribute nothing just as in
the "certain enforcement" case. Thus, within the standard game-theoretic
framework, zero cooperation and zero punishment would be the subgame-
perfect equilibrium strategies in all enforcement conditions.
4.3.2 Cooperation: Heterogenous players
If individuals have other-regarding preferences and are motivated by
more than their pecuniary payoffs then no punishment and full defection
may not be an equilibrium outcome. Fehr & Schmidt (1999) show, for
instance, that if some people care about payoff equity, full cooperation
can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome in a public good game with
punishment. The intuition behind such result is that individuals who care
about disadvantageous inequality will be willing to punish defectors despite
it being costly to them. Such a threat, given the information set of players,
would be credible enough to sustain cooperation. \Vhile the Fehr and
Schmidt model is consistent with a continuum of contribution profiles, it
predicts full cooperation by using a refinement argument. In fact, a number
of experimental studies have shown that individuals are indeed willing to
pay to punish defectors, and that high levels of cooperation can be sustained
in the presence of punishment. But uncertainty is likely to change the
decision setting. To get an insight into this, we use a simple model for a
two-player case.
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Let us start with some preliminaries. Consider a game G played by two
players. Each player has a type that determines the preferences she acts
on. Player 1 is purely self-regarding ("selfish") whose utility function 'UJ (.)
is defined on her own payoff, say '!rl, in the game. Player 2 is inequity-
averse with a utility function U2(.) defined both on her own payoff and the
other player's payoff in the game, say 7r2 and '!rI. UI (.) has a linear form
defined by UI(7ft) = 7ft. U2(') has a Fehr-Schmidt functional form (see Fehr
& Schmidt, 1999, p.822) defined by
With this in mind, let G be the following complete information public
good game with three stages. In the first stage, players decide simultane-
ously whether or not to contribute to the public good. Each player has
an endowment of e, so that c, E {O,e} (i E {I, 2}) is the discrete set of
strategies each player call employ, Payoff at the end of this stage is given
by
where r is the return to each player from contributions to the public good.
In the second stage, each player is informed about the other player's contri-
bution and decide simultaneously whether or not to impose a punishment
on the other player. Let Pi E {O,p} (i E {I, 2}) be the discrete set of
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strategies each player can employ in this stage. This stage's payoff is given
by
where 1 > 1 is the punishment impact rate, which indicates the first-stage
payoff deduction when the other player chooses to punish. Finally, in the
third stage "nature" chooses whether to enforce players' punishment deci-
sions; "nature" enforces punishment with probability q E [0,1]. Note that
players move in the second stage without knowing what is nature's choice.
Thus, the monetary payoff of a player i is simply 7ri = 7ri,C + 7ri,P.
Now, what is the prediction for this game under the assumption that
players are of different types? 110re specifically, how are decisions in the
first stage affected by the probabilistic enforcement of punishment deci-
sions? The prediction is summarized in the following:
Proposition 1
(1.1) If q = 0, then it is a dominant strategy for both players to choose
c, = 0.
(1.2.) If q > 0, then punishment sustains an equilibrium in which both
players contribute if (i) Cl > l~l and (ii) q > q* = e(~;r).
P1'Oof. See Appendix B •
The crucial implication of the above results is that the threat of punishment
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can only induce self-regarding players to contribute (hence, sustain full
cooperation in the game) if the probability q of punishment enforcement
is sufficiently high. Otherwise, if q is too low, the self-regarding type will
free-ride because expected punishment is too low to deter defection. In
this case, free-riding is also the best response of the inequity-averse player.
Based on Proposition 1, we conjecture the following
Hypotheses 1 (Contribution) The presence of punishment opporiuni-
ties will not raise contributions if enforcement is perceived as "uieak" (low-
probability event) to a sufficiently high proportion of subjects. The lower
q, the more free-ride types will be, breaking down prospects of sustained
cooperation.
Now, what are the predicted effects of probability enforcement on pun-
ishment behaviour? We know of no formal hypothesis that has been put
forward which would allow us to predict the direction of punishment en-
forcement probability effects in subjects' punishment behaviour; and our
previous basic framework regards only cooperative behaviour. Yet, we
conjectured in the introduction to this chapter that the effect of imper-
fect enforcement on punishment is ambiguous; it would ultimately depend
upon how backward- and forward-looking elements influence punishment
decisions.
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4.3.3 Punishment with forward-looking dominance
Instead, if forward-looking motives dominate punishment decisions, then
we conjecture that the more uncertainty over punishment enforcement, the
less punislunent will be observed. The intuition is that the anticipation
that punishment may not be enforced would weaken its strategic usc: the
ability to shape future interactions. If uncertainty creates a hindrance to
individuals' ability to influence the future, then the more the uncertainty,
the less punishment would he exercised hy individuals.
Hypotheses 2.1 (Punishment) If punishment decisions are dominantly
driven by forward-looking motives, then punishment points assigned (not
necessarily implemented) to free-riders and low contributions will be higher
in P 100 and P80 than in P20.
4.3.4 Punishment with backward-looking dominance
If backward-looking motives dominate punishment decisions, then we
conjecture the following: the more likely it is that free-riders can escape
punishment due to enforcement failure, the more intense will be the will-
ingness to punish them. The intuition here is that "bygones are not by-
gones" and players might get more intensely punished in a given round t
for failing to contribute in t and in rounds prior to t. By punishment in-
tensity we mean the punishment points assigned to a player per deviation
of her contribution from others' average. Note that with weak enforcement
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in a repeated setting, there will probably be players, especially in treat-·
ment P20, with a history of free-riding behaviour that went unpunished
because of other players' punishment decisions were not enforced. Thus, if
punishment is dominantly backward-looking and mainly directed towards
free-riders, then more punishment will be directed towards free-riders in
P20 than in PIOO and P80 treatments.
Hypotheses 2.2 (Punishment) If punishrnent decisions are dorninantly
driven by backward-looking motives, then punishment points assigned (not
necessarily implemented) to free-riders and low contributions will be higher
in P20 than in P80 and PlOO.
If that is the case, one may wonder whether this extra punishment
would not compensate the low probability of enforcement and lead to high
contributions. Note, though, that a more intense willingness to punish a
free-rider may have no bearing on cooperation, as willingness to punish
may not translate into actual punishment. Thus, even if others are willing
to punish free-riders in P20 more intensely than, say, in P80, this may not
necessarily induce cooperation levels in P20 as high as in P80.
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4.4 Results of the experiment
4.4.1 Cooperative Behaviour
W, tart by xamining contri bu tion patterns across treatments. Figure
1 presents box plots of contribution to the Public Account over th 10
periods for each treatment condition.
Figure 4.1: Average contribution, by enforcement condition
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Each box plot describes key distributional features of the data. The
median contribution value is shown as a line drawn across the box!'. The
variability in contribution is represented by first (lower hinge) and third
(upper hinge) quartiles of the distribution in each period. Let this in-
terquartile difference be H. The lower and upper adjacent values of the
contribution in each period are shown as ''whiskers'' in the plot lines used
to outline a boxl2• The upper adjacent contribution value represents the
largest contribution between the upper hinge (uh) and the threshold value
of uh + 1.5 x H; the lower adjacent contribution value, in turn, represents
the smallest contribution between the lower hinge (lh) and the threshold
value of lh - 1.5 x II. Dots outside the box plot identify contributions that
lie unusually far from the main body of data 13.
In the box plots for each treatment, by following the line drawn across
the box at the median, one can see the evolution of median contribution
to the Public Account over the ten periods. Contributions under the PlOD
condition, for instance, arc in line with previous experimental findings:
they start at roughly half of subjects' endowments and keep increasing over
time. This result confirms that the existence of punishment can improve
cooperation over time. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, it
suggests that the ability of punishment to sustain cooperation is unaffected
11In the second period of P80, the line representing the median contribution seems
absent of the box plot. This is because it coincides with the upper quartile (10).
12For contribution data in SOUle periods, these adjacent values coincide with the first
(P20, periods 3 and 10) or third quartile (e.g. all periods in PlOD) of the distribution
of contributions.
13Any contribution which lies more than three times the inter-quartile range either
lower than the first quartile, or higher than the third quartile falls into this category.
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by knowledge of contribution histories.
There is, however, clear separation in contributions between the un-
certain enforcement treatments. \Vhile median contributions in the P80
condition increase over time, closely following contributions in the certain
enforcement condition, it is clear that contributions in the P20 condition
are noticeably lower and on a divergent path compared to the P80 condi-
tion. \Vhile median contributions in the P20 condition start higher than
contributions in the P80 condition, they keep decreasing from the second
period on, while contributions in the P80 treatment increase over time.
This suggests that the existence of punishment opportunities is not effective
in raising contributions if enforcement is perceived as a "low" probability
event.
This result, based on visual inspection, is indeed confirmed by non-
parametric tests. \Ve conduct pairwise Mann- Whitney tests between treat-
ments for each period at a time in order to test for equality of distribution
of mean contribution of groups between all enforcement trcatmonts'". Test
statistics are reported in Table 4.1.
Two features stand out in the test results. First, they show that, apart
from the first period, there are no statistically significant differences in
mean contribution of groups in the PlOD and P80 treatments. Second,
they also show that there are statistically significant differences between
141t is worth noting that the sample of observations from a given treatment is formed
by the mean contribution of groups of players in a given treatment. This is 80 because
individuals' contributions, while independent across samples, are not independent within
treatments - which violates an assumption which the test relies on.
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Table 4.1: Are groups' mean contribution different across enforcement
treatments? Pairwise Mann- \Vhitney Tests
Test Statistics
Period \ Treatment P100 V.5 P80 P100vsP20 P80vsP20
Conparlson
z = 2.10 z = 1.31 z=-0.03
1 p=O.03 p=0.19 p=0.60
z = 1.26 z = 1.79 z=0.63
2 p=0.21 p=0.07 p=0.03
1 =0.10 z = 1.37 z = 1.34
3 p=0.92 p= 0.17 P =0.17
z = 0.74 1 = 1.68 1= 1.47
4 p=0.46 p=0.09 p= 0.14
z=0.08 z = 1.79 1= 2.00
5 p=0.06 p=0.07 p=0.04
1=0.47 z = 1.79 z = 2.26
6 p=O.63 p=0.07 p=0.02
1=0.03 z = 2.11 z = 2.37
7 p=0.60 p=0.03 p=0.02
z=0.08 1= 2.21 z = 2.73
8 p=0.56 p=0.02 p=O.OO
z =-0.32 1 = 1.90 z = 2.03
9 p=0.70 p=O.OO p = 0.01
1=-0.47 1=2.42 1=3.00
10 p=0.63 p=0.01 p=O.OO
z = 1.23 z=6.10 z=6.32
All periods p = 0.21 p=O.OO p=O.OO
mean contribution of groups in P2D and either PlOD or P80 treatments
after the initial periods of the game (in most periods, at the 5% level of
significance). Both features are more salient when considering test results
involving data from all periods pooled together.
\\'e need, however, to examine the robustness of these results. The
no-parametric tests do not capture intertemporal dependencies in group
contributions and may confound treatment effects. \Ve then turn to a more
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formal analysis of the data; we do so by running a regression of individual
contributions on treatment and individual variables. The panel structure
of the data allows us to handle some degree of individual heterogeneity and
obtain more consistent estimates of treatment effects.
We estimate an empirical model relating contribution to individual and
structural parameters of the game that largely follows a common specifica-
tion in these studies (e.g. Andersen et al. , 2006c; Nikiforakis, 2008). But
our econometric specification also includes lagged variables that seek to
capture recursive elements in contribution decisions. The underlying rea-
son for this is hardly controversial: in repeatedly played games, individuals
tend to reciprocate actions of other players; this produces behaviour that
is largely reactive and influenced by past outcomes (sec, e.g. Fischbacher
et al. (2001), Frey & Meier (2004) and Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2007)).
The model then has the following specification:
Ci,t = f30 + f31c-i,t-l + f32 (~~-l) + f33EEi,t-l + /34P80 + fi5P20 + z;o: +Ui,t
(4.3)
where the C-i,t is the average contribution of the other group members in
period t, ~~ is the total punishment points actually received by individual
i in period t - which is 0 if punishment decisions were not enforced. EEi,t
is the number of previous periods in which punishment was enforced in the
group i belongs to; this is meant to capture the effects of the particular
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sequence of enforcement experienced by i. P80 and P20 are dummy vari-
ables that equal one if individual i is taking part in the "high" or "low"
probability of enforcement condition, respectively. Components of z will
control for the variation strictly related to some subject-specific attributes
(gender, ethnicity, etc). Dummy variables to control for group effects are
included. UI.t is a composite error term including a subject-specific random
intercept and a purely random disturbance term which is assumed to he
i.i.d. over i and t.
Table 4.2 reports the results of the generalized-least-squares regressions
of the model in (4.3). Contributions are, on average, positively affected
by retaliatory behaviour from others in the past: the actual number of
punishment points received in the previous period as well as the number
of periods in which punishment points were actually enforced have both
significant and positive effect on contributions. Of interest in the results is
the estimation of the "low" probability of enforcement treatment effects on
contribution decisions, which in the case of this model consists of estimated
value and significance of the parameter in front of the dummy variable P20.
Even after controlling for the different enforcement conditions and group
effects (interaction and sequence of enforcement experienced by groups),
one can see that contributions from subjects in the low-probability of en-
forcement treatment are lower than contributions in both certain and "high"
probability of enforcement conditions. P20 is, in fact, the only enforcement
treatment whose effect on contributions is statistically significant. Thus,
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parameter estimates of the model support the raw results depicted in Table
4.2.
Therefore, as was apparent in Figure 1, there are significant differences
in contribution estimates between "high" and "low" probability of enforce-
ment conditions. The mere knowledge that sanctions may be imposed to
punish those regarded as free-riders cannot induce cooperative behaviour if
punishment enforcement is viewed as "weak". Based OIl the non-parametric
and regression analysis one can conclude that the experimental data sup-
port the following:
Result 1. The threat oj punishment can only promote cooperative be-
haviour iJ enforcement is perceived as a high-probability event.
4.4.2 Punishment Behaviour
The next issue to be examined is whether and how subjects' willingness
to punish is affected by the possibility of not having their punishment deci-
sions enforced. To get an intuition on this, we begin with some descriptive
statistics.
Table 4.3 presents the frequency of individuals who assign no punish-
ment. Two things are worth noting: first, that there is a considerable
amount of "free-riding" behaviour on punishment efforts across treatments.
In most periods, the option to punish is exercised by less than half of the
subjects. Second, that there is more punishing of individuals in the first
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Table 4.3: Fraction of subjects who assign no punishment points
Period PIOO P80 P20
1 0.31 0.53 0.57
2 0.65 0.66 0.63
3 0.50 0.53 0.63
4 0.53 0.59 0.63
5 0.63 0.66 0.56
6 0.69 0.63 0.72
7 0.66 0.53 0.72
S 0.69 0.56 0.69
9 0.56 0.63 0.72
10 0.66 0.66 0.63
period of the certain enforcement conditions than there is in the uncertain
enforcement conditions.
Examining punishment points assigned to subjects, we find that indi-
viduals in the PIOO condition were assigned more punishment points (2.19)
on average than those who are in the PSO and P20 conditions (1.41 and
1.53). A Mann-Whitney test shows that this difference in punishment in
the first period is significant at 5% level of significance (PlOD versus PSO:
p < 0.0224; PlOD versus P20: p < 0.0507). A natural question to ask is
why subjects in PlOD are imposing more sanctions relative to PSO and P20
conditions in the beginning of the game?
It is not that there is a great deal more of free-riding behaviour in the
PIOO relative to the other two conditions. In the first two periods, only
one subject in the PlOD contributes nothing to the Public Account, against
five and four subjects in the PSG and P20 conditions, respectively. While
the fraction of subjects who in the first period contribute less than the
group average is slightly greater in PIOO (59%) than it is in PSO and P20
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conditions (56% and 71%), average contribution in PlOD is actually higher
(11.03) than it is in P80 and P20 treatments (7.78 and 9.03, respectively).
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests provide a second bit of evidence consistent with
that: they show that one cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no
significant differences in the distribution of deviations from others' average
contribution between treatments in the first period (PlOD versus P80: p <
0.627;PIOO versus P20: p < 0.964; P80 versus P20: p < 0.627).
A possible interpretation of this first-period differences in punishment
between treatments is that subjects in the certain enforcement condition
are trying to discipline behaviour from the beginning by signalling "tough-
ness" with free-riders and low-contributors. Yet, this strategic reputation
building would be mitigated among subjects in P80 and P20 enforcement
conditions. Because they know that their punishment decisions may fail to
be enforced, they would be unwilling to accept the cost of enforced pun-
ishment as the potential "extra" cost of such strong signals early in the
game may not be compensated by higher cooperation levels later in the
game. This is likely to be the case of a forward-looking subject who be-
lieves that punishment will only work if it is enforced frequently, in which
case it would be rational not to punish in P20 even though unenforced
punishment is cost less.
Graphics in Figure 4.2 show other interesting aspects of punishment
behaviour in each enforcement condition. Each figure plots the average
punishment points assigned to i by range of deviation from the others'
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average contribution over time. There are four classes of deviation: 1 (-
20,-10], 2 (-10,0], 3(0,10], and 4 (10,20]. For example, the leftrnost cluster
of ten columns in each figure shows the average punishment assigned to
individuals whose contribution is between 10 and 20 Rubis less than the
average contribution from other group members (Deviation class 1). The
other three ranges of deviation move towards a positive domain as one
moves to the ten-sequence cluster of columns on the right-hand side of the
X axis of the graph.
Visual inspection of these plots suggests three things. First, that there
are some sort of first- and last-period effects. Note that the willingness
to punish free-riders and low contributors (those in deviation class 1) is
stronger at the beginning and at the end of the game. Second, that there is
no "anti-social punishment" when enforcement is weak: individuals whose
contribution is above the average contribution from the other group mem-
bers - deviation classes 3 and 4 - are barely punished in P20. Third,
that "negative deviators", especially in the middle rounds, are more inten-
sively punished in P20 than they are in PIOOand P80: individuals whose
contribution falls short of the average seem, on average, to have more pun-
ishment points assigned to them in P20 treatment than in the certain and
P80 enforcement conditions.
We now perform an econometric analysis of treatment effects on pun-
ishment behaviour. We regress the amount of punishment assigned to a
player on lagged contribution treatment and structural parameters of the
219
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game. The general empirical model has the following form:
~,t - Po + PIC-i,t +P2POSDEV + fJ3N EGDEV +... (4.4)
+ (J4AJVGER + (J5P80 + (J6P20 + ... + z/o + ui,t
where P;,t represents the number of punishment points assigned to subject
i, C-i,t is the average contribution from other group members, POSDEV
and N EG DEV are the absolute values of the deviation of i's contribu-
tion from other group members' average. \Ve follow here (Fehr & Gachter,
2000), including them as separate regressors. One of those variables is zero
depending whether i's contribution is either above (or equal) or below the
others contribution. ANGER denotes all the punishment points assigned
i that have not been actually enforced over the previous periods. P80 and
P20 are dummy variables that are equal to 1 if i is in the P80 or P20
enforcement treatments and 0 otherwise. Due to the random assignment
of participants to treatment conditions, those dummies allow us to iso-
late the effect of enforcement conditions on subjects' willingness to punish.
z is a vector of other dummies and interaction terms between treatment
conditions and deviation from i's contribution from other group members'
average that try to capture different levels of intensity of punishment as-
signment in each treatment condition. \Ve include, for instance, a dummy
regressor for the last period to capture last period effects on punishment
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decisions. Ui,t is the compound error term. Parameter estimates of model
4.4 are presented in Table 4.6 column (I).
We also separate the data according to enforcement treatments and run
separate regressions for each sub-sample of subjects. This allows us to ex-
amine our conjecture (see Section 3) that, because punishment is likely to
be less frequent in P20 than in P8 and PlOD, subjects will assign punish-
ment differently across enforcement treatments. These results are reported
in Columns (2)-(4).
Beginning with the estimates of the general model in column (1), we no-
tice that enforcement conditions do have an effect on punishment decisions:
subjects in the uncertain enforcement conditions punish relatively less. We
have conjectured that this effect has to do with the impact of uncertainty
over punishment enforcement on the strategic value of punishment: players
would be less inclined to punish if enforcement failure threats their ability
to send a signal to free-riders on a consistent basis.
Looking across the treatments, there are other noticeable aspects influ-
encing punishment decisions. First, we see that an increase in the group
average contribution induces a reduction in punishment. This holds for
all but the P80 treatment. Second, that punishment is mostly directed
towards free-riders, those who contribute below the group average. These
two results illustrate the elements of reciprocity in individuals' behaviour.
Third, we find that "bygones are not bygones": the more punishment points
towards a player ended up not being enforced in the history of the game -
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what we term "accumulated anger" -, the more punishment from others is
directed to her. This can arguably indicate that punishment decisions are
driven by emotions and not only by intertemporal concerns with material
payoff.
All in all, these results seem to support the view that punishment is
driven by a mix of backward- and forward-looking motives. The uncertainty
over whether the willingness to punish one will be materialised over the
course of the game seems, on the one hand, to weaken the strategic value
of punishment in shaping future behaviour; on the other hand, because of
the history of free-riding that goes unpunished, it also creates frustration
and increasing "anger" towards those who have gotten "off the hook".
It should not come as surprise, therefore, that punishment in the first
and the last periods is statistically significantly different from punishment
over the other periods of the game in the P20 treatment. Since there is no
strategic incentive to punish relatively more at the end of the game, this
seems to suggest that individuals arc pursuing some revenge for something
they deemed as unfair during the game. Indeed, the last round of the game
is the only round in which i can punish other group members without any
danger of repercussions.
Thus, the results from the regression results suggest that the existence
of uncertainty on whether punishment decisions will be carried out has
statistically significant effect on punishment levels. The following result
summarizes the findings of this section.
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Result 2: The willingness to punish free-riders is affected by the "uncer-
tainty" over whether punishment will be actually enforced. In both uncertain
treatments, individuals tend to punish less. There is a backward-looking el-
ement in punishment decisions as the more an individual has escaped being
punished in the past, the more punishment is directed to her.
4.4.3 'Velfare Analysis
In addition to looking for differences in punishment behaviour across
treatments, we now investigate how "uncertain" enforcement affects individ-
uals' welfare. The key difficulty in addressing this issue is that aspects that
are likely to affect individuals' utility in this experiment are not directly
measured. For instance, there must be gains in utility from punishing a
free-rider as much as there are losses in utility from not being able to pun-
ish a free-rider because of an enforcement failure. \Ve sidestep this problem
for a while, and following Nikiforakis (2008), we use individual earnings as
a proxy measure for welfare. Using the certain enforcement treatment as a
benchmark, we begin by examining whether earnings are increased in the
"uncertain" enforcement conditions.
Table 4.5 provides an overview of how earnings look like in each en-
forcemeat condition. \Vhile average contributions are slightly lower in P80
than they are in PlOD, subjects in P80 have higher earnings on average
than subjects in PlOD. \Ve have seen that contribution levels are similar
between PlOD and P80 treatments, despite the fact that in P80 punish-
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ment decisions might not be enforced with a probability of 20%. While
such a possibility weakens the threat of punishment, the degree of enforce-
ment was sufficient to lead to an increase in contributions over time. Since
punishment assignment is costless in P80 if punishment is not enforced, it
should make intuitive sense then that subjects in P80 could benefit from
higher contributions without necessarily incurring punishment costs in ev-
ery period. As a result subjects in PlOD have lower earnings than subjects
in P80.
Table 4.5: Earnings by enforcement treatment
Treatment Average contribution Average Punishment-associated costs! Average
earnings ings
after contri-
bution
PlOD 13.20 27.92 5.98 22.75
P80 12.67 27.60 3.11 24.54
P20 6.82 24.09 1.63 22.46
1 Average costs of punishment points given out (and enforced) to other group members and average
deductions in first-stage payoff as a consequence of punishment received.
Let us now look at what happens in P20. Compared to conditions where
the sanction system in place has stronger enforcement, earnings in P20 are
lower. As discussed before, for most groups in P20 punishment enforcement
occurred in few occasions irregularly spaced over the ten-period sequence.
This created a "disbelief' in the enforcement system, encouraging more free-
riding behaviour and, consequently, leading to a decline in contributions
over time. Yet, note that average earning differences between P20 and PIOO
are not great; this highlights, as showed by others (e.g. Fehr & Gachter
(2002); Sefton et al. (2007)), that in public goods experiments with certain
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enforcement, the benefit of higher contributions may be outweighed by
punishment costs.
We now turn to a formal assessment of the relation between individual
earnings and enforcement conditions. Table?? reports regressions which
examine treatment effects on individual earnings. Estimated results are
reported in columns (1) and (2).
The first regression results show that. none of the enforcement treat-
ments have a significant effect on period earning . This is in line with th
general impression that average earnings do not show much variation across
treatments (see Figure 4.3).
Figure 4.3: Average earnings
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half of the experiment as a result of the decay in contributions, while in
PlOD and P80 individuals are benefiting from higher contributions relative
to the first half. The second regression adds interaction terms between pe-
riod and enforcement treatments, Period x P80 an Period x P20. These
variables try to capture time trends in P80 and P20 with respect to that
in PlOD. The coefficient for the interaction term Period x P20 is nega-
tive and significant. This just confirms what. we have seen before: that
there is a continuous decrease in average period earnings over time in P20
as a consequence of decline in contributions, whereas earnings are kept at
higher levels in PlOD. Note, however, that earnings in P80 are higher with
respect to that in PlOD. This is the result of a more significant increase
in contributions and that in some period individuals in P80 need not incur
any punishment cost.IS Result 4 summarizes.
Result 4: The highest welfare level, measured by accumulated earnings, is
found in P80. While punishment enforcement is not certain in P80 like it
is in P1~O, individuals in P80 condition benefit from higher contributions
without incurring punishment costs in every period.
15Not only less punishment points were assigned in P80 (326 in total) with respect
to those in PlOD (422), but as punishment failed to be enforced sometimes in PSO, 77
out of 326 punishment points did not result in any cost.
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4.5 Conclusions
Using a public goods experiment, we investigate whether cooperation
prospects in a social dilemma situation can be affected when sanction op-
portunities are present but their enforcement is not certain. By not certain
we mean that enforcement in each period of the game happens with a known
probability p. The game is played under three treatment conditions, which
differ only by the value of p (1, 0.8, or 0.2).
One of the findings is that punishment opportunities do not promote
cooperative behaviour when enforcement is perceived as "weak" (treatment
in which p = 0.2). In this case, average contributions start at around
half of subjects' endowment and keep declining over time. This contrasts
with the levels of cooperative behaviour observed in the treatment where
punishment enforcement is perceived as "strong" (case in which p = 0.8):
average contributions are raised and sustained at a high level. This result
is somewhat comforting as it suggests that a sanctioning system with some
degree of "imperfectness" can still induce cooperative behaviour in social
dilemma situations. It also indicates that the deterrence effect of a sanc-
tioning system operates through the perception it induces regarding either
detection or enforcement likelihood. This result is in line, for example, with
the evidence that income tax compliance increases when taxpayers are sim-
ply threatened to have their income reports "more closely examined" (see
Slemrod et al. , 2001). Tax compliance, which is a form of cooperative
behaviour, is promoted not by a threat of more severe punishment, but by
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a change in the likelihood of being detected.
Another finding is that punishment of free-riders and low contributors
in general is more intense at the beginning and the end of the game. While
this could be rationalized as a compromise between strategic (reputation
I
building) and emotional (vindictiveness) components of individual's deci-
sion making, it is still unclear how to interpret these phenomena within
a rational framework. Such end-of game effects, in particular, may have
implications for the theoretical study of iterated prisoner's dilemma type
of games as they hint at the existence of path-dependencies in the play of
the game.
It is also observed that individuals in P80 condition benefit from higher
contributions without incurring punishment costs in every period and, as a
result, accumulated earnings in P8D are higher than in PlOD. Having said
that, the P8D and P2D enforcement treatments have no significant effect
on average earnings. This serves as an indication that, while failing to
lead to high contributions, a punishment mechanism with "weak" enforce-
ment might lead to similar earnings to the treatment where enforcement is
certain.
The major finding of our experiment - that, put loosely, subject's per-
ception of the likelihood of punishment enforcement matters - raises some
interesting questions: in a repeated setting, can a strong threat of pun-
ishment deter individuals from deviating from a collective optimal course
of action without it being ever 'demonstrated"? Can a history of "pun-
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ishment" itself sustain cooperation in social dilemmas without a strongly
credible threat of "punishment"? Can a threat of "punishment" efficiently
induce and sustain high levels of cooperation in social dilemmas without a
periodic demonstration of "punishment"? In sum, which "mixes" of threat
and punishment history can induce cooperation?
It is worth noting that from a theoretic standpoint a threat should suf-
fice. In the theory of infinitely repeated games, it is a classic result that it is
possible to achieve a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which players achieve
the highest payoff of all existing equilibria (Friedman, 1971). The core idea
underlying this result is that a given player is persuaded to follow such
perfect equilibrium strategy by threatening her with the strongest cred-
ible punishment. Punishment may not necessarily be history-dependent
(Abreu, 1988). But while the perfect equilibrium strategy profile specifies
punishment for deviations, the outcome path ends up not involving any im-
position of punishment - the simple threat of punishment has a deterrence
effect. Some may view results from Fehr & Gachtcr (2000) and many other
studies as lending support to this: looking at first-period data, when there
is no history of play, one can see that contributions are significantly higher
in punishment treatments relative to no-punishment treatments. While in
an experimental setting there is some degree of uncertainty over the size
of punishment in terms of payoff, the simple threat of punishment often
encourages pro-social behaviour.
But our experiment raises some questions. Its results suggest that the
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incentive constraints implicit in such punishment schemes may not rely
only on credibility, but also on what we term here "punishment demonstra-
tion" - that punishment must be exercised upon subjects. We have found
that an "imperfect" sanction system (in terms of enforcement) can achieve
higher levels of pro-social behaviour by simply changing, through proba-
bility manipulation, subject's perception about the likelihood of sanction
enforcement. It is unknown though to what. extent the efficacy of punish-
ment in inducing cooperative behaviour depends on perceived credibility of
punishment threat (probability) and the factual history of the game. We
view this as of theoretical and empirical relevance. Our experiment, like all
other experimental studies on cooperation with sanction systems, threat
and "punishment demonstration" arc entangled. \Ve intend to investigate
the influence of these factors in further research.
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ApPENDICES
4.6 Appendices
4.6.1 Appendix A - Proofs
Proof. of Proposition 1: Part 1.1. If q = 0, then only the first-stage is
payoff-wise relevant. In this stage, the strategy Cot = e is strictly dominated
by c, = 0, since 1T'i,C(Ci = 0, c_i = 0) > 1T'i,C(Ci = e, c.si = 0) for both
players. The game has then a unique Nash equilibrium in which both
players defect: (Cl = 0, C2 = 0), given their payoff outcomes, is the pair of
strategies that maximises the utility of the self-regarding player, Ut (.), and
the utility of the inequity-averse player, U2(')' for all Q > O. •
Proof. of Proposition 1: Part 1.2.
If q > 0, then actions in the punishment stage may have payoff conse-
quences for both players. For the self-regarding player, imposing no punish-
ment, i.e. PI = 0, is a dominant strategy as p, = 0 = argmaxuI(1T'i,C(Ci, c_i)+
1T'i,P(Pb P2) for all cooperative and punishment strategies of the inequity-
averse player. Since this is common knowledge, it is easy to see that the
inequity averse player will choose no punishment, i.e. P2 = 0, at the second-
stage of the game. Now, the inequity-averse player will also choose no pun-
ishment, PI = 0, when the profile of actions chosen in the first stage are
{Cl = e,C2 = e}, {Cl = 0,C2 = O}, {Cl = e,C2 = O}; in all these cases,
the inequity-averse player cannot be better off by choosing to punish, i.e.
P2 = p. For instance, choosing P2 = P following {Ct = e, C2 = e} is domi-
nated by P2 = 0 since r2e > r2e - (p + {3(p + Lp)) for all {3 > O. But the
inequity averse player will punish following the first-stage pair of strategies
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{c} = 0, C2 = e} if the final payoff when she assigns punishment to the
self-regarding player is larger than the final payoff of not doing so, that is,
if 1f} (C2 = e, P2 = p) > 7r} (C2 = e, P2 = 0). This amounts to the following
condition
(re-p)-amax{(e(1+r)-lp)-(re-p),0} > re-amax{(e(l+r))-(re), O}
which holds only if a > 12}. Note that in this case the threat of punishment
can only induce the self-regarding type to cooperate, and she will have no
incentive to deviate from that, if the final payoff from cooperating is larger
than the expected final payoff from free riding in the first stage and getting
punished in the second stage
r(2e) > (1 - q)[e(1 + r)] + q[e(l + r) - Lp]
which holds only if q > q* = e(~;r). This completes the proof. •
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4.6.2 Appendix B - Instructions
INSTRUCTIONS
CONDITION: CERTAIN PUNISHMENT ENFORCEMENT
\VELCOME
Thank you for participating in this study. Your earnings in this study
will be paid to you in cash at the end of the session. The instructions are
simple. If you follow them carefully, you may, depending on your decisions,
earn a considerable amount of money.
IMPORTANT NOTE
Please do not communicate in any way with other participants during
this experiment. Please remember to switch off your mobile. If you have a
question or problem at any point in today's session, please raise your hand
and Iwill COIIle to you.
THE EXPERIMENT
During this experiment Rubis will take the place of traditional monetary
units. At the end of the experiment the total amount of Rubis you have
earned will be converted into Pounds at the following rate:
1 Rubi = 2.5 Pence
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Each participant receives a lump sum payment of 20 Rubis at the be-
ginning of the experiment. This one-time payment can be used to pay
for eventual losses during the experiment. However, you can always avoid
losses with certainty through your own decisions. At the end of the experi-
ment, your entire earnings from the experiment plus the lump sum payment
will be converted to Pounds and immediately paid to you in cash.
This experiment is divided into 10 periods. In each period, partici-
pants will be divided into groups of four. You will therefore be in a group
with three other participants. During these 10 periods the group com-
position is constant. You are, therefore, grouped with the same people
throughout the experiment. Your earnings will depend on the decisions
that you and the other members of your group make. You will never learn
whom you have been grouped with.
Each period consists of two stages. In the first stage, your task is
to decide how many Rubis you want to invest in each of two investment
accounts. One account is a Private Account, which only you benefit from.
The second account is a Public Account, the benefits of which are shared
equally by all members of your group. In the second stage you will be shown
the amount invested in the Public Account by the three other members
of your group. Your task is to decide whether you want to reduce their
earnings from the first stage by distributing "deduction points" to them.
In what follows, these stages are described in more detail.
The First Stage
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At the beginning of each period, each participant receives 20 Rubis.
Your ask is to decide how many of your 20 Rubis you want to invest
in each of the two accounts mentioned above. To make your investment
decision you will type the amount of Rubis, a number between 0 and 20,
you want to invest in the Public Account in the input field on the following
input- er n:
Figur - 4.4: 1st stage - Investment decision
t«l# - - - -- - ,-- _. -. - ----,-. --- ._., .-----
Those Rubi that you do not invest in the Public Account are automat-
ically invested in th Private Account. Once you have made your decision,
you mu t lick on th red OK" button to submit it, after which your deci-
sion annot b changed. What you earn from your investment in the Public
Ac ount will depend on th total number of Rubis that you and the other
thr m mb r f our group invest in the Public Account.
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Your earnings in the first stage of a period consist of two parts, A and
B:
A = Your return from your Private Account.
Your Private Account returns 1 Rubi for each Rubi invested.
That is, for each Rubi invested in the Private Account you get 1
Rubi.
B = Your return from the Public Account.
To calculate this, we sum up all investments made in the Public
Account in your group, multiply the sum by 1.6 and divide the
result equally between the four members of your group.
Your investment in the Public Account also raises the earnings of the
other group members. On the other hand, you earn Rubis for each Rubi
invested by the other members in the Public Account. For each Rubi in-
vested by any member you earn l.~Xl = 0.4 Rubis. The income of each
group member from the Public Account is calculated the same way. Ev-
eryone gets 0.4 Rubis from each Rubi invested in the Public Account by
any group member. Therefore, you and the other group members receive
the same amount from the total investment in the Public Account. The
process is best explained by a number of examples.
Example: Suppose that you invest 0 Rubis in the Public Account but
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that the three other members of your group invest a total of 50 Rubis.
Then your return from the Public Account would be 1.6;50 = 20. Everyone
else in your group would also earn 20 Rubis from the Public Account. Your
total earnings in the first stage would be 40 Rubis (20 Rubis you kept in
your Private Account + 20 Rubis from the Public Account).
Example: Suppose that you invest all your 20 Rubis in the Public
Account but that the other three members invest nothing. Then your
return from the Public Account would be 1.6;20 = 8 Rubis. Everyone else
in the group would also earn 8 Rubis from the Public Account. Your total
earnings in the first stage would be 8 Rubis (0 Rubis you kept in your
Private Account + 8 Rubis from the Public Account).
Example: Suppose that you invest 15 Rubis in the Public Account
and that the three other members of your group invest a total of 50 Rubis.
Then your return from the Public Account would be 1.6;65 = 26 Rubis.
Everyone else in your group would also earn 26 Rubis from the Public
Account. Your total earnings in the first stage would be 31 Rubis (5 Rubis
you kept in your Private Account + 26 Rubis from the Public Account).
Once you have confirmed your contribution, your decision can no longer
he altered. The first. stage is over only when all groups have made their
decisions. After that, the second stage commences.
The Second Stage
In the second stage you will see how much each of the other group
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members invested in the Public Account and they will see your decision.
At this stage you will have the opportunity to reduce the income of each
group member by distributing "deduction points". The other group
members can also reduce your income if they wish. How your earnings in
the period are affected by decisions you and the other group members make
in the second stage are described below.
If you assign deduction points to another group member, the earnings of
this group member will be reduced by three times the amount of assigned
deduction points. This means that if you assign one deduction point to
another group member, her first-stage earnings will be reduced by 3 Rubis.
If you assign 2 deduction points to a group member, her earnings will be
reduced by 6 Rubis. If you assign 9 deduction points her earnings will
be reduced by 27 Rubis, and so on. If you decide to assign 0 deduction
points to a particular group member her earnings will not be changed by
you. You can assign a maximum amount of 10 deduction points
to each other member.
If you assign deduction points, you will also have costs. For each as-
signed deduction point, you will have costs of one Rubi. For example, if
you assign 5 deduction points, you will have costs of 5 Rubis; if you assign
10 deduction points, you will have costs of 10 Rubis, and so on. If you
assign 0 deduction points, you will have no costs from assigning deduction
points. After all participants have made their decisions in the second stage,
your final earnings for the period will be calculated as follows:
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Total earnings at the end of the Period =
(Earnings from the 1st stage - 3 x (deduction points received from
other group members) - (cost of deduction points you assigned
to other group members)
Please note there is an exception to this: if the tripled amount of deduc-
tion points you have received exceeds the earnings from the first stage, the
earnings after the second stage will be zero minus the costs of the deduc-
tion points you assigned to other group members. That is, no matter how
many deduction points you have received, you cannot loose more than your
first-stage earnings as a result of the deduction points assigned by other
people. But independent of deduction points received, you always have to
bear the full costs of deduction points you assign to other members. This
means that your earnings at the end of the second stage can be negative.
However, you can always avoid such losses with certainty by the decisions
you make.
How do you make your decisions at the 2nd stage?
In the 2nd stage your task is to decide how many deduction points to
assign to each of the other three group members. You enter your decision
into a input screen like the one in Figure 2.
In the first row you see the amount endowed by each member of your
group. In the second row you see how much of that endowment was invested
in the Public Account. Your investment is displayed in the first column,
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under the heading You", while the amounts invested in this period by the
oth r group member are shown in the remaining three columns. Note that
h olumn i alway headed by the group member ID number (1,2,3 or
4) which m ans that the column position of each member on this screen
is kept constant throughout the game.
Figure 4.5: 2nd stage - Assignment of "Deduction points"
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In the h last row 'Your deduction points", you have to make your
d ci ion for th cond stage. You must now decide how many deduction
p in ou woul lik 0 ign to a h of the other group members. You
mu t P in th r p ctiv box a numb r b tw en 0 and 10. You have to
m k an ntr int h b x. If you do no wi h to change the income of
a P .ific group 111 mb r t.h n ou nter O.
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PAGE MISSING IN
ORIGINAL
INSTRUCTIONS
CONDITION: UNCERTAIN PU:\ISHMENT ENFORCEMENT
\VELCOME
Thank you for participating in this study. Your earnings in this study
will be paid to you in cash at the end of the session. The instructions are
simple. If you follow them carefully, you may, depending on your decisions,
earn a considerable amount of money.
IMPORTANT NOTE
Please do not communicate in any way with other participants during
this experhnent. Please remember to swit.ch off your mobile. If you have a
question or problem at any point in today's session, please raise your hand
and I will come to you.
TilE EXPEHIMENT
During this experiment Rubis will take the place of traditional monetary
units. At the end of the experiment the total amount of Rubis you have
earned will he converted into Pounds at the following rate:
1 Rubi = 2.5 Pence
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Each participant receives a lump sum payment of 20 Rubis at the be-
ginning of the experiment. This one-time payment can be used to pay
for eventual losses during the experiment. However, you can always avoid
losses with certainty through your own decisions. At the end of the experi-
ment, your entire earnings from the experiment plus the lump sum payment
will be converted to Pounds and immediately paid to you in cash.
This experiment is divided into 10 periods. In each period, partici-
pants will be divided into groups of four. You will therefore be in a group
with three other participants. During these 10 periods the group com-
position is constant. You are, therefore, grouped with the same people
throughout the experiment. Your earnings will depend on the decisions
that you and the other members of your group make. You will never learn
whom you have been grouped with.
Each period consists of two stages. In the first stage, your task is
to decide how many Rubis you want to invest in each of two investment
accounts. One account is a Private Account, which only you benefit from.
The second account is a Public Account, the benefits of which are shared
equally by all members of your group. In the second stage you will be shown
the amount invested in the Public Account by the three other members
of your group. Your task is to decide whether you want to reduce their
earnings from the first stage by distributing "deduction points" to them.
However, everybody's "deduction points" are only carried out
with a probability of 80%(20%). Therefore, there is a chance
247
that everybody's first-stage earnings will not be reduced even if
deduction points" were assigned to them.
In wh t follows these stages are described in more detail.
The First Stage
A th b ginning of each period each participant receives 20 Rubis.
Y; ur ta k i 0 d id how many of your 20 Rubis you want to invest
in h of h two accounts mentioned above. To make your investment
ou will type the amount of Rubis, a number between 0 and 20,
uno inv t in the Public Account in the input field on the following
n:
Figur .7: 1 t tage - Investment decision
~- - -.:::~---- - -- ------- -----~=~:-~.-
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h Ru 1 h t u on t inv t in th Publi A count are automat-
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u II r d K" bu n t ubmi it aft r whi h your deci-
i n nn h n . v h u rn fr In . ur in tm n in th Public
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Account will depend on the total number of Rubis that you and the other
three members of your group invest in the Public Account.
Your earnings in the first stage of a period consist of two parts, A and
B:
A = Your return frorn your Private Account.
Your Private Account returns 1 Rubi for each Rubi invested.
That is, for each Rubi invested in the Private Account you get 1
Rubi.
B = Your return from the Public Account.
To calculate this, we sum up all investments made in the Public
Account in your group, multiply the sum by 1.6 and divide the
result equally between the four members of your group.
Your investment in the Public Account also raises the earnings of the
other group members. On the other hand, you earn Rubis for each Rubi
invested by the other members in the Public Account. For each Rubi in-
vested by any member you earn l.~Xl = 0.4 Rubis. The income of each
group member from the Public Account is calculated the same way. Ev-
eryone gets 0.4 Rubis from each Rubi invested in the Public Account by
any group member. Therefore, you and the other group members receive
the same amount from the total investment in the Public Account. The
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process is best explained by a number of examples.
Example: Suppose that you invest 0 Rubis in the Public Account but
that the three other members of your group invest a total of 50 Rubis.
Then your return from the Public Account would be 1.6;50 = 20. Everyone
else in your group would also earn 20 Rubis fro III the Public Account. Your
total earnings in the first stage would be 40 Rubis (20 Rubis you kept in
your Private Account + 20 Rubis from the Public Account).
Example: Suppose that. you invest all your 20 Rubis in the Public
Account but that the other three members invest nothing. Then your
return from the Public Account would be 1.6;20 = 8 Rubis. Everyone else
in the group would also earn 8 Rubis from the Public Account. Your total
earnings in the first stage would be 8 Rubis (0 Rubis you kept in your
Private Account + 8 Rubis from the Public Account).
Example: Suppose that you invest 15 Rubis in the Public Account
and that the three other members of your group invest a total of 50 Rubis.
Then your return from the Public Account would be 1.6;65 = 26 Rubis.
Everyone else in your group would also earn 26 Rubis from the Public
Account. Your total earnings in the first stage would be 31 Rubis (5 Rubis
you kept ill your Private Account + 26 Rubis from t he Public Account).
Once you have confirmed your contribution, your decision can no longer
be altered. The first stage is over only when all groups have made their
decisions. After that, the second stage commences.
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The Second Stage
In the second stage you will see how much each of the other group mem-
bers invested in the Public Account and they will see your decision. At this
stage you will have the opportunity to reduce or leave equal the first-stage
income of each group member by distributing "deduction points". The
other group members can also reduce your income if they wish. However,
it is not certain whether your decision and the decision from other group
members of reducing someone's first-stage income will be actually carried
out. This will be determined by chance. How your earnings in the period
are affected by decisions you and the other group members make in the
second stage are described below.
If you assign deduction points to another group member, the earnings of
this group member may be reduced by three times the amount of assigned
deduction points. This means that if you assign one deduction point to
another group member, her first-stage earnings may be reduced by 3 Rubis.
If you assign 2 deduction points to a group member, her earnings will be
reduced by 6 Rubis. If you assign 9 deduction points her earnings may
be reduced by 27 Rubis, and so on. If you decide to assign 0 deduction
points to a particular group member her earnings will not he changed hy
you. You can assign a maximum amount of 10 deduction points
to each other member.
If you assign deduction points, you may also have costs. For each as-
signed deduction point, you may have costs of one Rubi. For example, if
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you assign 5 deduction points, you may have costs of 5 Rubis; if you assign
10 deduction points, you may have costs of 10 Rubis, and so on. If you
assign 0 deduction points, you will have no costs from assigning deduction
points. In each period, the deduction points decisions will be car-
ried out with a probability of 80%(20%). This probability is the
same for all 10 periods of this experiment.
After all participants have Blade their deduction points decisions in the
second stage, we decide whether the deduction points assigned are actually
implemented. 'Ve decide this at a group level as follows: for each group,
we will draw a ball from a bingo cage. The bingo cage has balls numbered
from 1 to 10.
If the ball for your group is numbered 9 or 10 (1 to 8), then
the deduction points you and the other members of your group
have assigned ARE NOT carried out. In this case, your earnings in
the period will be equal to your earnings in the first stage.
If the ball for your group is numbered from 1 to 8 (9 or 10),
then the deduction points you and other members of your group
have assigned ARE carried out.
In this case, your earnings in the period will be calculated as follows:
Total earnings at the end of the Period =
(Earnings from the 1st stage - 3 x (deduction points received from
other group members) - (cost of deduction points you assigned
to other group members)
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Please note there is an exception to this: if the tripled amount of deduc-
tion points you have received exceeds the earnings from the first stage, the
earnings after the second stage will be zero minus the costs of the deduc-
tion points you assigned to other group members. That is, no matter how
many deduction points you have received, you cannot loose more than your
first-stage earnings as a result of the deduction points assigned by other
people. But independent of deduction points received, you always have to
bear the full costs of deduction points you assign to other members. This
means that your earnings at the end of the second stage can be negative.
However, you can always avoid such losses with certainty by the decisions
you make.
How do you make your decisions at the 2nd stage?
In the 2nd stage your task is to decide how many deduction points to
assign to each of the other three group members. You enter your decision
into a input screen like the one in Figure 2.
In the first row you see the amount endowed by each member of your
group. In the second row you see how much of that endowment was invested
in the Public Account. Your investment is displayed in the first column,
under the heading "You", while the amounts invested in this period by the
other group members are shown in the remaining three columns. Note that
each column is always headed by the group member ID number (1,2,3 or
4), which means that the column position of each member on this screen
is kept constant throughout the game.
253
In b th 1 t row Your deduction points", you have to make your
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Chapter 5
Chapter 5
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we bring together the main results presented within pre-
vious chapters, discuss sorne limitations of our analysis and briefly discuss
some extensions and follow-up questions for future research.
5.1 Main Findings
Chapter 2 presents evidence that endowing subjects with a relatively
small sum of money prior to eliciting risk preferences does not affect their
"baseline" attitudes to risk. This seems to be in stark contrast with findings
from other studies reporting that subjects' willingness to accept a given
actuarially fair gamble is increased when subjects had a prior gain 1 - the
so-called "house money effect"2 A natural question is why such an effect
failed to be replicated in our experiment?
While a definite answer requires further experiments, there are reasons
lThalcr &. Johnson (1900). For evidence of such effect in dynamic setting see e.g.
Ackert et al. (2006).
2Harrison (2007) reports evidence of a house money effect in public goods games.
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to believe that the source of the money - or the framing of it - matters".
The sum of money given to subjects in between the risk elicitation stages
was administered in a way to induce them to think the money was a genuine
earning rather than a windfall gain granted by the experimenter", Indeed,
there is some evidence that people may treat money they are promised
differently from money they have earned. Cherry et al. (2002), for in-
stance, show that when subjects in a dictator game made allocation deci-
sion over earned wealth, self-interested game theoretic behaviour was the
norm. \Vhile it is an open question whether our treatment administration
manages to legitimise the money given to subjects with effort, this result
does raise the question of whether effects of changes in monetary income
on risk preferences - or any other type of preference - are sensitive to the
origin of the money. This may have serious implications for the reliability
of results from laboratory experiments in which subjects are endowed with
(any form of) money 5. But not only this. It would also tell against the
standard practice in economic theory of aggregating income from different
sources.
Chapter 2 also showed that individuals may be willing to take more
risks when they become "wealthier" - despite the increment to wealth be-
3Tangibility of the money may also be important. But this is an aspect "held con-
stant" between our experiment and other experiments on house-money effects. In fact,
it is common practice that earnings throughout a laboratory experiment be only handed
over at the the end of it.
4The money was framed as a reward for completing the test. Subjects may have
treated this as "earnings" even though the reward was not related to test performance.
5This would include, for example, studies on myopic loss aversion in investment
decisions {e.g. Gneezy & Potters (1997), Haigh & List (2005) and Fellner & Sutter
(2009). Yet if the origin of endowments is to playa role, this is more likely to happen,
if at all, in experiments examining game situations.
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ing small, But whether this is true, the evidence suggests, depends on the
vehicle used to introduce the wealth increment. \Ve measure subjects' at-
tit udes towards a given risky prospect in two occasions: before and after
a given small-scale increment to wealth, say ~w, was given; no statisti-
cally significant differences in these risk measures, hence wealth effects,
are observed. However, subjects do change their risk attitudes when the
wealth increment is merged with all possible consequences of the prospect:
they exhibited more risk-lovingness in this situation. Because of the differ-
ent forms used to introduce an exogenous change in wealth, we term this
asymmetrical effect on risk attitudes the inside-outside framing effect.
Three observations about this effect are in order. First, that this aSYIIl-
metrical framing effect suggests that individuals judge risk by its direct
consequences not merging them with pre-existing outcomes - a violation
of the "asset integration" hypothesis demonstrated in some experiments by
Kahneman & Tversky (1979). Second, that while framing effects are no
novelty in the literature", it is the first time to our knowledge that such
behavioral asymmetry between the changes in risk attitudes induced by
the "inside" money and changes induced by the "outside" money has been
documented. It is worth noting that this result is not only in contrast to
studies reporting "house-money" effects of money granted by the experi-
ment on risk attitudes, but also with studies reporting an increase in risk
aversion when lottery stakes are scaled-up (e.g. Holt & Laury, 2002). Third,
tiSee e.g. Kahnernan &. Tversky (1979), Andreoni (1995b), Cookson (2000) and
Giichter et al. (2009b).
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that this result has implications for calibration critiques of decision theories
(see Rabin, 2000; Cox & Sadira], 2006). As shown by \Vakker (2005), these
critiques rely on an empirical assumption, namely, that attitudes to risk
hold constant for a wide range of levels of wealth. Our result challenges
this assumption. Although the existence of a wealth effect reported here
relies on a "forced" integration of wealth increment to prizes of the lottery,
this effect is not consistent with a utility function that exhibits constant
absolute risk aversion.
We now turn to the main findings of Chapter 3. The primary result
of this chapter is that individuals with higher cognitive ability show more
choice consistency in a series of risk-elicitation tasks than individuals with
lower cognitive ability. There is no relationship, however, between cognitive
ability and "framing consistency", that is, violations of descriptive invari-
ance. Such violations occur as a result of asymmetrical effects of different
forms used to induce a small-scale wealth increment on attitudes to risk.
Also, we find no association between performance in the cognitive test and
individual differences in risk preferences.
The account we offer for each of these results hints at an important ques-
tion, namely, when is an association between cognitive ability (CA) and
task performance likely to arise? Regarding the association found between
CA and choice consistency we advance that, given the repetitive structure
of the design, this is either (a) due to differences in subjects' ability to
retrieve information about their choices as they proceed through the ex-
260
periment (correlated with cognitive ability), or simply (b) a consequence of
an underlying lack of serious deliberation and engagement with tasks of the
experiment. Framing inconsistency, in turn, would be a manifestation of a
"narrow framing", whereby the increment received tends not to be mentally
merged with lottery consequences prior to reaching a decision. The reasons
why framing inconsistencies and risk preferences in our experiment are not
associated with cognitive ability seem, in our view, closely related: individ-
uals do not see framing consistency in our context and particular types of
risk attitudes as normatively appropriate responses. In line with Kahneman
(2003) and Stanovich &. West (2008), we argue that it is irrelevant whether
subjects differ in their cognitive resources if there are no situational cues
suggesting that certain patterns of responses arc more normatively-correct
than others. Thus, if in performing a given experimental task individuals
do not detect the existence of some sort of "correct answer", a relationship
between cognitive ability and task responses is unlikely to be observed even
if the ability to override a naturally primed response and replace it with
an analytic response is related to cognitive ability.
Finally, Chapter 4 has two major results. First, that the threat of pun-
ishment cannot raise and sustain high levels of contributions when pun-
ishment enforcement is perceived by the individuals as a low-probability
event. The experimental results show that a relatively low degree of uncer-
tainty over enforcement does not impair punishment to serve as an effective
deterrent device whereas a high degree of uncertainty does. This result fur-
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thers our understanding about under which circumstances a monetary sanc-
tion system can help to promote cooperation in social-dilemma situations.
Second, that punishment behaviour is driven by forward- and backward-
looking considerations. You find, for instance, that relatively more pun-
ishment was directed towards individuals who were "lucky" enough to not
have punishment assigned to them actually enforced. This suggests that
"bygones are not bygones" and that punishment decisions were driven by
the "anger" being accumulated towards players with a history of free-riding
behaviour that went unpunished in the past. This result points out the
presence of inertial elements in the play of repeated games.
5.2 Limitations
There are SOUle limitations to our analysis. First, in our measures of
attitudes to risk. \Vhile the method we usc (multiplc-pricc-list) is trans-
parent and incentive-compatible, it may be sensitive to the format of the
multiple price list table", Second, in the single set of wealth increment ad-
ministered. \Ye observe how risk behaviour responds to a given variation of
wealth. There are, of course, other possible ranges of variation. Third, the
cognitive test data has a relatively small number of observations. \Vhile
one should not expect a uniform distribution of scores across the entire
performance scale, there is a relatively small number of observations in
the tails of our distribution. Another caveat concerning, in particular, the
7See Andersen et al. (2006c).
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lack of association between cognitive ability and risk preferences relates
to the restriction of range in our sample. Individuals with above aver-
age cognitive ability are likely to be overrepresented in our sample, which
restricts the generality of our results. Fourth, there might be sequence ef-
fects in cooperation data that are not fully controlled for. While a "natural"
randomisation (as opposed to a pre-selected one) at a group level of the
enforcement st at us during the public good game in each session of P80 and
P20 treatments creates variation, it produces a sample of enforcement se-
quences with a potentially unbalanced representativeness. Note, however,
that this problem is worsened if we were to use pre-designed enforcement
sequences in the sessions with uncertain enforcement condition.
5.3 Extensions
I now outline some extensions or closely-related questions for future
research.
\\'e have made the case that results in Chapter 2 suggest that subjects
may treat money earned differently from money granted by the experi-
menter. A natural follow-up line of investigation is then to examine if the
replication of the "house-money" effect in a simpler setting is susceptible
to whether the money gained by subjects before facing up a given risk is
legitimised with effort. Part of this line of enquiry could also investigate
whether other departures from game-theoretic predictions, e.g. in public
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goods games, are diminished when subjects' endowment is earned. Thus,
the idea is to legitimise with effort the endowment used in the allocation
decisions. If it is a repeated setting, there are different ways to examine
this issue. A possible mechanism to change the origins of the endowments
and make them subjects' "own" earnings in this case is to make the earn-
ings at the end of the first period the "endowment" of the subsequent ones.
In fact, many social dilemma situations that we face repeatedly are likely
to be intertemporally linked, for the outcomes of our decisions at one mo-
ment are likely to affect the subsequent decisions we make. Yet, some of
the intertemporal structure of these decisions tend to be abstracted away
in most public good experiments since endowrnents are "topped-up" at the
outset of every period. A public good experiment in which subjects use
their own earnings as an endowment surely involves a more complex design
with linkages between periods. But it seems hard to avoid these complex-
ities if one is to examine the role of intertemporal incentives in subjects'
decisions.
In Chapter 3 we find that cognitive ability relates to some aspects of
individual decision-making - for instance, individuals with relatively low
cognitive ability have relatively noisier choices relative to individuals with
high cognitive ability. This is somewhat surprising given that samples of
university students are rather homogeneous in respect to this demographic
characteristic. But our result reinforces the general message being sent
off here and other similar studies: that is worth investigating whether dif-
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ferences in cognitive ability are associated with other types of economic
behaviour. Another potentially interesting extension to Chapter 3 is to
examine how cognitive ability is associated with ambiguity aversion. This
relates to studies in which probabilities associated with outcomes are either
not explicitly given or are only partially known - a situation that reflects
many economic problems of interest.
Finally, in Chapter 4 we examine how patterns of cooperation and pun-
ishrnent behaviour respond to an introduction of a source of risk over pun-
ishment enforcement. A natural extension to it is to examine how imperfect
observability affects cooperative behaviour. In this case, the uncertainty is
placed at a different point of the timeline of the game: before the punish-
ment stage takes place rather than after it. While with imperfect enforce-
ment the (measurable) uncertainty is resolved after punishment decisions
have been made, with imperfect observability the uncertainty is resolved
at the end of the contribution stage, which determines the very existence
of a punishment stage. This examines to some extent the sensitivity of
cooperative behaviour to the framing of uncertainty, for both types of "im-
perfections" are logically equivalent - as whether one is to be punished for
choosing a given contribution level is not affected by when this uncertainty
is resolved in the remaining of the game period.
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